The Central Asia Actors Balance Geopolitics and New Game

 

The Central Asia Actors Balance Geopolitics and New Game

 

By Professor Vakhtang Maisaia

 

The geopolitics of the Central Asian countries has changed recently due to numerous events in the world. Most of these countries have opted for a multi-vector foreign policy and economic diversification. The process of changing the approach to these issues has been forced by the war in Ukraine and by Russia's attitude itself. These countries, which are economically dependent on Russia, are increasingly feeling the sanctions imposed on Russia and are trying to find alternatives at various levels. Recently, there have also been major changes in the internal politics of these countries, such as the January protests in Kazakhstan, which strengthened the power of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, or the transfer of power in Turkmenistan from father Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow to son Serdar Berdimuhamedow. The issue of internal tensions, such as the unrest in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan or the fighting in Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan, is not without significance. One of the key elements in shaping cooperation between the countries is the issue of drinking water. This has long been a source of conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This is something of a paradox when you look at the economic problems of the countries in the region. Countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which are rich in natural resources such as oil and gas, have problems with access to drinking water. On the other hand, the two poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have water resources due to their mountainous location and the fact that the largest rivers in the region originate there. Central Asia is an area rich in natural resources, which naturally attracts the attention of China, but also Turkey, Azerbaijan and the European Union. In addition, its proximity to Afghanistan, where the Taliban rule, forces countries such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. All of these factors have shaped the foreign policy approaches of these countries. In order to better understand this process, it is necessary to look at each of them in more detail.

The analysis of changes in the geopolitics of the Central Asian countries should begin with Russia and its recent activities in the international sphere. All Central Asian countries, i.e. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, were part of the Soviet Union, which led to a very strong Russian influence in the region. Russia's invasion of Ukraine showed these countries that Russia was beginning to pursue an imperial policy, seeking to rebuild its former influence, including territorial influence in the former territories of the Soviet Union, which could pose a threat especially to Kazakhstan, which borders Russia directly and has a large Russian minority in the north of the country. Major failures on the Ukrainian front and the protracted conflict mean that the Kremlin's full attention is focused on Ukraine, which could allow the countries of Central Asia to change their foreign policy, something that countries such as China, Turkey and Iran will be keen to exploit. On the other hand, the conflict in Ukraine has led to the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia, which are also causing price rises and inflation in the Central Asian countries, which are still closely linked to Russia economically. Given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is also worth looking at the reaction of individual countries in the region.

As the largest country in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has the most confrontational foreign policy towards Russia. Most observers were surprised by Kazakhstan's stance and expected support from Kazakhstan after Collective Security Treaty Organisation troops helped quell protests in the country in January. The Kazakh government refused to send Russian troops to Ukraine. It cited provisions in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation treaty that allow its troops to intervene on the territory of Collective Security Treaty Organisation member states. Ukraine is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stressed that Kazakhstan does not recognise the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics. Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Uzbekistan issued a statement saying that the Republic of Uzbekistan recognises the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It did not recognise the independence of the Lugansk and Donetsk republics. It also stated that military operations must be stopped immediately. At the same time, Uzbekistan cannot afford a sudden and permanent deterioration in trade relations with Russia, so politicians in Uzbekistan, anxious to maintain friendly relations with Russia, decided to impose an information blockade, which remains in place to this day. State channels broadcast only fragmentary material about the situation in Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is trying to be very restrained in its criticism of Russia's actions in Ukraine. At the start of the war, under pressure from the Kremlin, the Kyrgyz government banned anti-war protests. This led to a diplomatic crisis between Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and the recall of the Ukrainian ambassador from Bishkek. The Kyrgyz government's stance should come as no surprise. The country's economy is heavily in debt. More than 30 per cent of Kyrgyz people work in Russia, and remittances account for 30 per cent of the country's GDP. Over time, voices from the foreign ministry have been heard saying that Kyrgyzstan values the principle of territorial integrity. The country's disastrous economic situation does not allow for greater criticism of Russia. Tajikistan is in a similar situation. Like Kyrgyzstan, it has a very bad economy and a large part of its population works in Russia. There is also a Russian military base in Tajikistan, where 8,000 Russian troops are stationed. A reduction in the number of Russian troops could lead to an increase in terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists. In view of the terrorist threat and the poor economic situation, the Tajik government has refrained from criticising Russia over the war in Ukraine. The authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan have not officially taken a position on the war in Ukraine, but they support Russian actions in every way possible. At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Tajik television imposed an information blockade. At the moment there are messages that are in line with Russian rhetoric. Turkmenistan, true to its principle of total neutrality, has refused to comment on the war in Ukraine. Despite the lack of an official declaration, there are signs that Turkmenistan is joining the Russian camp. On 10 June, 2022, during his visit to Moscow, Turkmenistan's President Serdar Berdimuhamedow signed a declaration on an enhanced partnership with the Russian Federation. The conclusion of such an agreement during the war indicates a lack of interest in the Ukrainian problem among the elites in Ashgabat.

