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CSTO and Afghanistan Crisis: Capability and Possibility to Win a Game

 

CSTO and Afghanistan Crisis: Capability and Possibility to Win a Game

Professor Vakhtang Maisaia 

  

Upon approaching to the southern borders of the CSTO countries, except Turkmenistan and partially Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan left Collective Security Treaty Organization – SCTO in 2012), by the “Taliban” forces, neatly at the end of June of 2021 the CSTO leadership expresses great concern on that matter. On June 28, 2021 the first statements were declared on providing key military support in accordance to Moscow Agreement signed up on 14 May 2002, mainly Article#4 that directly provides collective defense principle if one of the member-state is attacked by the third party, it is to be considered as the attack to all member-states. The statement done by Vladimir Zainetdinov, press-secretary of the CSTO. He mentioned that if Tajikistan applies for military assistance due to some reasons, the CSTO will provide immediate support. Later, on July 2, 2021, the Secretary General of the CSTO Stanislav Zass paid visit to Dushanbe to hold consultations with Tajikistan leadership. It happened soon after when the “Taliban” seized on Afghanistan territory key transit spot on river Panj on place named Sherhan-Bander. When “Taliban” got under control the whole Tajikistan-Afghanistan border line across and also Turkmenistan-Afghanistan and Uzbekistan-Afghanistan borders and more than 1.500 Afghani state border servicemen interned to Tajikistan territory, than Tajikistan official representative to CSTO during the online business conference officially Hassan Soltonov claims military support and Tajikistan mobilized more than 20 000 reservists for combat activities. The consultations of the CSTO representatives were held in accordance of Article#2 and Article#3 of the Moscow 2002 Agreement, founding legal act of the CSTO (see Photo#1).

Russia began to reinforce its allies and even Uzbekistan that is not a member of the CSTO but already intruded into the game against “Taliban”. During the period of August 5 till August 10, 2021 in Tajikistan, in military polygon in Harb-Maidon in 20 km from Afghanistan state border zone will be hold triple military drills with involvement of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. From the Russian side, Russian military contingent more than 1000 soldiers and officers (military unit#01162) deployed in Tajikistan takes place and more than 200 entities of armament (like armored vehicle BMP-2, combat tanks T-80U and T-72 together with bombardment Air Force jets SU-25 and SU-25M) participates in the drill. According to Commander in Chief of the Operational-Strategic HQ “Centre”, Colonel-General Alexander Lapin main scenario of the drills is very realistic and close of those scenario of spillovering of the “Taliban” forces into territories of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and the drill scenario contains: preparatory stage, working off destruction of possible “Taliban” militants entering into territories either of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan and also destruction concentrated militants on Afghanistan territories aimed of supposedly encroached on these territories. Russia has already delivered to Tajikistan 20 entities of the armored vehicle BMP-2 and mobilize on airdromes of the “Centre” HQ air strategic jets IL-76 and IL-80 as well as combat aviation wings and the same was done by the Uzbekistan side which mobilize their SU-25 jets participated in the drills. At the same time, Russian 201st military base were reinforced with the same vehicles BMP-2 entities (as the machines are very efficient in dessert-rocky terrain). At the same time Russia has handed over its newest military technology to Uzbekistan – complex of reconnaissance, control and communication complex “STRELEC” that was fixed in Namangan military polygon where Uzbekistan Airborne Special Destination Brigade deployed. The complex is mini mobile computer with wide capabilities starting with of communicate among the military servicemen and ending to organize military drone management. The complex was exploited and tasted in Syrian war.   

Photo#1: The CSTO state-representatives online conference on situation in Tajikistan


On August 3, 2021 in Uzbekistan at the military polygon Termez near the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan state border launched joint Russo-Uzbek military maneuvers (see Photo#2). The maneuvers are holding in parallel time frame with Tajikistan drills and it is very symptomatic certainly. The maneuvers include more than 1500 militaries from both sides. The polygon is situated in rocky place in Surkhandary District of Uzbekistan. The Uzbeki side provides with heavy military technique to the Russian militaries involved in the maneuvers. The maneuvers is being lasted for days and will finish just at the same day as do the drills in Tajikistan. The provision that both drills are finished at the same day is very important and worthy. It seems that based on the drills the Russian Federation is going to create special regional army grouping with participation of two Central Asian countries Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that directly corresponds to the CSTO Moscow Agreement Article#7 articulates with those statement that member-states of the CSTO in order to beef up collective security measures are fulfilling collective defense in a way of creating special army groupings:

1)      Coalition (collective) Armed Forces HQ in aegis of the CSTO

2)      Regional (joint) Army Grouping HQ

3)      Peacekeeping Forces with proper military infrastructures and systems of governance

Hence, it comes out that in order to response to “Taliban” attrition and spill over from Afghanistan into Central Asian states, Russia namely created the Regional Army Grouping with joint HQ run by the Operational-Strategic Command HQ “Centre” (Russian Federation) with involvement Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and the aim of the grouping is to not only provide collective defense but also if necessary to penetrate Afghanistan-Uzbekistan or Afghanistan-Tajikistan borders and enter into Afghanistan northern provinces. It is also concluded that Uzbekistan by doing so, de-facto re-joined the CSTO for sure.  

Photo#2: Russian and Uzbek militaries in the joint maneuvers August 3, 2021 in Termez (Uzbekistan)   



Brief review of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan military capabilities:

 

Tajikistan: The Tajik Armed Forces are very weak and to compare with other Central Asian states very small in size. The Tajikistan Armed Forces consist of 8.8 thousand regular Army and 7.5 thousand National Guard militaries. The combat tanks are 30 entities of T-72 and 7 entities of T-62, 23 armored vehicle of BMP-1 of 23 entities (+ newly added 17 entities of BMP-2 from Russia), 23 entities of armored car BTR-60 (Soviet made). Tajikistan does not possess Air Forces and only has 15 entities of strike and transport helicopters of MI-24 and MI-8. The main defense is provided by the 201st Military Base of the Russian Armed Forces with 5 thousand militaries.

 

Uzbekistan: The Uzbeki Armed Forces consist of 48 thousand, including 24.5 thousand Army. The Armed Forces are distributed with three Military District where each of them possess three Brigades of Tank, Airborne and Infantry ones. They are fully completed with by staff. The combat tanks consist of 70 entities of T-72, 100 entities of T-74 and 170 entities of T-62 as well as armored vehicles of BMP-2 entities of 270. The Uzbekistan Air Forces composing of squadron of MiG 29/MiG 29 UB jets; Squadron of SU-27/SU-27B, bombardment Air Regiment with SU-24, two Air Squadrons of strike jets SU-25/SU-25BM, transport Air Squadron of AN-24, C295W and TU-134 jets as well as two helicopter brigades of MI-24, MI-26 and MI-8.  

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