Russia's
sovereign democracy: Ideology and Political Manipulation
Dariusz Antkiewicz
Vakhtang Maisaia
The concept of sovereign democracy is attributed to the Russian politician
Vladislav Surkov[1],
although in international politics it was noticeable earlier[2]. At the outset, however, one should read the
definition adopted by Surkov:
"Considerations of sovereign democracy in
Russia correspond to the provisions of the Constitution, according to which,
firstly, "the subject of sovereignty and the only source of power in the
Russian Federation is its multinational people," and secondly, "no
one may usurp power in the Russian Federation." Accordingly, sovereign
democracy can be defined as a way of political life of a society in which the
authorities, their organs and actions are elected, shaped and directed
exclusively by the Russian people in all their diversity and integrity, in
order to achieve the material well-being, freedom and justice of all citizens,
social and national groups that make up it." [3].
It shows a clear emphasis
on the multinational people of the Russian Federation as a subject and a power
that cannot come from usurpation. While the objective dimension should not be
controversial, the objective dimension, i.e. the type of power, may be a cause
for dispute. It will be based on the differences in the worldview of the
evaluators. Well, for a liberal, the proper power will be one that not only
takes into account the interests of minorities, [4]but
even favors them.
For the conservative, the public good will always be in the foreground,
whether in terms of the local community, the country or the religious
confession. This is a clear reference to
the idea of free societies, which today we would call sovereign democracies.
The cooperation of such collectives takes place on reasonable and
understandable principles, for which global uniformity is an invasive and
destructive factor.
Here we touch upon the sphere of cultural sovereignty, which, for example,
in Poland until the political changes in 1989 (even during the partitions of
1795-1918) was greater than it is today. There has been a situation in which we
meet not only with the relativization of the truth, but also of gender. The
latter, according to the current requirements of liberal democracy, depend on
the declaration (read I see) of the person concerned. It must be admitted that in this respect the
sovereignty of Russia in comparison with Poland is much greater, although even
there – especially in large urban agglomerations – similar tendencies are
noticeable.
In terms of
international politics, the concept of sovereign democracy translates into the
demonopolization of the global economy, which is contrary to the interests of
global monopolies. Surkov notes that in Russia there are no obstacles in
non-governmental organizations, claiming that in the era of integration and
interdependence, clinging to sovereignty is a manifestation of anachronism or
even stupidity. These circles most often
refer to the example of the European Union, not noticing fundamental
differences in the possibilities of functioning of both political entities
(Russia and the EU). Well, the assumption guiding the EU is to create a
multi-ethnic European nationality, which is to exist in an unspecified,
all-union sovereignty[5].
According to Surkov, sovereign
democracy is conditioned by the following characteristics – intellectual
leadership, a compact elite, a nationally oriented open economy and the ability
to defend itself. To maintain it, fidelity to four priorities is essential:
1. Civic solidarity as a force preventing social
and military struggles. This means not accepting the widespread poverty
resulting from non-payment of taxes or the unfair redistribution of wealth. The
defence budget should be adequate to the needs, not prestige or the arms race.
2. The creative class, as the guiding force of the nation, should be renewed as a result
of free competition forthe aliens and their political, but also economic, and
social associations. Cooperation of creative social groups (culture, science,
business and politics) within a national framework, as a positive alternative
to the self-proclaimed aristocracy using tax havens.
3. Culture as a sphere of value creation and
ideological influence. "Russia
should talk about what it is doing, not do what it is told." It should be not only an importer, but also an
exporter of civilization factors. "Russian
communes in the cultural struggle should be firmand clear, inherently free, essentially
just, interesting in form, convincing in tone. We need to strengthen our
position in Western philosophical and socio-political discourse. Thanks to the
support of art (especially film and literature), the charming charm of national
culture must be gradually restored.
4. Education and science as a source of competitiveness. Here, Surkov sees
advantages in the legacy of the USSR in areas such as energy, communication, or
defense. He sees Russia as a powerful energy power, which will be created not
as a result of overproduction in the raw
materials sector, but in competition for high technologies of communicationand
information flow, energy production and storage, or the production of
completely new types of fuel[6].
