Geopolitical Risks in the Eurasia Space: War in Ukraine and Russia’s Neo-Imperialistic Features

 

Geopolitical Risks in the Eurasia Space: War in Ukraine and Russia’s
Neo-Imperialistic Features

Dr. Vakhtang Maisaia

Krzysztof JANKOWSKI

 

 

Eurasia attracts attention not only because of its wealth of natural resources, in particular energy, but above all because of its ability to influence global geopolitics. The persistence
of numerous unresolved conflicts in the region directly or indirectly affects relations between great powers and states of the greatest importance at the regional level. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union revealed pre-existing regional tensions: ethnic or territorial conflicts
that had been suppressed by the Soviet authorities. The outburst of some of these claims has created significant international tensions.

On the global stage recently the violation of the principle of territorial integrity
and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and its support for the separatists
in eastern Ukraine, unofficially also through the participation of military formations
of the Russian army and the supply of military equipment, have been particularly outrageous. The crisis in Ukraine in 2014, caused by the then pro-Russian President Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, led to a change of power
from pro-Russian to pro-Western, and in responsen the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces. Soon after, separatist forces in Donetsk and Lugansk, backed by Moscow, revolted against Ukraine's central government in order to declare two independent republics. Then
the armed conflict began, expanded by the invasion of the Russian armed forces on February 24, 2022 in many different parts of Ukrainian territory.

This aggression with its scale, touched the whole world, and in particular the Eastern European countries, that were in the past part of or in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, found themselves in a dangerous situation. In many speeches, Russian leaders expressed their will to recreate a great-power Russia, while the countries of the former USSR and the Eastern Bloc joined the European Union and NATO, tightening cooperation
with the United States. These countries are trying to strengthen their military security through independent actions and together with allies, making their bases available for NATO reinforcement forces and providing political and military support for Ukraine.

Russia's search for geopolitical balance has resulted in its greater prominence in areas where the United States in particular, previously had greater influence, such as Syria and the Middle East, as well as moving closer to China.

What is Russia's problem? The position of countries changes dynamically along
with changing power and other conditions. Striving to increase their positions is characteristic of virtually all countries, but they differ in the strategies used. Aspirations are also diverse – some of them are more realistic than others. Russia is a good example, because there are many indications that its superpower aspirations are far from possible. Russia plays clearly above its weight, tries to exaggerate its actual position. Many examples prove that high aspirations are characteristic mainly of former or collapsing powers, which find it difficult
to come to terms with the new situation, such as with their lower position.

Unlike most Western powers, Russia has never set its borders as lines it could not try to cross. Russia's borders are not precisely marked contours, but rather frontiers, where influences overlap and interests of various powers and nations cross (overlapping spaces). They remain areas of persistent conflict, where Russia intervenes to increase its influence and control
and to compete with its rivals. The belt between the Baltic and Black seas is an example
of such a borderland, where Russia is constantly trying to extend its control, using the entire spectrum of state tools, including military force. Meanwhile, Western powers no longer seek to extend direct control beyond their borders. As states, whether unitary or national, they are stable. While this is a positive historical change, it also seems to cause a certain inability
to understand that there are still countries in the world like Russia, that have never abandoned their aspirations to expand their territory. Unfortunately, it remains faithful to this goal.