The war has undermined Russia's credibility as a state interested in maintaining order in the post-Soviet space, but more than that it has shown that the Russia is actively destabilising that order. As a result of Western sanctions, Moscow's attractiveness as an economic partner has declined significantly. The immediate consequences of the war in Ukraine for the Central Asian states include increased public discontent, heightened fears of Russia and attempts to find alternative trading partners. For centuries, Russia has been a key factor in stabilising all processes in the region. Its relations with countries include economic and military cooperation, as well as economic emigration. Russia has built its position through integration structures of a political (Commonwealth of Independent States), military (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and economic (Eurasian Economic Union) nature. The most important moment for Russia as a regional patron and arbiter was the intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, which enabled the immediate suppression of social protests and confirmed Russia's position as a local guarantor of order. Moscow's position remained unchallenged despite the periodic American military presence as part of the mission in Afghanistan. Russia is a strategic, if not always the most important, trading partner, investor and transit route (e.g. for the export of Kazakh oil). It is also the dominant direction of emigration. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is of great significance for the disruption of order in Central Asia. Russia has challenged its will to stabilise the post-Soviet space and undermined its ability to guarantee or revise the regional order. From the Central Asian perspective, Russia has become the main challenge to the stability and development of the region and its individual states. The main manifestation of Central Asia's concern and distancing from Russia is the lack of political and military support for Russia. As a result, there is growing open concern in Kazakhstan's media, elites and society about repeated suggestions in Russia about the artificiality of Kazakh statehood or claims to northern Kazakhstan with its very large Russian minority. At the same time, each of the region's republics has taken steps to assert its own sovereignty and isolate its own society from the conflict. An important change has been the erosion of Russia's economic attractiveness. An example is the repeated threats to close or limit the capacity of the main export route for Kazakh oil, the KTK/CPC pipeline to Novorossiysk, which carries about 80% of all Kazakh oil, but also Moscow's firm opposition to plans to build the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Another important process in the region is growing economic insecurity, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The economies of these countries have been dependent on the Russian labour market and remittances from economic migrants for years. From being a stabilising force in Central Asia, Russia is becoming a destabilising force. The result is a cautious but consistent search for alternative stabilising factors and, above all, new economic partners. These processes are complex and risky for the region. Russia's ability to exert economic and military influence in Central Asia is weakening. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Zhaparov cancelled joint autumn military exercises with the Collective Security Treaty Organisation because of Russia's support for Tajikistan against Kyrgyzstan in clashes on their common border, and condemned Russia's general anti-colonial culture. Similarly, Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon, normally a reliable Russian partner, publicly accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of disrespecting the region's smaller states and not paying enough attention to the needs of all Central Asian states. He said that Russia was not treating Tajikistan as an equal strategic partner. President Rahmon said that Russian businessmen were only interested in energy resources and were not investing in the development of Tajikistan's economy. The Kazakh government has announced that it does not plan to sign a new military agreement with Russia in early October 2022. In the face of President Putin's general mobilisation, Russia has lifted quotas for Uzbek migrants to work in critical industries as the country struggles with labour shortages. On 10 November, the government lifted existing quotas that allowed only 11,000 Uzbek workers to work simultaneously in the construction and agro-industrial sectors under organised migration programmes. The migration programmes are still in place, but there are no limits on the number of workers Russian companies can hire under them. Moscow has also dropped the requirement for workers to have a Covid-19 vaccination certificate or a negative test result. Another important factor destabilising relations between Russia and the Central Asian states is the attempt to conscript citizens of these countries into the Russian army and then send them to fight in the war in Ukraine. In September, the Russian State Duma passed a law offering a simplified route to Russian citizenship in exchange for at least one year of service in the Russian armed forces. In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian armed forces. Before this decree was signed, foreigners could only serve in the armed forces as contract soldiers. Citizens of countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as citizens of these countries with Russian passports, were involved in the war from the beginning. Because of its losses in Ukraine, Russia tried to use deception and blackmail to threaten potential soldiers with the loss of their citizenship if they refused to join the armed forces. The main motivation for Central Asian citizens to fight in Ukraine is the promise of an accelerated path to Russian citizenship and high compensation. Despite constant attempts to recruit people from Central Asia, there is little evidence of their large-scale involvement in Russia's war with Ukraine. Migrants from Central Asia are aware of the colossal losses suffered by the Russian army in Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have issued stern warnings to their citizens against fighting in Ukraine. 

