Energy Security Dilemma at the Post-Soviet Space – Caucasus-Caspian Region Case-Study
Mirosaw
Sowakiewicz
Vakhtang
Maisaia
1.
Introduction
After the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the existing international order
underwent fundamental changes. The post-Soviet space has become a place of
struggle for political and economic influence of several players; Russia, the
West and China. Among the main subjects of the game were energy resources,
around which political conflicts arose, related to access to them and issues
related to the course of transmission routes (crude oil, natural gas). In the
theory of international relations, natural resources are considered the second
(after space) source of state power. It is assumed that countries rich in
energy resources are superior to countries that do not have them[1].
Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise to a new 'big game' around the
significant reserves of oil and natural gas in the Caucasus-Caspian region.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was a new beginning not
only for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also for the region
of the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. Once defined by the Soviets as the area of
five union republics: Georgia SSR, Armenia SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Turkmenistan
SSR and Kazakhstan SSR. The reign of the authorities from the Kremlin over
these areas ended in 1991. Independence was first announced by the Republic of
Georgia, which took place on April 9. Then, on September 21, the Republic of
Armenia was established, on October 18, the Republic of Azerbaijan, on October
27, the Republic of Turkmenistan, and finally, on December 16, the Republic of
Kazakhstan was born.
At the
beginning of the 1990s, Russia focused on internal problems, did not have a
developed strategy towards the region of the Caspian Sea, rich in energy
resources. Incapable of significant investment in the exploitation of the
Caspian deposits, Moscow has opted for a policy of 'containment'. Since Russian
energy companies were too weak to play a decisive role in this region, it was
necessary to block or hinder the implementation of projects carried out by
Western corporations[2]. In a
situation where Russia was not an attractive partner capable of offering
adequate economic assistance, countries with a raw material economy model
(e.g., Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) adopted a policy of opening up to Western energy
concerns. In those conditions, no one else was able to provide adequate
financial, technical and political support.
Natural gas and crude oil are currently the most
important commodities that the Caspian region can offer to the world. The
problem, however, is the location of the deposits, as the countries mentioned
do not have direct access to maritime trade routes, with the exception of
Georgia, which has access to the Black Sea. Therefore, the export of the
indicated energy resources depends on costly investments in land
infrastructure. Hence, the weakness of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazkhstan,
which have the discussed resources, is their vulnerability to political and
economic pressure from the great international players surrounding the Caspian
Sea region. This was particularly visible before 2009, when the entire export
of natural gas and crude oil could take place only through the Russian
infrastructure, which was the result of the decisions of the authorities in the
Kremlin, which were made during the Soviet era. Thus, natural gas and crude oil
from the countries around the Caspian Sea could reach Europe only with the
political consent of Moscow.[3]
The situation began to
change in 2009, when the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China was built, as
well as the first branch of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. This second
project, connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and in the future
Tajikistan with China, may turn out to be the most important investment in the
entire history of the region. Thanks to the new pipeline connections, Caspian
natural gas and oil began to flow in a wide stream to the People's Republic of
China and Turkey, which is already happening without the mediation of the
Russian Federation.
It is worth noting that
the European Union has recently joined the game for Caspian energy resources,
which was caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine on
February 24, 2022. However, contrary to the original plans, the gas pipeline
thread that is to run along the bottom of the Caspian Sea and connect Turkmen
resources with Baku in Azerbaijan (Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) was never
established, although in the longer term it would allow for the transfer of gas
to Europe and the acquisition of an excellent alternative to supplies of
Russian gas. This project failed due to the decision of the authorities of the
Federal Republic of Germany to withdraw from it, which was caused by the
construction of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline. However, on October 1, 2022, a
new Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector (GB) gas pipeline has been inaugurated at a
ceremony in Sofia, with Azerbaijan President Ilhan Aliyev along with leaders
from the European Union and several of Bulgaria’s neighbours i.e., Serbia,
North Macedonia and Romania[4]. This
pipeline may turn out to be a game changer for Bulgaria and for Europe’s energy
security and it will likely lead to freedom from dependency on Russian gas.
Apart from economic and
energy problems in Europe due to the war in Ukraine, similar obstacles can be
faced by the Caucasus-Caspian countries, and in particular the rivalry between
China, Russia, the United States and Turkey related to access to energy
resources in this the Caspian region.
2.
Reserves
and geopolitics around it
In order to become aware of the problem of
energy security in the Caucasus-Caspian region and the competition for this
region, one should first pay attention to the data on energy resources.
