China’s Political System: Ideology or Political Manipulation

 

China’s Political System: Ideology or Political Manipulation

Dr. Vakhtang Maisaia

Wojciech Brzozowski

Abstract

In this essay it is presented China’s political system in present according to the definition of “political system”. Putting together information from different sources and comments of its authors will be provided some view on how hard it is to evaluate whether it is an ideology or rather a political manipulation. It is to be advised to treat those informations cum grano salis, because no matter what we learn about China, no matter what we read about it, no matter what we write, we will never be sure how close we are to the truth. It seems that China strictly follows lessons of Sun Zi and stay “formless” or present fictitious form. They remember that “perception is everything”.[1]

 

Essay

Political system consists of state authorities, political parties and organizations and social groups (formal and informal), participating in political actions within particular state and general rules and norms regulating mutual relations between them.[2]

Ideology is a term in philosophy, social science and political science, which describe groups of worldviews used to holistic interpretation and transformation of the world.[3]

According to the definition of political system is introduced Chinese state authorities, political parties and organizations and social groups (formal and informal), participating in political actions.

The highest level act is the Constitution of the People's Republic of China of December 4, 1982, amended several times. The penultimate amendment took place in 2004, after a generational change in the Party.[4] The last one in 2018 abolished, inter alia, terms of office of the President and Vice-President of the PRC. The constitution consists of a preamble and 143 articles.[5]

The Basic Law of China (Constitution) defines the state system as follows: Art. 1 “The People's Republic of China is a socialist country of a people's democratic dictatorship, led by the working class and based on a workers and peasants alliance”. Pursuant to Art. 5 PRC is also a "socialist rule of law". In art. 2 we find a record according to which “(…) full power in the PRC belongs to the people. The National People's Congress, along with other field assemblies at various levels, are the organs through which the people exercise state power". The principle of the uniformity of state power (no tripartite division of power) means that the source of all power, including executive and judicial power, is the people personified in the National People's Congress.[6]

As Andrzej Bolesta claims, the ideological platform is connected with four principles: the leadership role of the party, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the socialist path; Marxist, Leninist, Maoist view.[7]

Igor Szpotakowski, on the other hand, indicates that the ideology of the PRC is based on six pillars: Marxism-Leninism, the view of Mao Zedong, the theory of Deng Xiaoping, the concept of the Three Representations, as well as the concept of Scientific view on development, added to the preamble by the 2018 amendment, and Xi Jinping's view for the new the era of socialism with Chinese specificity.[8]

 

State authorities:

 

1. Legislative power:

 

National People's Congress (Congress of People's Deputies) - unicameral parliament and supreme legislative college. It has full authority in the field of modeling and supervision of other state structures. The highest legislative and control authority at the constitutional level. It elects the president, vice-president, prime minister, deputy prime ministers and minister, chairman of the Central Military Commission, chairman of the Supreme Court, and prosecutor general. It is composed entirely of CCP members, elected in indirect elections for 5-year terms at provincial assemblies, in autonomous regions, separate cities, special administrative regions, and elected from the armed forces. In the years 2013-2018 it had 2,987 deputies. In 2018-2023 - 2,980 deputies. The deputy's manadate is a bound one, which means that the deputies are subject to the control of the electing units and they have the right to dismiss them. Deputies may submit interpellations to the State Council, ministries and commissions that are subordinate to the State Council, as well as submit bills and motions falling within the competence of the NPC. Deputies are entitled to formal and material immunity.

The NPC also includes other bodies such as the NPC Bureau, parliamentary committees and committees of inquiry. Special committees may also be set up.

 

The National Peoples' Congress Standing Committee - consists of the most important party dignitaries. The most important positions in the country are: Secretary General of the Party, President of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister of the State Council, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the NPC.  Has a legislative and control function between NPC sessions. It consists of the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and members, who can only be deputies. Prohibition of performing functions in administrative, supervisory and judicial bodies and in the prosecutor's office.

