Main strategic goals and tactical objectives of the Russian Federation in the war with Ukraine and results as of March 11, 2022

 Main strategic goals and tactical objectives of the Russian Federation in the war with Ukraine and results as of March 11, 2022

 

Nika Chitadze

Professor of the International Black Sea University

Director of the Center for International studies

President of the George C. Marshall Alumni Union, Georgia - International and Security Research Center 

What were (and are) the main strategic goals and tactical objectives of the Russian Federation in the war with Ukraine and what was it achieved by March 11:

Strategic goals:

1. The overthrow of the current government and its replacement by an openly Russian government (restoration of Yanukovych), which rejects Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and returns the country to the Kremlin orbit (program maximum). 2. Forcing the Zelensky administration to enter into a capitulation agreement with Russia, which includes the annexation of certain Ukrainian territories as well as the signing of neutrality (refusal to join military alliances) (program minimum). However, it is very likely that in the event of the capture of Kyiv, Putin would have completely collapsed and tried to change the government.

2. Implementation of the "Novoria" project, which will allow Putin to cut the land corridor with Crimea and control the highway connecting the Donbas region. Ultimately, the strategic goal for the Novorossiysk project is to eat meat, which means the annexation of the south-eastern and southern territories of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

Tactical tasks:

1. Demoralize the Ukrainian army, government, and people of Ukraine through blitzkrieg and rapid territorial acquisition.

2. Capture Kyiv and Kharkiv as quickly as possible, which would break the fighting attitude of the Ukrainians and end the war quickly.

3. "Restoration" within the administrative borders of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, without which the Novorossiysk project would be practically impossible.

4. Take the port city of Mariupol, which forms the highway connecting the Donbas region. Without the control of Mariupol, it is impossible to create a south-eastern arc (Donetsk, Luhansk, and Mariupol).

5. Occupation of Kherson, Melitopol, and Berdyansk, connecting the Russian Federation with the annexed Crimea by a land corridor.

6. Mykolaev control, which is the only land route from the east to the strategically important port city of Odessa. In turn, there is a short distance left from Odessa to the Moldovan border and specifically to Transnistria, where the Russian military contingent is also stationed.

7. In the South, the ultimate tactical task is to create the Odesa-Kherson-Mariupol triangle, which, if achieved, would deprive Ukraine of access to the Black and Azov Seas and turn it into a Landlock state.

8. Russia's tactical task in the northeast is to occupy the Chernihiv-Sumy-Kharkiv arc. These cities run along the Russian border, and the Kremlin would use them to control all of northeastern Ukraine.

9. In the direction of Kyiv its surroundings, small towns: Bucha, Irpin, Brovary, etc. Rapid submission would have made it easier for the Russian army to capture the capital with minimal losses.

10. Minimal human and technical loss. As much as the Kremlin suggested a quick end to the war, their human and technical losses should have been kept to a minimum.

What is the situation on the 13th day after the start of the war and how well did the Russians manage to achieve their strategic goals and tactical tasks?

1. A quick war did not come out.

2. The Ukrainian army turned out to be better prepared than the Russian military general staff had ever imagined.

3. The occupation of Kyiv and Kharkiv did not take place due to the persistent resistance of the Ukrainians, the low combat motivation of the Russian soldiers, and the logistical problems.

4. The Russians could not take the outskirts of Kyiv, and consequently, the siege of the capital did not take place.

5. Some areas of Chernihiv and Sumy are controlled by the Russians, however, these areas are quite far apart and do not form a single arc.

6. The Russians were unable to retake the territory they controlled in Donetsk and Luhansk within their administrative boundaries. He did not, in this direction, the Ukrainian army launched a counterattack and recaptured a small area.

7. even though the Kremlin has been mercilessly bombing Mariupol for a week, the city is still in the hands of the Ukrainians. Most likely, it will not last long, however, so far the situation is under the control of the Ukrainians.

8. The Russian army is still unable to occupy Mykolaiv, without which it is impossible to launch a ground attack on Odesa.

9. The Ukrainian government has not demoralized and is successfully continuing the war of liberation with the Russian Federation.

10. Despite a rather large advantage in the sky, the Russians still fail to gain full dominance over the Ukrainian sky.

11. The losses of the Russian army are enormous (12,000 troops, more than 100 fighter jets, helicopter gunships, hundreds of tanks, more than a thousand armored personnel carriers, two dozen air defense systems, etc.), which is a catastrophic loss for the Kremlin.

The only tangible result the Kremlin has is cutting the land corridor to Crimea and making some territorial acquisitions in the south, and that alone does not seem to satisfy Putin. In the end, to put it mildly, the war is not going as well as the Russian president had hoped.