Mikhail Leontiev[7] also
has a clear position on this topic:
"Sovereign democracy is
based on the elite's belief that Russia, due to historical conditions and
current circumstances, cannot and should not cede sovereignty to other states
and international organizations. It could be quickly looted and divided. There
are countries that cede their sovereignty in exchange for some other
convenience, such as security guarantees. Poland is one such country. And that
doesn't mean she's wrong. Thanks to this, she gained such and no other benefits
and that's it.
The Russian elite, on the other hand, claims that
giving up sovereignty reduces Russia's security. Today, the ability to maintain
sovereignty is determined by a certain degree of political and economic power.
The U.S., the European Union as a whole, Russia, India, China can be sovereign. Smaller
countries tend to overwhelm that"[8].
Of course, critics of sovereign democracy will call it a managed democracy.
Leontiev responds to this accusation that the Russian political system is
essentially no different from Western democracies. However, it differs in the
form, which in the Russian variant allows for control, but only to the extent
necessary, regarding compensation for the shortcomings that have occurred. He also
points out that the image of liberal democracy largely depends on political
advertising. In Russia – in his opinion – people vote for Putin, choosing a
specific model of life, politics and, consequently, the future. In the US, on
the other hand, there are no significant differences in worldview among the
electorates of Democrats and Republicans.
In his opinion,
the elections in the United States are closer to a beauty contest than
politics. To prove this, he points out that the differences between "United
Russia" and the Communists are disproportionately greater than between the
American parties[9].
In terms of ideology, it is difficult not to refer to the opinion of the
leading, and certainly the most recognizable Russian ideologist – A. Dugin.[10]
He has no sympathy
(with
reciprocity) of the aforementioned V. Surkov, but in the issue we are
discussing, their opinions seem to coincide. Well, Dugin takes the position:
"From
the point of view of statehood, at the current historical stage, such a power
structure is optimal. The level of centralization and concentration of power in
the hands of the head of state is sufficient to maintain sovereignty, and this
is a lot. Of course, if you want, you can find significant shortcomings and
excesses in it, but all in all, approximately, and in the face of the need to
preserve sovereignty, they are all justified by the difficult situation in
which Russia finds itself[11]."
To justify his position, Dugin refers to the politically
opposed period of Boris Yeltsin's rule. At that time, the central authority was
a façade, and important decisions were often made outside the government. At
that time, there were strong supranational (globalist) structures in Russia,
playing a more important role than the state. This situation was conducive to Russia's
control by Western structures and the Russian elite loyal to them.
Anarchy reigned throughout the country, and criminal groups almost
completely controlled law enforcement and national security services. The oligarch lobby controlled the state
apparatus and corrupted the administration.
Although society had no influence on the political processes taking place
at that time, it was called democracy. The political directions were decided by
the West through oligarchs, while at the local level the real power was
exercised by criminal clans[12].
Currently, it can be said that during the
20 years of Putin's rule, the above model has been completely destroyed and
turned upside down. Now it can be said with a clear conscience that:
1. Russia pursues a policy independent of the
West. It is de jure enshrined in the new version of the Constitution and exists
de facto. It is based on sufficient force potential, constituting real, not
just formal, sovereignty.
2. Criminal clans are fully controlled by
law enforcement agencies, and oligarchs deprived of the power to direct the
administration have no influence on politics[13].
In general, A. Dugin does not use the term
sovereign democracy, but democracy (in the negative sense of the word) and
sovereignty (in various variations), which is the most important feature of the
current political system in Russia. It has consistently rejected the
possibility of applying Western criteria to Russian policy
and political
history, because they are not adequate for Russia. He considers all
manifestations of liberalization or broadly understood Westernization to be not
only unnecessary but also harmful to the national character of Russia.
Of interest in the initiative is the
"sovereign ideology", which appears to be a continuation of earlier
sovereign democracy. It is based on the traditional values of the Russian
people, often mentionedby Vladimir Putin. Well, under the leadership of the
most important Russian regions, Councils for the Protection and Strengthening
of Traditional Values are being established, whosetask is to promote them.