Such a structure of the legislative power weakens the system of mechanisms for mutual control and balance of state organs. This position of the NPC leads to the recognition of this system as a system of parliamentary government. This is confirmed by the above-mentioned characteristics and description of the competences of the NPC, in particular the right to appoint and dismiss President and Vicepresident of the PRC, prime minister, viceprime ministers and other members of the State Council.[9]

 

2. Executive power:

 

President and Vice-President of the PRC - the term of office is the same as that of the NPC. An important amendment to the 2018 constitution is the removal from Art. 79 of the sentence, defining dual adjudication. In executing the decisions of the NPC and its Standing Committee, it announces bills, appoints and dismisses the prime minister, viceprime ministers, counselors of state, ministers, committee chairmen, the controller general, the secretary general of the State Council, grants state orders and honorary titles, announces amnesty decrees, declares the introduction of a state of emergency, declares a state of war and issues mobilization decrees. The  President represents the PRC, receives foreign diplomatic representatives; executing the decisions of the Standing Committee of the NPC, appoints and dismisses plenipotentiary representatives abroad and ratifies or terminates treaties and important agreements concluded with foreign countries. The Vice-President of the PRC supports the President in his work and may perform the functions and powers entrusted to him by the President of the PRC. The importance of this position is mainly related to the practice of combining it with the function of the secretary general of the CCP, the most important position in party structures, which has been implemented since 1993. Combining both functions facilitates diplomatic contacts for the secretary general, he pays or receives foreign visits as the President of the PRC (state affiliation, not party affiliation).[10]

 

State Council (called Central People's Government) - the central government headed by the Prime Minister. It consists of 20 ministries and special thematic commissions. Two-term prime minister, vice and state councilors. Limited powers in the scope of enacting administrative law. For example, the People's Bank of China (central bank) and the State Economic and Trade Commission are under it’s control. After 1978, the State Council became a technocratic body to which activists with extensive experience in state management were delegated, often with education in science. It received extensive competences in the day-to-day management of the state administration and economy, although the most important decisions directing the state's policy are still made in the highest bodies of the CCP.[11]

 

Central Military Commission - the highest military body in charge of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Armed People's Police and local people's militias. The main task is the security and public order of the country. It includes the most important army commanders. The independence of the military is limited by the civil supremacy over the army and  party supervision is submitted to prevent armed protests in the future. 5-year term of office together with the NPC.

 

3. Judicial power:

 

People's Courts: Supreme People’s Court, Common Courts, Military Courts and other special courts. Public prosecutor's office: Supreme People’s Procuratorate, local prosecutor's offices, military prosecutor’s offices and other special prosecutor’s offices.

 

Supreme People's Court - the highest court in China's judicial system and the final instance for all types of courts. It also settles matters of constitutional importance.

 

Supreme People's Procuratorate - Equivalent to the Attorney General. Cases of corruption, violation of civil rights and political crimes. In practice, politicized like the supreme court.[12]

Art 136 of the Constitution states that the Public Prosecutor's Office is independent, and Art. 138 that the SPP is accountable to the NPC, and local prosecutor's offices are accountable to assemblies at the appropriate levels. This raises doubts as to the independence of the prosecution service.

 

Supervisory committees - a new body added by the 2018 amendment. Division into the State Supervision Commission (central supervisory body) and supervisory committees of various levels. According to Jinting Deng, the decision to set up a supervisory committee led to the transformation of the Chinese anti-corruption model from a two-track system towards the creation of a single anti-corruption agency, which would absorb into its ranks both the already existing structures of the Central Committee for the Control of Party Discipline and a special anti-corruption division of Prosecutor's Office. Therefore, while the supervision committees do not infringe the position of the judiciary, in the case of the Public Prosecutor's Office they will take over some.[13]

 

As Michał Bogusz and Jakub Jakóbowski judge, the formal structure of the state is façade, and the Chinese Communist Party fully controls the state institutions of the PRC, defining their structures, rules of functioning and personnel. This reflects a fundamental feature of the Chinese political system, in which the party is responsible for all key political decisions, leaving the state structures to legally implement and administer them. The main channel of exercising party power over state institutions is personnel policy - CCP members fill all politically important clerical positions according to their position in the party.[14]

 

Party system:

 

The preamble to the Chinese constitution defines the party system of the PRC as "a multi-party system of cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP." In addition to the CCP, there are eight other parties (the "united patriotic front" composed of "democratic parties" recognizing the sovereignty of the CCP): the Revolutionary Committee of the National Party of China, the Democratic League of China, the China Democratic State Building Association, the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the Peasants 'Workers' Democratic Party Of China, September 3 Scientific Association, China Party for the Pursuit of Justice, Taiwan Democratic League of Autonomy. These so-called The "democratic parties" have 378 seats in the NPC (12.7%). The constitution states (preamble) that the party has the duty to "lead the Chinese people along the socialist path according to Marxist-Leninist ideology. This means the principle of unity of state power (high centralization), characteristic of states under the socialist regime.[15]

At the local level, the CCP does not have extensive power due to the functioning of a real democracy and the possibility for the population to elect its representatives. Its position in rural areas has never been strong due to the repression and deliberate omission in development policy. Where key decisions are made - at the state level - the party is the only ruling power. All the most important positions in the country: the President, the Council of State (i.e. the government) and the Central Military Commission are filled by officials of the CCP.[16]