Turkmenistan is rich in
oil and especially natural gas resources. According to official figures,
Turkmenistan’s resource base is approximately 71.64 billion tons of oil
equivalent, including 53 billion tons located in onshore fields and 18.21
billion tons in the Caspian Sea. The 2021 British Petroleum (BP) Statistical
Review of World Energy indicates that Turkmenistan, as of the end of 2020, had
600 million barrels of proven oil reserves and 19.5 trillion cubic metres in
proven reserves of natural gas. According to the same report, Turkmenistan
produced 59.0 bcm of natural gas in 2020; of that, Turkmenistan consumed 31.3
bcm domestically and exported 27.7 bcm to China. Oil production in 2020 reached
216,000 barrels per day. Turkmenistan consumes roughly 60 percent of its oil
production domestically and exports the remainder over the Caspian Sea to world
markets. The Turkmenbashy Complex of Oil Refineries and the gas-to-gasoline
plant in Ahal province produce liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), though no
official data on production is available. Exploration and development of oil
and natural gas fields, especially Galkynysh (formely South Yoloten), Osman,
Minara, Tagtabazar-1, Caspian Sea offshore blocks, and mainly Dostluq field,
and the Central Karakum group of fields are the most important Turkemnistan’s
oil and gas reserves[5]. For
example, the Galkynysh field, which is the second largest discovered gas field
on Earth (after South Parsi on the border between Iran and Qatar)[6], has
such large reserves (estimated reserves of between 4 and 14 trillion cubic
metres)[7]
that the existing production and transmission infrastructure is insufficient to
exploit this potential and increase exports. To change this, Ashgabat
decision-makers decided to attract foreign investors in order to increase the exploration
capacity. For example, in June 2019, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov
opened the world’s only natural gas-to-gasoline plant in Ovadan-Depe
settlement, near the capital of Turkmenistan, where gas will be processed.
Gasoline, purified diesel fuel and liquefied gas will be produced there[8].
In turn, thanks to the
Central Asia - China pipeline, Turkmenistan in 2015 became the largest supplier
of gas to China. Back in 2006, the Russian state-owned company GAZPROM received
2/3 of Turkmenistan's natural gas. This state of affairs lasted until 2009,
when the Chinese joined the game for the regional energy market. Interestingly,
this was due to the fact that the Kremlin authorities took advantage of the
region's complete dependence on the Russian transmission infrastructure, which
allowed them to impose low purchase prices for Turkmen gas, which the Russian
Federation then sold at a considerable commission on European markets. Then, in
2016, the Russians completely stopped the purchase of gas from the Turkmen. The
related crisis forced the Ashgabat authorities in 2018 to stop free supplies of
natural gas, electricity and water to the inhabitants of the Caspian country. Russia's
actions certainly contributed to obtaining more favourable conditions for
itself in the new five-year contract for the import of Turkmen gas, which was
finally signed in July 2019[9].
However, once again Moscow turned out to be a difficult partner for
cooperation, and therefore the Ashgabat government is open to developing
economic and political relations in other directions.
Turkmenistan also has oil
resources located on the coast of the Caspian Sea, the daily production of which
reaches 216 thousand tonnes barrels/day. The 2021 British Petroleum Statistical
Review of World Energy indicates that Turkmenistan, as of the end of 2020, had 600
million barrels of proven oil reserves[10]. The
country's internal demand for crude oil is roughly 60 % of its oil production which
is provided by the state-owned company Turkmenneft and the remainder is
exported over the Caspian Sea to world markets. Oil processing for the needs of
Turkmenistan is handled by two state-owned refineries, Seidi and Turkmenbashi.
The remaining part of extraction is carried out by foreign companies.
The second major producer
and exporter of energy resources in the Caspian region is the Republic of
Kazakhstan. The sale of natural gas and crude oil is Kazakhstan's most
profitable export sector (over 45% of the value of all domestic exports)[11]. As
in the case of Turkmenistan, the main oil and gas resources are located in the
west of the country, on the coast of the Caspian Sea. Kzakh oil reserves are
estimated at about 1.4 billion tons, which is from 1.2% to 2.5% of the world's
reserves. In December 2021, daily crude oil production in Kazakhstan was 1.48
million barrels[12].
The internal demand for oil was then over 350,000. barrels/day. In 2021,
Kazakhstan was the fifteenth largest oil exporter in the world[13].
In 2013, the Kazakhs sold
over 11 million tons of oil to the Chinese. However, in 2018 this level fell to
just 1.3 million tonnes[14]. The
reason was that the giant oil fields, i.e. Kashagan, Tengiz and Karachaganak are
mainly exploited by Western petroleum companies. Therefore, a large part of the
oil is pumped to Europe via the Russian network[15].