John P. LeDonne in "Forging a Unitary State: Russia's Management of the Eurasian Space, 1650-1850" suggests that Russia is therefore in a better position than its Western rivals, who opt for new, postmodern principles of global harmony and supranational cooperation. It does not take into account, however, that Russia, selfishly still striving to expand its sphere
of influence and the territory it controls using all available methods, ignores the fact
that the inhabitants of territories such as Ukraine absolutely do not want to be included in its sphere of influence. With the support of the West, which is at a much higher technological level, they are able to effectively resist it also in the military aspect, as is happening now.
In his book, the author also refers to the prospects for lasting peace in the border area mentioned above. Russia and its neighboring countries have fundamentally divergent interests, policy vectors and civilizational foundations. As a result, they are embroiled
in persistent conflicts that will not be overcome by the expansion of globalization
or international institutions. On the one hand, there is Russia, which is interested in expanding the territory it controls, and on the other, the West, which is satisfied with its advantage
in the markets. Markets cross borders and frontiers, creating a space that is difficult to control by one authority. Russia has always been obsessed with creating a centralized, self-sufficient and as large as possible but unified power, based on the principles of Orthodox civilization, under the authoritarian leadership of a multi-ethnic elite focused on maximizing military power. Russia is therefore a centralizing state, not an open power that tries to compete
on markets. Russia's neighbors are looking for a stronger anchor in Western political
and economic structures, Russia continues to attract them to its core, also by means
of military force. The rivalry between Russia and the West may end when either Russia abandons its centralizing character and historical desire to expand its unitary state, or when its neighbors cease to aspire to be part of the wider Western world. The ongoing war in Ukraine and its outcome may force Russia, in the face of its exposed military weakness, to change its approach.

Russia became the most important state created as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, inherited the federation formula from the Soviet era and acts as the Russian Federation. It was recognized by both its own authorities and other countries as the main successor of the USSR, taking over from it a permanent place in the UN Security Council in the international system. The young and unconsolidated Russian state, consumed by a deep post-Soviet structural crisis (economic, political and social), faced the difficult task of defining its role and place
in the new post-Cold War world. Much in this matter depended on Russia's determination
of its attitude to the heritage of the Soviet Union, and even the pre-revolutionary Russian empire, i.e. to the broadly understood imperial heritage. Thus, the Russian Federation had
to define its international and internal identity. Find a compromise between the imperial formula and the concept of the nation-state. In Russia, in many circles, including democratic ones, the memory of the mighty Russian power and the superpower status of the USSR has survived. In the conditions of the disintegration of the empire, it took the form of nostalgia
or imperial nostalgia, which boiled down to the conviction that the Russian state had to be restored to its important position in the international system. The result was a renaissance
of geopolitical thinking in Russia.

Geopolitics there assumed the features of a universal idea, comprehensively explaining
the post-communist world to the Russians, filling the ideological vacuum left by the bankrupt communist ideology. In this country, geopolitics was becoming a method of rationalizing
the new international situation, setting goals and missions facing Russia in post-imperial
or neo-imperial conditions, creating specific ideas about the world order.

During the first term of office of the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, Russia, going through a difficult period of dynamic liberal political and economic transformation, tried to enter the democratic-liberal model of globalization promoted
by the United States and find a place in the unilateral international system constructed
by Washington as an American junior partner. Moscow agreed to the global hegemony
of the US and its status as a "world policeman", but in return for the US administration recognizing Russia's special dominant role in the post-Soviet area. Washington, however, took a negative stance towards Russian aspirations and decided to change its strategy towards the post-Soviet space, abandoning the current pro-Russian „Russia first” policy (calculated
on Russia collecting the entire post-Soviet nuclear arsenal and concentrating
it in the possession of one reliable operator) in favor of supporting the aspirations of other post-Soviet states especially Ukraine.

Russian national interests, the Russian raison d'état, as well as the goals of Russia's foreign and military policy, are defined in several documents constituting the country's normative security system. These documents define goals, threats and challenges. Some of their main points include: initiating integration processes in the CIS area, stopping NATO's expansion
to the East, and promoting the vision of a polycentric international system. Therefore,
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia began to take steps to integrate
the post-Soviet area in new post-imperial conditions. Integrating the post-Soviet space
into an institutionalized system of political, economic and military cooperation is intended,
on the one hand, to ensure Moscow a dominant position in the area of the former USSR,
and, on the other hand, to build a zone of stability around Russia, keeping the CIS countries
in close political, economic and cultural ties with Russia. A central idea here was to develop an integration process modeled on the European Union. Therefore, the main area where Moscow pursues its vital interests is the CIS, which is the Russian sphere of influence, where Russia strives to maintain its dominant position, in particular against the influence
of the West. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the East
is considered to be the main threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.