I would like to draw your attention to a very interesting thesis put forward by Michał Bogusz and Jakub Jakóbowski: "The party makes all personnel decisions, controls the internal policy and foreign, it exercises direct control over the army and has an overwhelming influence on the economy through the state-owned enterprise sector. It does not have legal personality, it exists outside the structures of the state, parallel to them and above them, constituting their bond, as well as the only human resources base. Party structures are a place of decision-making and their transmission within the extensive and multi-level state structures of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The CCP therefore plays the role of the state's "nervous system" and in this dimension there is no alternative to it in the present political system of the PRC. " This means that the constitution and the organizational description of the country indicated in it are one thing, but there is also the CCP above. And it is the CCP that should be treated as the actual image of the system - the description of the constitution seems to be a facade in this case.  This is confirmed by another thesis “Under the official image of the party monolith there is a 90 million members, multigenerational and internally complex organization, an arena of constant struggles for power between fractions and interest groups and, more and more often, family clans. The dynamics of power in the CCP, and hence the functioning of state structures, are constantly transformed, which proves the great flexibility of the PRC. "[17] This could explain the abolition of the two-term office of the President and Vice-president of the PRC. It was not so much about empowering the President as about strengthening Xi Jinping's "group" within the CCP. And if this is the case, then it is worth taking a closer look at the structure of the CCP.

Under the statute, power in the CCP comes from the granting of lowest party levels emerging the top leadership through a multi-tier system of electoral colleges. The party structures operate from the basic party cell in the workplace or local committee in a village or district, and their subsequent levels correspond to the administrative division of the PRC. Party delegates to successive levels of territorial division - municipalities, counties, prefectures, and provinces - elect higher-level committees up to the CCP's central congress, where provincial committee delegates form the majority.[18]

The formal structure of the CCP is only a facade. In fact, the main decision-making and driving force in the PRC remains the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and its Standing Committee headed by the secretary general. These organs exercise control over the personnel policy in the CCP and the staffing of lower-level committees. In line with the Leninist doctrine of democratic centralism, the CCP's leadership centers are formed on the principle of co-optation - it is the highest party organs that decide on the vertical promotion of individual members. The appointment of key decision-making bodies is the subject of a constant struggle for power in the CCP, which has always been largely based on fractional politics and client networks, and the system of sending delegates is a facade.[19]

 

The CCP Congress is formally the most important body of the party. It has been held at regular intervals of five years in recent years. The Central Committee of the CCP decides to convene a congress. Approximately 2,300 delegates are elected by 40 electoral units, including provincial party organizations, departments of the Central Committee of the CCP, organs of the central government, the largest state-owned enterprises, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Armed People's Militia (APL) and members of the CCP from Taiwan ( In practice, the CCP tries to find someone who was born in Taiwan or at least had Taiwanese ancestors in order to use the fact of the arrival of a delegate from the "revolting province" for propaganda purposes.). The congress is the only body empowered to amend the CCP's statute, which regulates the mechanics of the internal party. Delegates "elect" the Central Committee from their group, but the candidates are proposed by the departing Central Committee.[20]

 

The Central Committee has 376 members, including 205 full voting members and 171 alternates (non-voting), and is formally the party's most important governing body between congresses. It implements decisions of the congress, conducts party work and represents the party on the international arena. In fact, it is the Central Committee that sets its own tasks. The Central Committee also elects the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CCP, members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP and Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP. In fact, it is the members of the ending term bodies who recommend the new composition, therefore it is reasonable to define co-optation. The Central Committee also appoints members of the General Secretariat and the Discipline Control Commission.

 

The Politburo of the Central Committee consists of 25 people from  the leading members of the CCP - a group of the most important party activists, both at the central and provincial levels. The political power of the Politburo is concentrated in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, which now has seven members and represents the CCP's top leadership with virtually absolute power over the party and the state. Meetings are held on average once a week, during which the Standing Committee takes decisions on current affairs and is to act according to an agenda set by the Secretary general. The way these bodies function is largely hidden, and the procedures that govern them are unknown. Leaks and perfunctory information show that the Politburo has more freedom of discussion than at lower organizational levels of the party, and it acts more as a forum for developing general directions of action and making compromises between particular interest groups. The Politburo often invites different kinds of experts to present selected topics, but they always appear in a darkened room without seeing who is present, and they receive questions through assistants. They are also obliged to maintain full secrecy.[21]

 