However, in July 2022 a Russian court threatened to shut the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium’s pipeline, which for 20 years shipped oil to Russia’s Black Sea
port of Novorossiysk[16].
This action prompted the Kazakh government and major foreign producers to set
up contracts for other outlets as a precaution. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s state oil firm Kazmunaigaz (KMG) discussed
with the trading arm of Azerbaijan’s state firm SOCAR to allow 1.5 million
tonnes per year of Kazakh crude to be sold through the Azeri pipeline that
delivers oil to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, BTC). Another 3.5 million tonnes per year of Kazakh crude oil will
start flowing in 2023 through another Azeri pipeline to Georgia’s Black Sea
port of Supsa. Relying on Azerbaijan would allow Kazakhstan to side-step
Russian territory. Moreover, BP Azerbaijan will redirect flows away from the
Baku-Supsa pipeline to the larger BTC pipeline. The new BTC route means
Kazakhstan will have to rely on a fleet of small tankers to take its oil across
the Caspian Sea to Baku from it port at Aktau that has limited spare capacity.
Kazakh natural gas proven
reserves have been estimated at 3 trillion cubic metres and projected reserves
at 5 trillion cubic metres[17]. The country also expects a lot of oil-associated gas that
will bring 1,000 cubic meters of gas for every new tonne of oil (100 million
tonnes of new oil will lead to 100 billion cubic metres of gas). Natural gas production
is utilized for well re-injection, exports and to meet domestic consumption
(liquefaction and development of internal gas pipeline infrastructure). The
country’s gas output - which is mostly associated gas - is forecast to continue
an upward trend, reaching 29.6 bcm in 2027. Gas reserves are mainly located in
the Karachaganak, Tengiz and Kashagan deposits. Annual gas production in 2021
was 29.4 billion m3[18].
Kazakhstan
is also 10th in terms of coal production (106 Mt in 2021[19]),
and in 2021 it was ranked 10th in the world in terms of the value of its
exports[20]. The
size of coal reserves in this country is estimated at over 28 billion tons,
which is nearly 2.5% of world reserves (10th place globally)[21]. However,
it should be emphasized that the consumption of black gold in Kazakhstan is
extremely high and amounted to 1.56 exajoules in in 2021, the same figure
reported one year earlier[22].
The
third key player in the Caspian-Caucuses is Azerbaijan. This country is rich in
oil and natural gas resources. In January 2021, its proved oil reserves were
estimated at 7 billion barrels accounted for 0.4% of global reserves[23]. Oil
is produced both onshore and offshore in the Caspian Sea. The
Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field, located about 100 km east of Baku,
is the largest oilfield in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Basin.
Azerbaijan has three crude oil export pipelines. About 80 % of the country’s
oil is exported through the BTC pipeline, which began operations in 2006 and
has a capacity of 1.2 million barrels per day. It transports crude oil produced
at the ACG field as well as condensate produced at Shah Deniz from the
Sangachal terminal near Baku through Georgia to the Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan in Turkey; from the oil is shipped by tanker to world markets. The BTC
pipeline also transports some Turkmen and Kazak oil[24].
Another pipeline, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline runs from the Sangachal
terminal on the Caspian Sea to the Novorossiysk terminal on the Black Sea in
Russia. It has a capacity of 105000 barrels per day and has been operating
since 1996. The state-owned SOCAR operates the Azerbaijani section and
Transneft operates the Russian section. Despite proposals to increase the
pipeline’s capacity which would be a key transportation addition as production
expands in the Caspian Sea, operation of the pipeline was halted in 2014 and
resumed in 2015 at lower loading levels. In October 2020, the pipeline was the
target of armed attacks by Armenian forces due to the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh
region of Azerbaijan[25][26]. In
January 2021, a deal was signed between SOCAR and Transnieft to transport over
1 million tonnes of oil through the pipeline but from January to February,
2021, no oil passed through the pipeline (rerouted via Turkey instead)[27]. The
Baku-Supsa pipeline transports crude oil from offshore oilfields in the Caspian
Sea to Supsa, Georgia, on the Black sea where it continues to European markets
via tankers. It has been in operation since 1999 and has a capacity of 145000
barrels per day.