At the end of October 2022, the XXIV Congress of
the World Russian People's Council was held in Moscow. The founder of Tsargrad TV Konstantin Malofeyev
proposed that in the first stage the creation of such councils should take
place under the leadership of the Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Moscow and St. Petersburg
oblasts.
In the latter case, Malofeyev has
already discussed the work of the future Council with the head of the region,
Alexei Teksler. This proposal in the near future is intended to change the
entire system of spiritual life of the country. Among the guests, Pyotr Tolstoy – Deputy
Chairman of the State Duma also gave a speech. He even stated that "There are many
issues on which we will have to train the Russian government quite
intensively." This statement is important because it refers toPresidential
Decree No. 809.
on the preservation and strengthening of traditional values, published on 9
November 2022[14].
The seriousness of the undertaking can be
proved by the attitude of Putin himself, who at the meeting of the Valdai Club[15]
stated that true democracy in a multipolar worldpresupposes, first of all, that
every nation of any society and any civiliancivilization can choose its own
path and its ownsocio-political system. In his decree, he listed the main features
(traditional values) that make up the hundred of the Russian road. Alexander Dugin calls this list "the code
of the new operating system of Russian society". It consists of the
following characteristics:
-life
-dignity
- rights and freedomsand man
- patriotism, citizenship, service to the Homeland and responsibility for
its fate
- high moral ideals
- strong family
- creative work
- the primacy of the spiritual over the material
-humanism
-grace
-justice
- collectivism, mutual aid and mutual respect
- historical memory and continuity of generations
- unity of the peoples of Russia
These features are to form the basis for the emergence and developmentof
the Russian sovereign ideology.
They are the promotion and beginning of the introduction of sovereign
ideology into all spheres of public life and into all layers of Russian
society. It is also the promotion of
traditional values listed in the decree of the President of Russia[16].
Of course, the
implementation of these values has a chance to be implemented only by
well-organized and morally certain elites, which is quite a breakneck task.
Unfortunately, Dugin does not see these difficulties, or at least does not
write about them.
When discussing the subject of sovereign democracy, the significance of
elections (presidential, parliamentary or local government) and their social
legitimacy should be discussed.
It should be noted here that the scientific community from countries with
well-established liberal democracy perceives the political system prevailing in
Russia as authoritarianism. Michał Słowikowski approaches it no differently,
stating that elections taking place in contemporary authoritarian systems are
not only nothing exceptional, but on the contrary – they are desirable[17]. They act as a stabilizer for both the current
political system and the dominant party. Most studies on the stability of
authoritarianism show that hegemonic parties function through elections. A
feature of these parties is influencing electoral procedures, seeking to win
over members of the opposition elite
and convincing them to the camp of power. There is also a clear tendency to
reward their own activists – mainly from among the elite – for their loyalty. Elections
are a kind of test of loyalty, which is a criterion for judging who deserves
recognition and who has failed.
It is the elections that provide a thorough knowledge of the power of the
local elites, which are the main body ensuring the continuity of power. The
elections held in Russia also give a clear picture of the cohesion of power and
show areas requiring intervention[18].
Contemporary theorists of
authoritarian systems tend to agree that it is the elections that ensure that
the hegemonic party achieves most of its goals, namely:
- building the image desired by the center of power,
- recruiting desirable people to the party, mainly from outside politics,
- getting information about public moods,
- rewarding the most active party activists and supporters.
It is worth mentioning that elections also play an image role in the
international dimension, which is particularly important for illiberal
democracies. This image warms the attitude towards a particular country and
allows it to be clearly separated from consolidated authoritarianisms, where
opposition parties do not participate in the elections. Of course, the question
remains open to what extent the organisation of multi-party elections entails
the risk of losing power by Putin and "United Russia"[19]?
According to observers,
the elections in Russia are not free from anomalies planned
and coordinated by regional and local power structures subordinate to the
Kremlin.
They were both qualitative and quantitative, and manifested themselves in
an abnormally low number of invalid votes, a high number of votes outside the
place of residence, rounding of the number of votes cast and an excessive
turnout.