The Secretary general, according to the statute of the CCP, has "supreme power and authority over the party, government, and state." In practice, his agency in the entire political system depends on the individual characteristics of the person holding the position and the support he enjoys among the apparatus. Informal requirements are the appropriate age, 55–60 at the time of assuming power, moreover, the candidate must already be in the inner circle of power, that is, in the previous term of office he must already be a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, and preferably of its Standing Committee.[22]

The most important bodies of the Central Committee of the CCP: Central Military Commission of the Central Committee, Secretariat of the Central Committee, Discipline Control Committee of the Central Committee, Organizational Department of the Central Committee, Publications Department of the Central Committee (commonly, also in the internal discourse of the CCP, called the "propaganda department").[23]

A characteristic feature of the political system built by the CCP is the functioning of a number of informal groups and mechanisms connecting members of the party apparatus outside the official decision-making structures. In many areas of party and state management, informal structures are the main space for internal coordination, decision-making, and transmission to lower-level bodies. The informal party bodies de facto bypass and replace the formal decision-making process. This serves not only to maintain full control by the CCP over the state structures, but also to expand the scope of the personal power of CCP activists. Two basic types of informal institutions are the so-called xitong (system) and small management groups. The annual elite holiday in the Beidaihe resort is also of great importance in the decision-making process at the strategic level.[24]

The aforementioned informal bodies known collectively as small leadership groups (lingdao xiaozu) operating at the central level are a real phenomenon of the political system built by the CCP - they are the main decision-making centers in the PRC. This concept covers four categories of groups: (a) working under the direct leadership of the Central Committee or in the Politburo of the Central Committee itself; (b) operating under the central government; (c) formed in the structures of PLA; (d) acting vertically, bringing together people from the various structures of the party-state bureaucracy. Most of the management groups work covertly, have no formal powers and usually operate without any legal basis - their exact number is unknown, and often the composition and scope of tasks as well. The results of their work take the form of internal notes containing solutions and recommendations, and become the official position of the CCP summits, and thus begin to function as guidelines for the administration. Small groups are effective because they shorten the decision-making chain by gathering in one place all stakeholders normally operating on various levels of the bureaucratic ladder, and thus they are able to break decision-making inertia both in the CCP itself and the state administration, including ministries.[25] Estimates based on press reports or statements by people from the management indicate 83 groups in the leadership of the CCP of the 18th Congress (2012–2017). They differ in terms of the scope of responsibilities (from PLA reform and economic restructuring to the issue of the development of football in the PRC) and the frequency of meetings (from regular meetings every month to ad hoc meetings), but also in the way they operate (from loose discussion panels to teams working out specific solutions).[26]

“The CCP is to exercise power holding in its hands" rifle, pen and sword ":" rifle "is an army," pen "is propaganda, and" sword "- in China symbolizing execution - a security apparatus. These are the three indisputable pillars of the communist party's rule, which it will never give up. "[27]

The Chinese Communist Party plays the role of the elite (the group in power) in China. Her position is not only due to the fact that she has been ruling the country for the last 55 years, but also because, especially in the period of reforms, she tried to meet the expectations of the society, in line with hierarchical and ideological constraints. System reforms implemented along with the development policy were supposed to, i.a. changing the negative perception of the CCP in society.[28]

“The Chinese Communist Party is by definition an elite formation. Membership in the party is both a source of personal influence and a proof of achieving success in life. Many of those joining the party today are recruited from the best students in individual faculties - an "invitation" that hardly anyone can refuse. Others are nominated by friends or colleagues who are already in the party. One can still apply for admission with the support of at least one member. Although the statistics do not reflect this, currently the greatest emphasis is placed on recruiting people with higher education and successful people who have the ability to influence the opinions of their surroundings. In each of these cases, admission is determined by several factors, such as social class, family connections, academic or professional achievements, but also the assessment of loyalty and susceptibility to ideological indoctrination. Membership in a party is often perceived not only as a privilege but also as a restriction - the party, by absorbing local elites, largely incapacitates them.”[29]

On the one hand, there is work to improve the intellectual level of party members, and on the other hand, there is talk of the myth of meritocracy, referring to the tradition of Mandarin exams in imperial times. Today, the CCP tries to legitimize its power as a substantive institution, arguing that strict promotion rules ensure that the PRC is ruled by the best in its generation. The achievements of cadre activists are indeed of some importance, but in practice, promotions are often the result of personal games and an element of building their own political base by local party "barons" as well as the main political centers in the Central Committee of the CCP. The transition to a higher level is a product of Beijing's political strength, the strength of its own base, as well as success in the effective management of subordinate jurisdictions (which after 1978 usually amounted to achieving high local GDP growth) and preventing social unrest.[30]