The issue of access to drinking water resources is not without significance for the future of the region. It has repeatedly been a source of regional tension in the region and even military conflict between individual countries in the Central Asian region. Water is crucial to the agricultural and energy sectors of the Central Asian countries, and therefore to their economies. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are countries located on the lower reaches of the region's rivers. In addition, most of Turkmenistan's territory is covered by desert. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have large areas of desert and steppe. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are located in the upper reaches of the rivers and in the rich mountain waters. During the Soviet Union, all countries were part of a single water management system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the management system collapsed and competition between countries began. The World Food Organisation's 2021 report shows that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are among the world's most water-deficit countries. The amount of water they use relative to their resources is 169% and 144% respectively. This compares with 62% in Tajikistan, 33% in Kazakhstan and 50% in Kyrgyzstan. The situation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is critical, making access to new water resources strategically important for these countries. These were also the countries in the Soviet Union most affected by inefficient water management for cotton cultivation. As a result of this policy, the Aral Sea dried up, causing an environmental and social disaster in Karakalpakstan, the autonomous republic of Uzbekistan. Over the past 10 years, there have been more than 150 conflicts on the common border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with casualties on both sides. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been unable to demarcate more than 1,000 kilometers of their mutual borders, making conflicts over borders and water resources commonplace. One of the causes of water conflict in Central Asia is the main river basin, where the run-off from Mountain Rivers is shared between the three countries through which the Fergana Valley flows: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Together with the Isfara River and the Tortkul reservoir near the Vorukh exclave, they are at the center of water politics and growing tensions in the region. Every year, during the irrigation season from April to June, there is a conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan over the use of water resources, as the two countries share some 40 water channels. Kyrgyz farmers living downstream complain that Tajiks living upstream use most of the water. Each Central Asian country has experienced some of the worst droughts in the last five years, leading to shortages of water for irrigation and hydropower. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have plenty of water upstream, Uzbekistan is entirely dependent on a steady supply of water for its food security. As a result, claims to water resources in the fertile Fergana Valley are likely to become an increasing source of conflict throughout Central Asia. Access to water resources is a highly controversial issue. This is illustrated by the border demarcation between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two countries signed a border agreement in September 2022. One of the points was the transfer of the KempirAbad reservoir in western Kyrgyzstan to Uzbek control. The dam itself will be managed by a joint commission. This decision did not sit well with the local population, who began protests that spread to the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. The decision also led to a heated debate in parliament. The opposition argued that it was an important source of water for the economy and rice crops in that part of the country. In the end, despite domestic opposition, the documents were signed. The issue of access to the Kempir-Abad reservoir is a major success for Uzbekistan. Conflicts also arise over the use of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which are Uzbekistan's main water arteries. Water levels in these rivers are crucial for Uzbekistan, but depend on Tajikistan's policies. There have also been water conflicts in the recent history of the two countries. The loudest was over the Farkhad hydroelectric power station near the city of Shirin on the Uzbek-Tajik border. The resolution of the power plant case came after the death of former Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the rise to power of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has a very good personal relationship with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. The countries finally reached an agreement in 2018. An interesting example is the relationship between Kazakhstan and China over Lake Balkhash. It is the second largest lake in Central Asia after the Caspian Sea. Balkhash is divided into two parts: freshwater and saltwater. It is 80 per cent fed by water from the Ili River, which originates in China's Xinjiang province. Kazakhstan warns that the lake's water level is falling dangerously and that the entire reservoir is at risk of a disaster similar to that of the Aral Sea. The problem is Xinjiang's soaring water consumption. In the 1970s, just over 7 million people lived in Xinjiang; now the population is over 25 million. As the population grew, so did agriculture, especially cotton farming. The Chinese also built a hydroelectric power station and dams to regulate the flow of water in the lower reaches of the Ili River, reducing the amount of water flowing into Lake Balcharz. The problem is serious because the tributaries of Lake Balkharz are home to 3 million people, about 15% of Kazakhstan's population. The water from the lake will also be used to cool the nuclear reactors in the planned nuclear power plant on Lake Balcharz. The lake's water level is therefore of strategic importance to Kazakhstan.