The last installment of the integration processes initiated by Russia in the post-Soviet area, was to be the Eurasian Union, whose core, in the Kremlin's visions, would be Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, along with Russia. This union would in a sense, be an alternative
to the European Union and would be open to other CIS countries, as well as other countries favorably disposed to this idea. As a result of Russia's actions towards Ukraine after the Euro-revolution at the turn of 2013 and 2014, the attractiveness for potential members has definitely decreased.

In addition, there are a number of more or less objective reasons that hinder the reintegration of the post-Soviet space, including: the great diversity of political and economic systems
of the post-Soviet states, as well as the lack of democratic traditions, the countries
of the region preferring their own national interests at the expense of the common interest, fears of some CIS countries about Russia's imperial policy, economic weakness
of the countries of the region, different models of reforms and lack of harmonization
in their implementation, counteracting integration processes in the CIS area by the West (especially the USA), international financial institutions and large transnational corporations, huge discrepancies between integration concepts and reality, lack of regular readiness
of Russia to be a driving force of integration and a source of assistance to the post-Soviet states.

Within the CIS, there were also initiatives aimed at limiting or eliminating the factor
of Russian domination, such as the creation in October 1997 of the GUAM group based
in Kiev and bringing together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This group is more an initiative of the United States than of the countries participating in this project, conditioned by a regional game for influence, aimed at weakening Russia. Mainly due to the economic weakness of its members, GUAM did not transform into a regional organization or union, being only an association of interests and a consultative body. Attempts to give the project more prestige, undertaken outside the CIS, did not help much either. This group has been treated by Moscow as a threat to Russian interests since its inception.

Three basic integration models of the post-Soviet space constructed by the Russian political elites can be distinguished: 1. The Soviet-Communist model, that is the restoration
of the USSR as a result of the dissolution of the CIS and the restoration of a single state preserving its pseudo-federal system, as proclaimed by the communists. 2. The restoration-nationalist model, i.e. the revival of the unitary Russian empire, promoted not only
by extreme nationalists, but also by radical "centrists". 3. The pragmatic-integration model
as economic integration in the form of a confederation or federation, which has the support
of the majority of the Russian ruling elite and is aimed at securing Russia's political, economic and military hegemony in the CIS area.

The third one seemed the most realistic of the above models, but also in this scenario
the impossibility of even half of it was quickly revealed. In the time perspective, various trends could be observed in the Russian integration policy towards the post-Soviet area: 1992–1995 – from the concept of a near abroad to reintegration, 1996–1998 –
from reintegration to reintegration of "different speeds", 1999–2003 – from the integration
of “different speeds” to the development of bilateral relations, 2003–2008 - return
to "multi-speed" integration; from 2008 – a period of assertive and aggressive policy
of Russia, caused by the transition of part of the post-Soviet space (Georgia and Ukraine) towards geopolitical and geostrategic structures competitive to those organized and controlled by the Kremlin: NATO (mainly the United States) and the European Union.

However, despite certain inconsistencies in its integration strategy with regard to the post-Soviet area, Russia remains interested in broadly understood integration within and around
the CIS, which may be an effective instrument for the Kremlin to control post-Soviet Eurasia. The priorities of Russian policy towards the CIS countries include: integration processes, state security, elimination of Western presence and influence, political influence in Eastern Europe, protection of the Russian minority and Russian-speaking population, economic presence
in the CIS countries and development of economic cooperation within the community, military presence, the status of the Russian language and the popularization of Russian culture, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, shaping a positive image of Russia
in the region, participation in settling disputes and armed conflicts, migration of people
from the post-Soviet area to the Russian Federation. These priorities were particularly applicable to Russia's strategy towards Ukraine.