 

Ideology:

 

Officially, Marxism-Leninism, adapted to Chinese requirements by Mao Zedong and expanded by the leaders, constitutes the  ideological basis of the CCP. After 1978, the party left Mao Zedong as the founder of the PRC, but departed from his amalgam of Marxism with traditional Chinese philosophy. According to the constitution of the PRC of 1978, the party builds "socialism with Chinese characteristics", which is a reference to the pragmatic and reducing the influence of ideology on state management philosophy of Deng Xiaoping. Late Stalinism (1946–1953) is, however, invariably a model for internal management and for building relations between the party organization and the state. The CCP today prefers institutional violence over political terror, but does not hesitate to use it in a limited way when it deems it necessary. For the party, ideology is also not a closed work and it continues to evolve, changing with the development of science and technology.[31]

Marxism, however, invariably influences Chinese decision-makers and the party apparatus, while remaining an important cognitive tool, giving it coherence and strength to act. Party elites are subjected to constant training, and a good knowledge of the doctrine is still one of the conditions for promotion. It is Marxism-Leninism that gives members of the Communist Party a whole network of concepts in the field of social sciences, including a perspective on international relations. Ideology is also a tool for controlling the party apparatus, and in several dimensions: (a) through indoctrination it guarantees the internal cohesion of cadres; (b) creates a shared perception of reality, which causes different people in different places to undertake similar actions independently of each other; (c) it is a tool for disciplining personnel - anyone can always be accused of deviating from ideology.[32]

“Ideology is also used to build the authority of the top leaders of the CCP, as well as to set general directions for the party's development. So far, the author's theoretical contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism, formally entered into the constitution of the PRC, was made by five leaders: starting with Mao Zedong ("Mao's Thought"), through Deng Xiaoping ("Deng's Theory"), Jiang Zemin ("The theory of three representations" ), Hu Jintao ("The Concept of Scientific Development"), to Xi Jinping ("Xi Jinping's view on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in New Times"). These actions are to symbolically sanction the supreme position of the leader in the party, but they are also a tool for influencing the way of thinking and acting of the party apparatus. References to the current theories of the leader, containing a general vision of the development of the party and the state, are included in key party documents or sectoral policy projects. Ideology is therefore a kind of guide for the party apparatus, thanks to which each of its members is aware of the priorities of the current leadership.”[33]

After several years of the CCP's relative withdrawal from ideological interference in the everyday life of the Chinese people, the period of Xi Jinping's rule brought a revival of great ideological campaigns. It can be predicted that the role of Marxism will only increase in the coming years, as the party elite is looking for a tool to discipline the lowest party levels and for social control in the period of rapid economic and cultural changes in China.[34]

The essence of Xi Jinping's conservative turn was the internal renewal of the party, the affirmation of its supremacy over state institutions, while restoring the importance of party ideology, increasing control over society and internal "revolutionary" cleansing of cadres. In this respect, the program is conservative - Xi Jinping's policy openly refers to the foundations of the PRC, created in 1949 according to the Leninist-Stalinist state model. In terms of socio-political management, Xi Jinping openly refers to Stalinist concepts, although this is selective in nature and does not include, i.a., mass terror or central planning in the economy. Xi Jinping's rule is characterized by the strengthening of the so-called top management, i.e. a narrow party elite, with the participation of the security apparatus and a military-like disciplined bureaucracy. The essential elements of Stalinist social management are: (a) permanent indoctrination and control of society through manipulation and coercion; (b) striving for the uniformity of the population despite ethnic and religious differences, carried out by administrative methods and the use of repression; (c) bureaucratic centralism; (d) control and formation of mental and cultural life; (e) the cult of personality. All these elements are on the political agenda of the current leadership of the CCP.[35] Xi Jinping's program is of a neoconservative nature - modern tools of social control are used to implement classic Stalinist concepts, and the CCP leadership is also trying to adapt it to a modern, globalized economy. The main difference between Xi Jinping's program and the Stalinist model is the limitation of direct repression to relatively narrow groups (i.a., religious minorities). The leadership of the CCP is trying to increase its control over society with the help of modern information technologies, including the use of artificial intelligence and big data to shape the individual behavior of the people of the PRC, as well as party activists. The second significant deviation from the Stalinist model is the maintenance of the economic model developed in China after 1978, in which the party departed from autarky and central planning in the economy in favor of competition, market mechanisms and partial openness to the world.[36]