There was even a geographical pattern showing the areas where abuses most
often occurred. The regions most susceptible to the influence of regional
administrations include the Caucasian countries, such as Dagestan, Chechnya,
Ingushetia, but alsoAlmatya, Morva, Tuva, and the Kemerovo and Orlov oblasts
and (what is particularly interesting) Moscow[20].
These similarities concerned two consecutive
elections, because the map of the areas concerned by the reservations had
already undergone some changes in subsequent elections. However, it can be
considered that sensitive areas remain those located south-east of Moscow
(mainly the Caucasus) and concern less urbanized and more agrarian areas.
Of course, it is difficult to determine what the election results would
look like without the interference of regional authorities, but it is assumed
that they would not affect the election of the president, but could translate
into the number of deputies belonging to the participating parties.
Vladimir Putin (formerly Dmitry Medvedev) enjoys unwavering popularity,
and the fact that he wins the election in the first round does not surprise
even his opponents.
The same applies to support for 'United Russia', although this party does
not have such an established position in the Russian Federation as the
President.
Returning to sovereign
democracy as a political concept, it formally functioned in the years 2005 –
2008. It was supposed to play the role of a consolidator of Putin's power,
and its main slogan was – Justice for everyone in Russia , justice for Russia in the World. This
concept fell out of favor with the new president, Dmitry Medvedev, who decided
to pursue his own visions of the future[21].
One thing seems certain, this concept was the first attempt of this type to
define Russia's national interest in domestic and international terms. It
presented the challenges of the twenty-first century, taking into account the
negative effects of the political transformation of the 90s, the shortcomings
of the raw materials economy and the hostile international situation, leaning
towards a unipolar order based on US hegemony. It was a clear message that
Russia is focused on building a multipolar order in the world. From the very
beginning, sovereign democracy was treated as a state ideology, but also as a
kind of operation popularizing the then power elite in Russia[22].
This concept was facilitated by the international situation with the
intervention of NATO troops in Iraq in 2003, color revolutions in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (2003-2005). This created tension among the Russian
government's elite, which resulted in the development of the so-called
siloviki, i.e. the ministries of national defence, internal affairs and special
services. Since then, more and more clear aspirations to rebuild the
geopolitical sphere of influence in the area of the former USSR have begun to
appear[23].
At the seminar "Sovereign Democracy: From
Idea to Doctrine" organized in autumn 2006 by United Russia, the concept
of sovereign democracy was already defined as a doctrine that was to become the
foundation of the party's political program.
A similar theme appeared on December 2, 2006, during the VII Congress of
"United Russia", which was held in Yekaterinburg. Aprogram
declaration was adopted at that time, which referred to sovereign democracy and
contained two main theses:
- every nation has the right to make choices based on its own traditions
and laws,
"Russia has the right to participate in shaping a just, multipolar
world order.
At that time, the term sovereign democracy was used as a fundamental value
for Russian domestic and international politics. The party congress expressed
its full appreciation for the universality of democracy, while stressing the existence of
its many variants. The thenleader of United Russia, Boris Gryzlov, maintained
that sovereignty
And democracy in the modern world are inseparable[24].
In September 2007 (when Surkov's project
had already begun to lose its political significance), during a meetingof the International
Discussion Club "Valdai", Putin stated that "sovereign democracy is a controversial and somewhat
contradictory concept. Sovereignty is something that speaks of the nature of
our relations with the outside world, and democracy is the state and quality of
society." Elaborating on this idea, Putin stated that next to Russia,
only China, India and a few other countries have real sovereignty,while other
states are dependent on each other or depend on another center of power. "Russia
is a state that cannot exist without defending its sovereignty. It will either
be independent and sovereign, or it will probably not be at all"[25].
In 2008, when the Russian authorities were
preparing for elections and changing offices, the concept of sovereign
democracy practically ceased to be used in the media space. At that time, a
replacement had not yet been created
of similar rank and aims. During the 2008 election campaign, the ruling
camp, including Surkov himself, opted for the electoral programme 'Putin's Plan
– a dignified future for a great state'. It said Russia was ready "not only to defend its
national interests, but also to be responsible for global stability
and the fate of the world”[26].