In
addition, Azerbaijan has significant natural gas reserves. In 2007, it became a
net exporter of natural gas with the start-up of the huge Shah Deniz natural
gas and condensate field; before then it imported gas from Russia. The country
has two main gas export pipelines. The largest is the South Caucauses Pipepline
(SCP) that transported gas from the Shah Deniz field through Georgia to Turkey
parallel to the BTC crude oil pipeline. It has a capacity of 7 bcm. The second
export pipeline is the Hajigabul-Shirvanovka-Mozdok, which transported natural
gas from Russia to Azerbaijan until 2007 when an agreement between SOCAR and
Gazprom allowed the pipeline’s flow to be reversed, and gas exports to Russian
began in 2010. The country’s production of 10.3 bcm per year became sufficient
to meet its internatl demand of 8.3 bcm. Azerbajian’s Shah Deniz field, which
is considered one of the world’s largest gas-condensate fields located on the
deepwater shelf of the Caspian Sea, is producing approximately 9 bcm per year.
Since its launch in 2006, Shah Deniz has supplied over 96 bcm of gas through
the South Caucasus Pipeline and via the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) mega
pipeline since 2018 to Turkey and Europe. SGC consists of the Shah Deniz-II project
and three pipelines which traverse six countries including Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Turkey, Greece, Albania and Italy. The expanded South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)
is the first segment of SGC connecting Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Shah
Deniz field pumps 16 bcm of gas to Turkey and the European Union annually.
According to Azerbaijan’s Energy Minister Parviz Shahbazov the country has 2.6
trillion cubic metres of proven gas reserves, which could be supplied to
foreign markets. Azerbaijan is expected to start operating its biggest gas
condensate field ‘Absheron’, but also Babak and Umid gasfields[28]. Shah
Deniz II and the SCP pipeline are key parts of the SGC infrastructure project
to deliver Caspian gas to the EU. The other parts are the Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline (TANAP) crossing Turkey to Greece and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline
(TAP) from Greece via Albania to Italy.
Due
to the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan started benefiting from the EU’s pivot away
from Russian energy, boosting oil transit shipments and enjoying high prices
for its own crude oil, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. After
the EU agreed on May 30, 2022, to ban Russian oil imports by sea, Azerbaijan
may serve as an alternative supplier of oil and gas[29].
However, it quickly turned out that Azerbaijan was unable to increase output
due to the lack of spare capacity at ACG (Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli complex of oil
fields in the Caspian Sea). In longer term, if these issues were resolved,
production from new fields could lift Azerbaijan’s oil production.
The last two countries located in the Caspian- Caucasus region, Armenia and Georgia, do not have significant oil
and gas reserves. Gerogia’s 65 % primary energy supply is from external sources[30].
This country is situated on major energy transmission lines and hence is
geopolitically important. Pipelines such as South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)
connects Caspian Shah Deniz gas field to Turkey, the BTC oil pipeline connects
offshore oil fields in the Caspian area to the Turkish coast and European
markets, and Western Route Export Pipeline Baku-Supsa (WREP) supplies Azeri
oil. North-South gas pipeline exports Russian gas to Armenia. Importantly, 60 %
of Georgia’s current domestic gas demand is provided from gas transit fees from
SCP and North-South gas pipelines.
Russian-Georgian
war in 2008 resulted in energy crisis in Georgia and since then there has been
a significant improvement in energy security. The country signed an agreement
with SOCAR to supply gas from the Shahdeniz gas field and the portion of
Russian gas is now limited to in-kind fee for transit to Armenia. However,
Georgia still faces electricity problems because Russia occupies 20 % of
Georgian territory where the power house and switchyard supplying electricity
to Georgia are located there. Therefore, Georgia needs to develop internal
energy resources and diversify energy supplies in the future. Turkey is
considered as most promising market for Georgian electricity but also
rehabilitation of existing interconnections with Armenia and Azerbaijan can
open up new possibilities. Georgia also has own brown coal deposits which can
be used in power sector for security and economic development reasons. In
addition, exploration of shale gas and construction of gas storage facilities
will certainly add to the Georgian energy stability. In October 2022, General
Director of the state-owned Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGS) stated the
interest of Georgia in natural gas supplies from Turkmenistan[31] and
such a preliminary agreement has been reached on deliveries of Turkmen natural
gas and oil to Georgia[32].
This clearly shows that Georgia seeks alternative energy suppliers to become
fully independent from the Russian supplies.
Armenia
has no proven reserves of natural gas and oil, and hard coal deposits are
estimated at 154 Mt with further potential of 317 Mt[33].