Andrzej Bolesta has a different approach to ideologizing the CCP - “the Chinese Communist Party is currently communist in name only. Its power is no longer based on ideology, but on the results of government work, especially in the field of introducing economic system reforms. The CCP has become the ruling elite - the power party, described by some as the rational party of power. However, the scope of this control is much smaller than in the totalitarian period and is still changing. The party's relationship with society and the government is being redefined. Its role, albeit informally, continues to be decisive in legislation and the judiciary. The CCP is a disciplined, though not always coherent, highly centralized structure that performs leadership functions. The immediate support of the leader is no longer made up of ideologists. Their place was taken by technocrats, businessmen, experts in the economy and practitioners. Pragmatism has replaced revolutionary slogans.”[37]

According to Andrzej Bolesta, deidoologization processes are progressing. There has been a shift from ideology to technocracy. The Marxist philosophy, long rejected in government policy, is a collection of slogans enabling the CCP to remain in power. Strong leadership and the separation of party and government structures allow the government to focus on the implementation of the national development program and system reforms. The condition for effective system reforms and development policy is precisely a strong state with sufficient power to carry out difficult changes. [38]

 

Problems - trials and possibilities of overcoming them / The party and Confucianism”

 

The Chinese Communist Party skilfully uses the traditionalist attitude of a large part of society and often refers to Confucian ideas, borrowing many terms from them, as well as an attachment to a certain ritualization of actions. The narrative about the Confucian character of China's contemporary political system and the rich traditions of Chinese statehood is supported by the Central Committee's Publications Department, especially in messages addressed to foreign audiences, in order to expand Chinese soft power and mask the Leninist nature of the party. However, the real translation of Confucian concepts (including social idealism, humanitarianism, attachment to metaphysics) into the functioning of the party itself is limited, and its self-identification and conceptual system are based on Marxism-Leninism. This is especially visible in the case of Xi Jinping, who in his narrative addressed to party members consistently refers to the thoughts and writings of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Xi Jinping also belongs to the first generation of leaders brought up on full Chinese translations of the classics of Soviet Marxism-Leninism.[39]

Contrary to what can be heard about the order and rigor in China resulting from Confucianism, it turns out that pathologies are quite common - nepotism, corruption or embezzlement in the sphere of public finances. This is the result of society's strong ties with the party.[40] According to the information provided by Transparency International, in 2016 China was ranked in 79 out of 176 countries in terms of the Corruption Perception Index (1st place - Denmark). Other indicators point to widespread bribery in business and law enforcement.[41] Amnesty International reports that common phenomena in China are: unjustified imprisonment for opposition activities, restriction of freedom of speech, torture, and other xenophobic repression of the population.[42]

Patryk Janczak points to politicization resulting from the absolute domination of one party and the tradition of guan xi deeply rooted in Chinese culture as the main causes of pathology and the inability to overcome them. It is a social model based on long-term, personal, but informal interpersonal relationships, creating a complex network of connections, generating specific obligations.[43]

After Wei-Wei Zhang, Andrzej Bolesta points out that the limited level of political reforms is influenced by five interrelated factors, which is consistent with the above-mentioned reasons. First, there is disagreement over the redefinition of the role of the party in Chinese political structures; secondly, the reform must entail changes to the party’s personnel system and the nomenclature, and therefore against their interests; third, the reform will have an ad hoc impact on the living standards of millions of people employed in the government apparatus; fourth, the reform would involve the elimination of a privileged position in the economy of many party activists; fifth, there is no example in history where political reforms have been successfully carried out in such a large country.[44]

 

Political system:

 

Proponents argue that China's political system "allowed for institutional regulations drawn from a variety of political and socio-economic systems. The government, on the other hand, has always sought a balance between control of power and freedom, government and political activity, state and society, party control and government activity, as well as between institutional demands and expectations and the maintenance of an authoritarian one-party system. There is also an opinion that it is a specific model of authoritarianism that is largely responsible for China's economic development. In other words, it would not be possible to effectively link systemic reforms with development policy (a necessary condition for the rapid development of transition countries) if it were not for China's enlightened authoritarianism. This system is characterized by the dosed participation of citizens in political processes. Local party organizations give their opinion on national legal acts. The political involvement of other party organizations, apart from the Chinese Communist Party, is increasing. The transparency of the functioning of government structures has increased. Democracy was introduced at the local level of non-urbanized areas. The Chinese describe their system as a collective or Chinese democracy. The concept of collective democracy was created on the basis of the negation of Western democracy. Neo-Marxists - a strong group among the people of science in the PRC - believe that Western democracy is "the competition mechanism that allows the bourgeoisie to take advantage of the working class”.”[45]