In 2009, when D. Medvedev was already the president, at the congress of the
United Russia party, the program "Russia: we will preserve and multiply!
The new president consolidated his image as a professional and technocratic
manager, avoiding ideological disputes. D. Medvedev in his original manifesto
"Russia, forward" highlighted the need for modernization, which
translated into an ambitious strategy for the national securityof the Russian Federation until 2020,
approved by presidential decree of 12 May 2009[27].
Thus, after a relatively short career, the concept of sovereign democracy
has been
in the political space of that time, it was supplanted by the postulate of
modernization of Russia, which after the return of Vladimir Putin to the office
of president in 2012 was replaced by a declaration (idea?) of the revival of
conservatism.
APPLICATIONS:
Vladimir Putin has been the President of the Russian Federation for the
third decade (with a four-year break of 2008-2012). From the perspective of
Western politicians, but also Western political scientists, analysts and
journalists who adhere to liberal democracy, "Putin's Russia" is not
a democratic state, but an authoritarian one. Earlier, the same bodies referred
to "Yeltsin's Russia" as a democracy in which authoritarianism has no
place.
The Russians themselves, on the other hand, remember the 90s as a
"period of sorrow", i.e. anarchy and lawlessness.
In Poland, there is a well-known statement of Andrzej Duda, who as an MEP,
at the forum of the European Parliament on March 11, 2015, stated, among other
things, that today's Russia has nothing to do with democracy. Before such an
unambiguous and strict assessment, however, it is worth taking into account the
position of Russian political scientists who do not question the functioning of
democracy in their country. However,
they believe that it has different determinants than the western one, which
makes it different, but not worse.
The fact is that
organizations such as the European Union or NATO quite precisely define the
spectrum of values and attitudes that countries aspiring to these structures
must meet. However, not everyone is obliged to approve of these patterns.
Francis Fukuyama in his " The
End of History" also tried to prove the superiority of liberal
democracy over other forms of political systems, but as we know, his
predictions did not come true. Liberal democracy has not caught on in Russia,
and Moscow is still a European power. Attempts to democratise Russia on the
Western model have failed, the sanctions imposed are not effective, and
accusing aggressive politics, lack of freedom of speech or non-observance of
human rights is throwing peas against the wall.
In the concept of
sovereign democracy, there was a noticeable opposition to the hegemony of the
West and the preservation of independence and full right to self-determination.
This has been emphasised many times during media appearances by Putin himself.
According to his political philosophy, the democratic tradition in Russia
is a completely natural historical value. It is similar with freedom and
justice, and above all, it is the Russians themselves who determine the time,
stages, conditions and forms of development.
The development of
"non-Western" democracy in Russia is facilitated by three main
factors:
1.
For
Russians, a constant priority is to maintain security, which guarantees the
maintenance of sovereignty, while in the West this role is played by broadly
understood individual freedom.
2.
It is
important to accumulate and maintain power in one hand. This is a manifestation
of the personification of power, the roots of which date back to the period of
autocracy. This state of affairs somehow cements the position of the incumbent
president for the coming years, and gives Russians a sense of certainty and
stability.
3.
The
lack of readiness of Russian society to adopt different norms of conduct and
model of behaviour. In Russia, only a strong authority is respected, from which
it is widely known what can be expected. This is also facilitated by the image
of a familiar Russia and a demoralized West created by the media.
Today, the concept of sovereign democracy is
somewhat anachronistic, although in the consciousness of the masses it still
functions as a synonym for independence and maintaining cultural
distinctiveness.
This fact leads to the exclusion of potential manipulation, for which
sovereign democracy would be only a slogan. The discussed concept is much
closer to an ideology which, regardless of the ad hoc slogan, will be closer to
the Russian spirit.
It is reasonable to quote the words of RomanBäcker, who wrote that "it is impossible to understand Russia if
one applies to it a network of categories used to analyze the societies of
Western Europe or North America"[28].
[1] Vladislav Yuryevich Surkov (b. 1964),
served as State Counsellor of the Russian Federation, First Class (2000).