In February 2007, at the 43rd Security Conference in Munich, Putin in his speech accused Western countries, mainly the United States, of ignoring Russian interests and warned
the West against continuing such a policy. Putin's speech can be interpreted as marking
the Western countries with a "red line" in relation to the post-Soviet area, in particular
with regard to attempts to draw the CIS countries into NATO and to expand the Western sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. In this context, there was first the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008.

The Kremlin reacted with equal firmness to the events in Ukraine, known
as the Eurorevolution, at the turn of 2013 and 2014, caused by the withdrawal
of the pro-Russian Ukrainian authorities from the accession process to the European Union. Russia called the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych a state coup controlled
by the West, and in the longer term envisaged the removal of its presence, including
the military one (the base of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea), from Ukrainian territory
by the new pro-Western Ukrainian government. In March 2014, Moscow decided
to implement a radical scenario that surprised the West and annexed Crimea, which belongs
to Ukraine and is inhabited mostly by Russians (about 60% of the total population
of the peninsula), thus securing its strategic depth in the Ukrainian-Black Sea section.
From spring 2014, Russia began to support the separatists in Donbas. This initiated
the outbreak of an “asymmetric” proxy war in Ukraine, during which the influences
of the West and Russia clash on Ukrainian territory (delegated war). At the military level, Russia was directly involved in this conflict only unofficially (hence the "asymmetry").
The Kremlin's goal seemed to be the federalization of Ukraine or at least the autonomy
of the Donbas, especially its part controlled by the separatists, and the neutralization
of Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO and the European Union.

Carrying out a multi-directional aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia
also made an unsuccessful attempt to storm the capital in order to probably change the power in Kiev to a pro-Russian one, and the war that has begun continues to this day. In the present situation, a voluntary integration of the post-Soviet area around Russia seems completely unrealistic. It is visible that it is losing influence, except for the area of Belarus. It has to rely more and more on the means of hard power. And the conflict in Ukraine exposed many of its weaknesses and shortcomings in this aspect.

It is worth paying attention to the conditions and goals of Russia's imperial policy during
the period of power held by the environment centered around Vladimir Putin. For two decades (2000-2021), this policy can be described as a conglomerate of conducted and mutually coordinated political and economic undertakings, supported by diplomatic actions. Its main goal was to convince the majority of other participants of the international scene of the need to grant Russia the status of a global player and to approve the country building its own sphere of influence. Upon assuming the office of president of the Federation, Vladimir Putin gave Russian policy a global dimension, aimed at regaining the state's imperial position.
An important feature of this political concept was its identification with activities aimed
at ensuring state security. In domestic policy, these activities were focused on regaining full control of the central authorities over the administrative entities of the Russian Federation
and the fuel and energy sector. The internal dimension of this policy also included
the construction of the so-called „safe space” around Federation territory. This goal was to be achieved through actions aimed at maintaining political influence or creating a situation
in which countries recognized as part of this space would take into account Russia's interests in their policy, such as: strengthening its position as a global power, building the potential
to prevent military aggression the ability to control economic and military activity
in the border area, as well as counteracting disinformation and protecting information resources. On the other hand, international activity was reduced to dominating specific regions, considered to be the location of the interests of the Russian Federation. This process was not described as expansion, but aimed at creating the security of the Federation, which should be considered a form of masking activities. The long-term concept of rebuilding Russia's imperial position, developed in the first years of the 21st century, has therefore been focused on five areas for which a mutually coordinated regional policy is conducted.
The assumed goal of influencing the so-called "near abroad", officially perceived in terms
of building a safe environment around its own borders, is the economic and political vassalization of some border countries (Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
and Turkmenistan) and binding, also with economic and political instruments, the countries
of the region that stand out for their sovereignty (Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan).
The manner of influencing these countries depended on the shape of the regional and internal situation in these countries and the current interests of Russia. In Europe, a group of countries was selected. Their role in Russian politics was determined by the scope of possible economic cooperation and influence on European politics.