According to the concept of enlightened authoritarianism, it is the most developed form of this system, governed by an educated and competent elite, aimed at the economic development of the country. An elite elected in an undemocratic manner. In the enlightened authoritarianism, there are institutions that create a political and economic system, identical to those in a democratic system, but there are no democratic mechanisms, understood as the nation's control over the government. Could China someday be a country with a model of Western democracy? Chih-Yu Shih - the most serious and well-known defender of the collective model of Chinese democracy on philosophical and moral grounds, states that "The PRC will be ideologically ready for Western democracy only if the individualistic perspective is incorporated into the existing collective political culture”.[46]

An authoritarian state is a state in which the supreme power has fallen into hands other than parliament. There is no undisputed evidence of the fulfillment of this feature. In practice, the CCP is the only organization in the country that actually exercises power through the state apparatus. The structure has a dual nature - apart from the official positions and state bodies, there are structures of the ruling party connected to them, sometimes even both positions are held by one person (President Xi Jinping is also the secretary general of the CCP), and the most important political decisions are often taken by party bodies, and only later approved by state authorities.[47]

Another interesting observation by Michał Bogusz and Jakub Jakóbowski on the situation in the CCP: “The essence of the changes carried out by Xi Jinping is the concentration of power in the hands of the CCP leadership, at the expense of sectoral interest groups in the party, local activists, as well as state and party bureaucracy structures at the central level. This is being done through an unprecedented replacement of party cadres as part of an anti-corruption campaign, the development of informal party bodies controlling the decision-making process, and centralized reforms of the state administration. At the same time, Xi Jinping is developing an extensive system of social control based on modern surveillance and artificial intelligence technologies, aimed at both internal ideological discipline of CCP members and preventing any oppositional attitudes in society, as well as shaping behavior at the individual level. Concentration of power and strengthening of supervision is to increase the state's controllability and increase the stability of the society in the face of growing internal and international challenges. The consequent progressive increase in the CCP's control over the economy, however, often runs counter to attempts to create a modern, innovative and largely private-sector economic system. This calls into question the implementation of the most important reform package announced by Xi Jinping - the development of a new model of economic growth for the PRC.” [48]

Another thesis is worth quoting: “Xi Jinping's conservative turn translates into serious changes in the process of creating sectoral policies in the PRC, influencing the decision-making process and communication channels in foreign contacts with the PRC. The personalization of power in China increases the importance of those personally linked to Xi Jinping. Decision-making competences - not only to guide policy, but also for the day-to-day management of the state - are shifted to the formal and informal structures at the CCP headquarters. Depending on the individual policy sectors, decision-making is strengthened either by a significant concentration of prerogatives and positions in the hands of individual people from Xi Jinping's entourage, or by institutional reforms. This creates a new personal mosaic at the CCP summit, in which the importance of people in formal positions is giving way more and more to their political empowerment in Xi's environment and their position in informal party bodies.”[49]

The main tool of the conservative turn implemented by Xi Jinping has been the concentration of power in the hands of the secretary general and his entourage, both within the party and state structures, and centralization between Beijing and provinces, unprecedented for decades. After Xi Jinping took power, he led to the marginalization or breakup of rival party factions. the largest anti-corruption campaign in the history of the PRC. By means of formal and informal tools, he has managed to transfer some of the current state management and reform process to specialized units located at the party's decision-making center, reducing the powers of the government bureaucracy and local authorities. As has happened many times in the history of the PRC, state structures have been restructured and adapted to the new dynamics of power in the PRC, i.a. through the liquidation of some ministries, vertical integration of the territorial administration, as well as the transfer to the party bureaucracy of new powers, which previously belonged to the state. The changes in the functioning of the parties and state structures implemented since 2012 lead to a partial revision of the political system developed after 1978, although they take place within the broad and flexible framework of the Leninist state, established in 1949.[50]

How different is the view of Andrzej Bolesta, who claims that "the introduction of the model of Western democracy in the PRC, with full individual rights and freedoms, is only a matter of time."[51] It seems that he thinks everything is driving towards democracy. Is it? After all, Karl Marx himself, one of the main ideologists of the PRC system, said "For socialism to prevail in a given country, it is enough to introduce democracy in it".