Another factor that could affect the geopolitics and geostrategy of Central Asian countries is the recent protests and social discontent, particularly in countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The past year has been a turbulent time across Central Asia, which has been affected by a number of factors, including the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the effects of the war in Ukraine, climate change, droughts and heat waves. Although the reasons for this year's protests in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are different, there are some similarities. A common thread linking these protests is the reluctance of governments to truly test public opinion and implement difficult changes without wider public consultation. In such cases, Central Asian governments tend to publish their own narratives of what happened. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has increased the sense among ruling elites in Central Asia of the threat of separatism and the possible incitement of such movements by neighbours. To understand these actions in detail, we need to take a closer look at the largest protests in individual countries in the region in recent times.

The first country where protests took place was Kazakhstan. Protests in Kazakhstan broke out on 2 January, 2022 in the city of Zhanaozen in the west of the country. They quickly spread across Kazakhstan. They were directly caused by the increase in gas prices, which acted as a catalyst for years of growing discontent with social conditions and abuses by the authorities. The demonstrations were spontaneous, with political slogans directed at local authorities and former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. On 5 January, public buildings were attacked, including the presidential residence in Almaty, the city hall, the media offices and the airport. Similar situations occurred in other cities. There were also clashes with the police. The situation spiralling out of control forced Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to abandon the policy of concessions to the demonstrators, to remove Nursultan Nazarbayev from his position as head of the Security Council and to call in the forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. On the night of 5-6 January, 2022, at the peak of nationwide social protests in Kazakhstan, the Collective Security Treaty Organization decided to launch the so-called anti-terrorist operation. The first troops arrived in Kazakhstan on 6 January, 2022. According to the version adopted by the authorities, the protests were prepared by terrorist forces controlled from outside and supported by the National Security Committee. The terrorist threat was supposed to be the formal reason for requesting assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, as well as for dismissing the influential head of the National Security Committee, Karim Masimov, and charging Masimov with treason. The protests undoubtedly affected both Tokayev and former President Nazarbayev himself, who supported him. They provided an opportunity for changes in the state elite and confirmed the enormous tensions in the state apparatus. By staying in power, Tokayev is strengthening his position on the domestic scene. This is at the expense of internal rivals, as the purges of the National Security Committee and the government show. A breakthrough in the crisis in Kazakhstan has been the intervention of Collective Security Treaty Organisation troops. According to official figures, more than 2,000 troops took part in the intervention, mainly from Russia, but also from Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. They provided protection for strategic facilities in Kazakhstan. The intervention was an expression of support for Tokayev. The intervention in Kazakhstan was the first mission and manifestation of Russian power since the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in 2002. On January 19, 2022 the state of emergency introduced in connection with mass riots ended in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the withdrawal of Collective Security Treaty Organisation troops was completed. The government has taken a number of measures to deprive former President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the formal titles that would