The practical implementation of the policy of making border areas dependent was undertaken after 2004, after the stage of taking full control over the authorities of individual entities
of the Federation and the fuel and energy sector. Taking advantage of the process
of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, these activities were given the formula of protective measures, not expansion. The narrative form used was reduced to the thesis that these are actions aimed at creating a safe space around the borders
of the Federation. Its scope includes three parallel processes: the integration of Russian society with the ruling camp, the restoration of a sense of community in the societies
of the former Soviet republics, and the political and economic bonding of selected Eurasian countries through the policy of exporting mining raw materials. The activities carried
out in relation to its own society were aimed at integrating it with the state policy, which was achieved by proposing an attractive historical heritage. These undertakings were also used
as an instrument for the process of creating integration offers for the countries
of the Commonwealth of Independent States and their societies. The created myth of Great Russia, the Mother of Nations, the care of the traditions of the Great Patriotic War
and the armed deed of soldiers. The victors of World War II and strong authorities guided
by the interest This of the state and caring for the safety of citizens have become an important element of political influence. On the other hand, successively after 2002, the main strategic goal was to lead to a situation in which the states operating in this area took into account the interests of Russia in their policies. This goal resulted, to a limited but significant extent, from the conviction that the first phase of NATO enlargement (1999) was carried out with only partial respect for Russian interests. An important element of this policy was the political
and military reaction to the transformation of the political situation in the "near abroad" zone and the regions where the country's strategic interests are located. It took the form of support for the pro-Russian regime (Syria, Belarus, Kazakhstan) or political and military pressure (Georgia, Ukraine) with simultaneous influence on the international environment. Its aim was to gain approval for Russian actions, obtained among others through skilful diplomatic
and propaganda activities. Their formula and scope were based on the experience gained
from the Russian-Georgian war (07-16.08.2008). Using reflective management and the fact that the Georgian army was the first to undertake strictly military actions, the Russians presented their own interpretation of the reasons for its occurrence, which was accepted
by the international community. It has become a starting point for international peace initiatives that are basically in line with Russian expectations.

The strategic goals and the method of implementing the policy of regaining the rank
of a global player resulted directly from the assumptions of Russian strategic documents developed over the two decades of the 21st century. Russia's imperial policy was largely accepted by major international players. They accepted the fact of building a new sphere
of Russian influence, the right to create the political and economic situation in the areas where Russian interests are located. Russia, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, gradually returned to the status of an empire. Guided by a realistic assessment of the effectiveness
of the Russian strategy of gradually rebuilding its own political position, it is difficult
to indicate rational reasons for starting the aggression on the territory of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It probably counted on a quick military victory and expanding own sphere
of influence. Especially that the political rival, which is in Russia considered to be the USA, decided that the area of its activity should be mainly the Indo-Pacific region. Irreversible losses have been suffered in the image of Russia due to the start of an open bloody invasion. The possibility of economic cooperation with the European Union countries and the benefits resulting from the export of energy resources and the acquisition of technologies have been practically lost.

Nowadays, the increased activity of separatist movements is noticeable in the post-Soviet area. At the same time, the contradiction between the principle of respect for territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination should be emphasized. International law does not specify which social groups have the right to self-determination. The Russian Federation supports separatist movements because it is interested in destabilizing
the countries it considers its sphere of influence. This applies to the greatest extent
to the space of the so-called Holy Rus, i.e. Ukraine and Belarus. Strengthening separatist tendencies is part of the tactics of hybrid warfare, which is officially not based on classic aggression. The lack of direct military involvement dismisses the accusation of violating international law, even though the annexation of Crimea and the creation of separatist forces of quasi-republics on the territory of Donbass were acts of aggression. The case of Crimea clearly showed that the inviolability of borders in the post-Soviet space remains a dead principle of international law. The Russian authorities have not come to terms with the change of power in Ukraine from pro-Russian to pro-Western.