 

Conclusion:

 

Describing China is all the more difficult because all movements and changes are hidden and rarely get into the media. On view results from the evaluation of the constitutional provisions, something else one can see, and something else is invisible to the untrained eye. And what is invisible often turns out to be the most important. On the one hand, we have formally functioning organs, on the other, informal ones that actually have influence. The use of terms known to our culture for individual organs of power is de facto misleading, because we think about these organs from the perspective of our experiences as Europeans. There, however, there is often something else under the well-known name. Merely talking about democracy causes misunderstandings. Saying that there is no democracy in China and that it is not the individual but the collective that counts, may wake an indulgent smile in a Chinese. After all, the religious systems functioning in China are the most individualistic ones. Moreover, as indicated earlier, democracy functions at the lowest level of party. In addition, one of the manifestations of democracy as we know it is the market economy, which also functions in China, especially in smaller business. When we Europeans listen to socialist newspeak and clumps of terminology such as "collective democracy", we wonder how it differs from ordinary democracy? The comparison of an ordinary chair to an electric chair immediately comes to mind.

It seems that the formlessness mentioned at the beginning of this essay is fully reflected here. Observers are confused at every turn. Even knowing the goal that it seems that China wants to achieve does not help, because we think European, as people from the circle of Latin civilization. As the authors of the work of the Center for Eastern Studies suggest, the description of the political system of the PRC must focus more on answering the questions: how the party rules China and who and how rules the party.

It should be noted Patryk Janczak's interesting observation in the context of the reference to the teachings of Sun Zi. Namely, Janczak claims that attention should be paid to the change in the rhetoric of Chinese authorities that has taken place in recent years. While the approved ideology is "Marxism-Leninism", the newest party strand is far removed from orthodox socialism. In 2012, at the CCP congress, the importance of a theoretical system based on a socialist system with Chinese characteristics was emphasized. It was recalled that the reforms did not contribute to the development of capitalism and pompous slogans were promoted about holding the banner of socialism high. Official messages of the Chinese authorities, shown on government websites, are filled with capitalist content - "the decisive role of the free market in stimulating the economy." The party reassures that capitalism in the socialist version is the beginning of the road towards full communism.[52]

 

Resume:

 

According to the definition of ideology provided in the beginning of this essay, we can say that Chinese political system is an ideology and is filled with ideology. It is a worldview which has ambitions to interpret and transform the world and as we see those ambitions realize around us. It is also a political manipulation because as I presented something else comes out from analysis of constitution and something different comes out from analysis of facts available.

 

Sources:

[1]Sun Zi i jego Sztuka wojny. Filozofia i praktyka oddziaływania na bieg zdarzeń. Praca zbiorowa pod redakcją Piotra Plebaniaka, Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne, Kraków 2020 r.

[2]https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_polityczny

[3]https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideologia

[4]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

[5]Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

[6]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[7]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[8]Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia     Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

[9]Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

[10]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[11]ibidem

[12]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

[13]Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

[14]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[15]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

[16]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[17]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[18]ibidem

[19]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[20]ibidem

[21]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[22]ibidem

[23]ibidem

[24]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[25]ibidem

[26]ibidem

[27]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[28]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[29]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[30]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[31]ibidem

[32]ibidem

[33]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[34]ibidem

[35]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[36]ibidem

[37]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[38]ibidem

[39]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[40]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

[41]ibidem

[42]ibidem

[43]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

[44]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[45]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[46]ibidem

[47]Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

[48]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[49]ibidem

[50]Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga” autorstwa Michała Bogusza, Jakuba Jakóbowskiego, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.

[51]Andrzej Bolesta – „Ustrój polityczny Chin” – miesięcznik „Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

[52]Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

Additional Sources. 

1. Constitution of the People's Republic of China". National People's Congress. 20 November 2019.

 

2. Constitution of the People's Republic of China". National People's Congress. 20 November 2019.

 

3.  Unger, Jonathan; Chan, Anita. "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model". The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs. 1995

 

4. Unger, Jonathan; Chan, Anita (January 1995). "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model". The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs.

 

5.  The Development of Socialist Consultative Democracy in China". english.qstheory.cn. Archived from the original on 9 March 2017. Retrieved 13 May 2018.

 

6. Andrzej Bolesta, “Ustrój polityczny Chin”, “Dziś”, nr 11, 2004 r.

 

7. Michał Bogusz, Jakub Jakóbowski, “Komunistyczna Partia Chin i jej państwo konserwatywny zwrot Xi Jinpinga”, Warszawa, Wrzesień 2019, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich

8. Patryk Janczak, “Współczesny system polityczno-ekonomiczny Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej” KWARTALNIK PRAWO-SPOŁECZEŃSTWO-EKONOMIA, 2/2017

9. Igor Szpotakowski, “Konstytucyjne ramy systemu rządów w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej”, Białostockie Studia Prawnicze, 2019 vol. 24 nr 4.

10. Sun Zi i jego Sztuka wojny. Filozofia i praktyka oddziaływania na bieg zdarzeń. Praca zbiorowa pod redakcją Piotra Plebaniaka, Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne, Kraków 2020 r.