He was
Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation (March 26, 2004 - May 7, 2008);
Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation for socio-economic
cooperation with the CIS countries of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (20 September
2013 – 7 May 2018; 13 June 2018 – 18 February 2020). Former Deputy Prime
Minister of the Russian Federation - Head of the Government Office of the
Russian Federation (2012-2013).
[2] "The
successful transformation of new independent states into sovereign democracies
is at the heart of European stability" (Waren Christopher, Secretary U.S.
State, 1994); "Our Union [European] protects the essence [...] sovereign federations Democracy" (Romano Prodi, President
of the European Commission, 2004).
[3] В. Сурков "Национализация
будущего", https://Expert.Ru/Expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_Buduschego/
Insight
22.12.22.
[4] It is mainly about moral norms, LGBT
rights, the model of health care (e.g. compulsory vaccination or strict
compliance with WHO guidelines) and the so-called religious freedom – that is,
the possibility of disregarding norms sanctified by customary and canon law.
These issues boil down to the common slogan 'Human Rights'.
[5] В. Сурков "Национализация
будущего"...
[6] Ibidem.
[7] Mikhail Vladimirovich Leontiev (b;. 1958)
is a Russian journalist, political scientist, publicist, and well-known and
influential political commentator. Advisor Presidenta PJSC Oil Company Rosneft
i gTelevision programme director. Winner Highestj Awards of the Union of
Journalists of Russia « Golden Feather Russia".
[8] F. Memches, Servants and enemies of the empire. Russian talks about the end of
history, Kraków 2009, p. 156.
[9] Ibidem,
p. 157.
[10] Aleksandr Gieljewicz Dugin (b.1962) –
Russian politician, geopolitician and historian of religion, philosopher,
lecturer at Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov in 2008-2014.
Chief Russian ideologueon neo-imperialism, Eurasianism and integral
traditionalism. In 2014, he was banned from entering European Union countries
as part of sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea.
[11] А. Дугин, Нейтрализация и её пределы,
https://izborsk-club.ru/20745, Insight 23.12.22.
[12] Ibidem.
[13] Ibidem.
[14] Cуверенная
идеология мобилизует Pоссию. начнём с четырёх
губерний, https://Tsargrad.Tv/articles/suverennaja-Ideology-mobiluet-rossiju-nachnjom-s-chetyrjoh-Governorate_674520, Insight
[15] International discussion club
"Valdai" – an annual meeting of well-known experts specializing in
the study of Russia's domestic and foreign policy. It was established in
September 2004 on the initiative of the RIA Novosti agency, the Council for
Foreign and Defence Policy of Russia, the newspaper "The Moscow
Times" and the periodicals "Russia in global politics" and
"Russia Profile".
[16] Cуверенная
идеология мобилизует…
[17] M. Słowikowski, United Russia in the political system of the Russian Federation,
Łódź 2018, p. 99.
[18] Ibidem, p. 100.
[19] Ibidem, p. 101.
[20] Ibidem, p. 164.
[21] R. Czachor, "Sovereign Democracy" — the genesis, content and critique of
contemporary Russian political and legal thought", Acta Universitatis
Wratislaviensis No 4021, Studies on Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism 42,
No. 3,
p. 47, Wrocław 2020. file:///D:/DOKUMENTY/Downloads/128584__Suwerenna_demokracja_geneza_tresc_i_krytyka_wspo_.pdf
Insight 29.12.20.
[22] Ibidem,
p. 47.
[23] Ibidem,
p. 50.
[24] V.V. Ivanov, Putin's party. Istoriya "Edinoj Rossii", Moskva 2008, p.
252.
[25] Vstrecha
s uchastnikami mezhdunarodnogo diskusionnogo kluba "Valdaj", http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24537 Insight 30.12.22.
[26] Предвыборная программа
партии "Единая Россия, https://rg.ru/2008/02/02/edinros.html
Insight 30.12.22.
[27] Россия, вперёд! Статья
Дмитрия Медведева, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413 Insight 30.12.22.
[28] R. Bäcker, Russian political thinking under President Putin, Toruń 2007, p.
298.
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