From the beginning of Putin's first presidential term (2000-2008), the Russian Federation has seen a renaissance of the category of nation in relation to the idea of civilization or religious community. This is related to the government's instigation of actions aimed at "secondary nationalisation". An example of this is the concept of the "Russian mir", which is based
on the pursuit of national-cultural as well as historical-political integration in the post-Soviet area. "Russian mir" is not only the Russian world, but also the entire area of influence
of Russian culture. The role of the concept of “Russian mir” in the neo-imperial policy
of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine is also important. It is a tool for Russian geopolitical expansion on the territory of this country, although this project has definitely lost its importance after the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which became a fact in December 2018. The category of "Russian mir" has a long history in Russian political thought and has long been the subject of theoretical reflection. It is perceived not as a political project, but as a universal model of the unity of all nations, which covers the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. It can also be treated
as a continuation of the idea of "Holy Russia" and "Moscow - the Third Rome". Both of these ideas were religious and political in nature, and later became the official ideology justifying the expansive policy of the Duchy of Muscovy and then the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, the civilizational triad of imperial ideology - "Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality" - was of great importance. From Slavic themes, an integral part of the Russian imperial doctrine was formed. The political unification of the individual parts of the Russian state must be preceded by their moral and intellectual unification. In this regard, it is necessary to develop
a Russian national sense, which will be the mainstay of the existence of the state and the basis of morality. The triad by the Minister of Education Count Uvarov, is a reflection
of the Russian mentality, the perception of Russia as the most important center of the Slavic land, with an emphasis on its superiority over other Slavic nations, which gives it legitimacy for political and cultural expansion. The prominence of Orthodoxy testifies to the great importance of the religious factor: Autocracy is the main condition for Russia's existence,

it serves as the foundation on which the entire state stands. It creates its power, ensures independence and integrity, strengthening the sense of nationality.

Russian intellectuals initiated the formation of this doctrine right after the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The term "Russian mir" was introduced into the colloquial language
in 2005. It is considered one of the attempts to create a Russian-centric, East-Slavic civilizational pole as an alternative to European integration. Previously, it was considered
a neo-colonial project or a concept of civilization based on Orthodoxy, Russian culture,
and especially the Russian language. Its basis is the existence of a community identified
by the Orthodox religion and culture, covering mainly Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, but also other countries of the post-Soviet area. The nations of these countries are offered integration consisting in actual subordination to the spiritual, cultural and political tradition of Russia.

The doctrine of Russian foreign and security policy is based on the desire to build
a multipolar world. The main goal is to stop the influence of the West on Russian territory
and in the post-Soviet space. In this context " Russian mir" creates a value-semantic space
in which Russian statehood gains its identity. According to this point of view, one of the most important tasks of the Russian state is "to protect the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots living in abroad, on the basis of international law and existing bilateral agreements.

During his second presidential term (2005-2008), Putin, in his speech before the Federal Assembly, recognized the Soviet period as the golden age of Russian statehood, and the 1990s as the worst period in the history of the nation. He described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. State authorities' emphasis
on the presence of a large Russian diaspora in the near abroad and in other countries is aimed at stimulating neo-imperial sentiments, which is why the security doctrine of the Russian Federation includes an obligation to defend the interests of all Russians, regardless
of their place of residence. In his public speeches, the President of the Russian Federation referred to the situation of compatriots living abroad in the context of their linguistic, cultural and civilizational unity. Russia emphasizes that it aims to stop the influence of the West
on its territory and in the post-Soviet space. Considering the multimillion-strong Russian diaspora, " Russian mir" plays an important role in developing and strengthening the reach
of the Russian language and culture. The aim is not only to protect the interests
of the Russian-speaking population living outside the country, but also to strengthen Russia's influence on the integration processes in the post-Soviet space using cultural and information mechanisms. This is the use of "soft power" against opponents of Eurasian integration. Russia also seeks to strengthen its influence in the post-Soviet area through activities in the sphere
of science and education, which are primarily aimed at promoting the Russian language
and culture. This is manifested among others in in organizing scientific exchange and opening branches of Russian universities, e.g. M. V. Lomonosov also opened branches in Ukraine
in Sevastopol. Over time, Russian policy in the post-Soviet area became more and more expansive. The primary goal is the restitution of the empire, and the concept of the "Russian mir" is one of the methods and strategies used to achieve it.