There are six coalfields and some shale oil deposits but the economic viability
of mining these deposits has not been determined. However, given its more than
400 mostly small, steep mountain rivers of at least 10 km in length, Armenia’s
small hydropower potential is significant. Energy security in Armenia has
greatly improved since the gas and power supply crisis in the early to
mid-1990’s. Since then, increased natural gas heating, investment in new
generation capacity and the network, and improved operational management have
restored a consistent and uninterrupted supply of electricity and gas[34]. The
gas transmission network comprises 1682 km of pipelines, A soviet-era
connection with Russia through Georgia, and a 2.3 bcm connection with Iran built
in 2009 to barter gas imports for electricity. Since 2007 Gazprom Armenia increased
consumer access to gas, boosting the connection rate from 20% in 2002 to 96.4%
in 2019. It also rehabilitated the Abovyan underground gas storage capacity and
invested in a new gas unit at the Hrazdan-5 power station. As it can be seen,
because of its proximity to Russia, Armenia is an exception in the South
Caucasus, where Azerbaijan and Georgia have kept their distance from Moscow
since their independence. However, in recent years, Armenia has been
diversifying its partnerships and looking particularly to the West[35]. The
economy is a source of rivalry between powers in the South Caucasus. While
Russia remains a crucial player in Armenia, the latter has initiated an apparent
rapprochement with the European Union. Armenia also finds support from its
neighbours, Iran and Georgia. Iran’s share in Armenia’s trade is increasing and
in 2020 Iran became the 3rd largest supplier country for Armenia,
just after Russia and China. Moreover, Armenia intends to construct a railroad
and an oil pipeline between Tabriz in Iran and Yeraskh in Armenia[36]. Georgia
arouses Armenia’s suspicions because its cooperates with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Yet, Tbilisi retains its place as a stable partner with which several
agreements link Yerevan. Georgia is a commercial outlet for Armenia because it
also provides it with almost 90% of its Internet network. However, the 44-day
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was a turning point in the region, with the silence
of the major Western powers leaving the field open to the Russian and Turkish
authorities. Armenia’s destiny, therefore, seems destined to remained tied to
Russian power. However, the economic growth and the multidirectional diplomatic
activity developed by Yerevan suggest that Armenia is seeking to balance its
foreign relations[37]. This
is also reflected in Armenia’s neutrality to the Russo-Ukrainian war. This is
despite the fact that it is facing an extremely fragile situation both
militarily and strategically. Whilst the country is still effectively at war
with Azerbaijan, Russia remains its only strategic partner and is supposed to
help against security threats[38].
3.
Summary
The Caucasus-Caspian
region is a huge storage of raw materials. In a multipolar world, there is no
single 'guardian of order' and regional powers (Russia, China) strive for
expansion and seizing nearby buffer areas into their spheres of influence. In
such conditions, the states of the Caucasus-Caspian region do not seem to be
able to maintain the current level of independence. Strong divisions are still
visible along the lines Uzbekistan-Tajikistan (the water dispute),
Armenia-Azerbaijan (territorial dispute) and Georgia-Abkhazia-South
Ossetia-(Russia) (territorial dispute). All countries in the region compete
with each other in the export of gas, cotton, agricultural products and mineral
resources. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the unexpected appearance of
a new actor, particularly on the Armenian scene, Turkey, a historical enemy of
Armenia and a traditional ally of Azerbaijan. Turkey would like to implement of
communication routes, especially the corridors linking it to the Azerbaijani
enclave of Nakhchivan and opening up access to the Caspian. For Armenia, the
objectives lie in recognizing the Armenian genocide and opening the border.
Nevertheless, if the current international order collapses completely, then one
of the neighbours will reach for Caspian resources. The Russian Federation has easier
access to Caspian energy deposits. Yet, even if the authorities from Moscow
managed to achieve the goal of controlling the Caspian-Caucasian region, the
lifting of the entire region would be extremely difficult, because this region
is beginning to be economically dependent on the People's Republic of China and
Turkey.
Finally, Iran, despite
the appropriate potential due to the fight for its own buffer zones in the
Middle East, is not interested in fighting for influence in the Caspian-Caucasian
region. Such a fight would have to be fought against much more powerful allies
and partners, namely Russia and China.
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[35] Lorgeoux, M,. 2022. Armenia: what degree of dependence on Russia.: https://regard-est.com/armenia-what-degree-of-dependence-on-russia
[36] https://armenpress.am/eng/news/591758/iran-and-armenia-agree-on-constructing-an-oil-pipeline.html
[37] Hemar, M., 2019. Presque 30 ans après son indépendance, où en est
l’économie arménienne?: https://www.afd.fr/fr/ressources/presque-30-ans-apres-son-independance-ou-en-est-leconomie-armenienne
[38] Hovhannisyan, T., 2022. Why Armenia is neutral on the war in
Ukraine.: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/04/12/why-armenia-is-neutral-on-the-war-in-ukraine/
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