"Russian mir" is a neo-imperial project. It is based on the idea of exclusivity of the Russian civilizational world and Russian spirituality, the special messianic role of Russian Orthodoxy, the right to political and cultural expansionism. This also includes the right to humanitarian intervention in the territories of the post-Soviet states, which has been clearly stated formulated in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016 (International humanitarian cooperation and human rights, point 45). To justify its policy, Russia refers to non-legal categories such as national interest, truth and justice. This means usurping the right to use force as a legitimate tool to protect the interests
of the Russian-speaking community outside the country.

Such influence of Russia towards Ukraine is an example of an attempt at a new approach
to conflict resolution, in which the psychological "processing" of the opponent is a priority. Much attention was paid to this factor in the Kremlin, as a well-planned campaign
of psychological pressure on the local population was intended to reduce the need to use military force to subdue them. The effect of such actions was to be the capture and annexation of the territories of the neighboring country, which would also mean a change in the balance of power in the region, beneficial for the aggressor. The psychological impact of the Kremlin was not limited to influencing the state of consciousness of Ukrainian citizens. Separate actions were carried out in relation to its own society and to international public opinion.
The attack on the Ukrainian mentality, traditional values, language, education system, historical memory of the nation, and the national church was aimed at destroying the identity of the Ukrainian nation, the cohesion of society and the state. Russia carried out a special operation in Ukraine in order to transform it into a destabilized and powerless part
of the „Russian mir”.

With the intensification of Russian military aggression against Ukraine from February 24, 2022, it turned out that the military strength of the units sent to the offensive was
not sufficient to achieve the assumed goals of defeating the armed forces of Ukraine.
This made it impossible to make any further attempts to change the power in Kiev
and subjugate the attacked country. Probably, the Russian authorities counted on more beneficial effects of their psychological actions against the Ukrainians and less determination to put up armed resistance. The Russian perception of the mood prevailing among
the Ukrainians probably failed completely.

It turned out that the armed forces of Russia are not able to defeat theoretically a much weaker opponent, the troops of one of the poorest countries in Europe, taking into account GDP per capita. This exposed the military weakness of the Russian center of power, which should certainly have a large impact on the continued use of hard power in its imperial endeavors. Especially against countries with much more modern armed forces and much better, more technologically advanced military equipment at NATO's disposal.

It seems that in the current situation, the only way to stop Russia's neo-imperial tendencies is to provide a military advantage to countries that are a potential direction of Russian expansion. In this context, it is now necessary to provide adequate support with military equipment and intelligence information to Ukraine, which is defending itself against aggression. So that Russia knows well also for the future that it is not able to succeed
in its expansive policy through military actions, because it will face inevitable humiliation
in a military clash with any state associated with positive relations with Western countries
and the NATO alliance. Otherwise, and in the absence of proper military support for Ukraine, especially from the US, it should be expected that it will continue to try, despite
its backwardness and military technological weakness towards the West, to subjugate neighboring countries with potential invasions. So that they cannot implement policies
in accordance with the will of their citizens. Certainly, they can be forced to be in the sphere of Russian influence, doomed to backwardness and less wealth, only through the military force of Russia, if unfortunately it turns out that the West, despite the significant advantage
of its conventional military potential, does not guarantee a proper level of security
to the countries neighboring the Russian Federation. That is why it is so important to end
the war in Ukraine by further confirming the decisive military superiority of the West.

 

 

 

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