allow him to influence the situation in the country. On 19 January, 2022 the lower house of parliament adopted amendments abolishing Nursultan Nazarbayev's lifetime chairmanship of the Security Council. The head of the National Security Committee and former prime minister, Karim Masimov, was recalled and subsequently arrested, and his deputy, Samat Abish, was dismissed. Tokayev also dismissed Defence Minister Murat Bektanov. In the following weeks, the following were dismissed or forced to leave: Kairat Sharipbayev, chairman of the board of QazaqGaz, Dimasz Dosanov, chairman of the board of KazTransOil, billionaire Timur Kulibayev, head of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs Atameken. Kairat Satybaldy was arrested on charges of embezzlement. On 16 March, Tokayev gave a speech summarising his actions to date and announcing a systemic reform. In order to prevent similar crises in the future, President Tokayev drafted a constitutional reform, the assumptions of which he presented in mid-March. A constitutional referendum was held in Kazakhstan on 5 June. Almost 80% of voters supported the adoption of a package of amendments covering more than a third of the articles of the constitution. A total of 56 changes were made. The new solutions, which were finally adopted on 5 June, aim to improve the management and functioning of the state by decentralising decision-making process, limiting the scope for abuse and corruption, and ensuring broader social representation in parliament. The death penalty has finally been abolished. The President managed to stabilise the situation after the January crisis and to maintain an independent policy in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The preparation and implementation of the constitutional reform proves that he has taken real control of the state and freed himself from Nazarbayev's influence. On 20 November, 2022 the incumbent head of state, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, won the early presidential elections in Kazakhstan. According to official results, he won 81.3% of the vote. The next country where protests took place was Uzbekistan. On 25 June, 2022 the Uzbek authorities published a list of some 200 amendments to the constitution. On 1 and 2 July, 2022, mass protests were held in Nukus, the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, against the amendments to the Uzbek constitution, which include the abolition of Karakalpakstan's autonomous status and its right to secede from the country by referendum, the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years and the right to run for re-election, which would allow him to remain in office until 2040. The Republic of Karakalpakstan is an autonomous part of Uzbekistan, occupying 40 per cent of Uzbekistan's territory, while the region is home to about 7 percent of the country's population - about 2 million people, most of whom are Karakalpaks and related Kazakhs. The current constitution of 1993 contains a chapter 17 devoted entirely to the Republic of Karakalpakstan. The two main theses of this chapter are that Karakalpakstan is a sovereign republic and that the population of this republic has the right to secede from Uzbekistan on the basis of a referendum of the people of Karakalpakstan. It was these paragraphs, which were to be removed from the new version of the constitution that caused outrage among the region's inhabitants. The republic faces a number of ecological problems linked to the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Under the conditions of an authoritarian political system, the republic's autonomous status was only formal. The authorities in Tashkent attempted to defuse the situation politically, while at the same time using force to quell the demonstrations. The Uzbek authorities sent additional National Guard troops to Karakalpakstan in response to local protests. Protests took place in the cities of Chimbay, Mujnak and Nukus. A 30-day state of emergency was declared in the region and an information blockade, including the Internet blockade. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to Nukus and announced the withdrawal of these proposals to the local parliament. The decision to withdraw the changes to Karakalpakstan's status was confirmed by the Uzbek parliament on 4 July. The brutal repression of the demonstrations is a signal to all the country's inhabitants that the gradual liberalisation of the system does not mean consent to demonstrations. The tensions in Karakalpakstan are a particular manifestation of processes that affect the whole country. The cautious liberalisation of the system under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has thawed a number of social and political problems that had accumulated over the years of President Karimov's rule. A group of politicians and ideologues has emerged in the presidential administration who firmly believe that autonomy is separatism. This idea prevails among many representatives of the Uzbek government. Politicians are convinced that sooner or later Russia will apply the example of Crimea, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the countries of Central Asia. Uzbek politicians wanted to resolve the issue of the republic's status quietly, but they did not expect such a strong reaction from the people of Karakalpakstan. Another region where social manifestations have taken place is Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan. The situation in this troubled region has been tense since November 2021, when security forces fatally wounded Gulbiddin Zijobekov, a local resident wanted for kidnapping. Locals gathered at the time to demand an investigation into Zijobekov's death. The crisis began on 14 May after harsh sentences were handed down to those involved in the November 2021 rallies. The demonstrators sent an ultimatum to the authorities demanding the resignation of the Vilayet Chairman and the Mayor of Khorog and the abolition of the pass regime. After the ultimatum expired, a demonstration took place on 16 May, resulting in the blocking of the road leading to Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. The Interior Ministry said in a statement on 17 May that the latest unrest began when a group of people acting on the orders of one of the local leaders, Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, attacked the Interior Ministry offices in Khorog. On 18 May, the Tajik authorities began to pacify the protests in Gorno-Badakhshan. During the dispersal, clashes broke out with the use of Molotov cocktails and small arms. The Tajik government has imposed an information blockade, including cutting off access to the Internet. GornoBadakhshan is an autonomous region of Tajikistan, occupying more than a third of the country's territory and home to some 200,000 people. Its distinctiveness stems from geography as well as ethnic, religious and historical differences. Since Tajikistan's independence in 1991, GornoBadakhshan has been a base for rebel forces during the civil war. The region's mountainous terrain makes it difficult to navigate, and its economy has been devastated by unemployment, harsh living conditions and high food prices. Tensions between the government and the people of the troubled region have been rising since a five-year civil war broke out shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then, the region has remained largely in information isolation. Communication with the rest of the country remains difficult, and a system of checkpoints has been set up on internal roads. In Tajikistan, problems related to the inefficiency and brutality of the regime and the very bad economic situation are piling up. Dushanbe's problems have forced Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to publicly ask Moscow for its willingness to send troops to the region, as it did in Kazakhstan in January. So far, Russia has not responded to these appeals. Neighboring Afghanistan poses a religious threat to Tajikistan. It is an Islamic sect led by the Aga Khan, which the Taliban oppose but which has a large following in northern Afghanistan and especially in Gorno-Badakhshan in Tajikistan. If the Aga Khan gains influence, it could trigger Chinese intervention, as China sees him as a dangerous threat. The long-term destabilization of Gorno-Badakhshan is a major challenge for the whole of Central Asia. It is also a serious challenge for Russia and China, which share a border with Tajikistan and are concerned about the threat of destabilization in Xinjiang. An additional problem for Russia will be to maintain its credibility in the eyes of China as a force for stability in the region.

 Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia is unable to pay the same attention to the Central Asian states as it did before the war broke out. Other countries with interests in the region, i.e. Turkey, Iran, China and European Union, will certainly want to take advantage of this opportunity. Turkey is looking to Central Asia for alternatives to its strained relations with the West. Following the September summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Uzbekistan, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey intends to become a full member of the organization. Turkey is increasing its involvement in Central Asia through a series of trade and defense deals, as well as arms sales. In March, Erdogan visited Uzbekistan. Ten agreements were signed during the visit, and both countries committed to increasing bilateral trade to $10 billion. Similarly, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Turkey in May 2022 and signed 15 bilateral agreements to strengthen Kazakhstan's strategic partnership with Turkey. Tokayev noted that since Kazakhstan began using Turkey's shipping lanes, the time for transporting cargo from Kazakhstan to Istanbul has significantly decreased from 60 days to 13 days. Arms sales have strengthened Turkey's image in Central Asia. Turkish drones used by Ukraine to destroy Russian military equipment have attracted the interest of Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have bought Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones. Kazakhstan has agreed to begin domestic production of Turkish Anka drones. Turkey remains highly dependent on external energy supplies. Ankara is particularly interested in securing energy supplies and transport corridors that are not monopolized by either Russia or Iran, which is seeking to develop its own trade with Central Asia. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, which has access to the Caspian Sea, could lead to greater access to Turkmenistan's vast gas reserves, with simultaneous trilateral cooperation. Such efforts are likely to bolster Turkey's ambitions with energy infrastructure projects such as the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which aims to pump gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and on to the Southern Gas Corridor, which runs through Turkey to southeastern Europe. On June 15, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with the new leader of neighboring Turkmenistan, President Serdar Berdimuhammedov. As a result of the talks, it was agreed to sign a cooperation agreement for the next 20 years. Iran has agreed to resume imports of Turkmen natural gas through the long-disused Korpeje-Kurtkui pipeline after paying an outstanding debt of $1.8 billion. Iran continues to weaken international sanctions against its regime over its nuclear policy. Turkmenistan, which is reviving its contract with Iran, is expanding its potential natural gas export options. Iran's efforts to improve relations with Turkmenistan are in line with President Raisi's initiative to strengthen his government's policy of deepening relations with its neighbors. The intensification of contacts between Tajikistan and Iran in the current situation was influenced by the war that began in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian armed forces, Russia withdrew some troops from the 201st military base in Tajikistan to take part in the war in Ukraine. The accelerated development of relations between Tajikistan and Iran can be explained primarily by the desire to strengthen security on its southern borders. After the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, Tajikistan was for a long time the only country in Central Asia that did not make contact with the Taliban. The Taliban now have units made up of Tajiks hostile to the government in Dushanbe. Emomali Rahmon arrived in Iran, where he met with many senior officials, including Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. The trip ended with the signing of 16 agreements in areas such as trade, transportation, and energy. China supported Kazakhstan's measures to quell the riots that took place in January 2022. Chinese officials described them as the work of "external forces" trying to carry out a "color revolution." Kazakhstan accounts for half of China's trade with the five Central Asian countries. Xi Jinping met with all five Central Asian presidents in 2022. In talks with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the leaders discussed plans to deepen the strategic partnership. Xi's meeting with

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon focused on importing green technologies to Tajikistan.

President of Turkmenistan Seydar Berdimuhamedow paid a state visit to China on January 56 2023 at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. During the visit, the two presidents announced the upgrading of Sino-Turkmen relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. China has established comprehensive strategic partnership with all Central Asian countries. At the regional and multilateral level, China has proposed the establishment of the China-Central Asia Cooperation Mechanism (C+C5), a new format for multilateral cooperation between China and Central Asian countries outside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. At the same time, China has signed Belt and Road Initiative cooperation agreements with all Central Asian countries. Connections such as cross-border railways, gas and oil cooperation, trade and investment are key to the Belt and Road Initiative agreements. Turkmenistan is the largest supplier of natural gas to China. Turkmen gas is pumped to China through three lines of the 1,833-kilometer Trans-Asian Gas Pipeline through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Beijing and Ashgabat are pushing for a planned fourth pipeline, the 1,000-km Line D, which also connects

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and will eventually increase annual supply capacity from Central

Asia to 85 billion cubic meters per year from the current 55 billion cubic meters. The Sino-

Turkmen talks mentioned a cross-border railway, following the increased interest in the ChinaKyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project raised by Xi Jinping during his visit to Uzbekistan last year. The high number of meetings between leaders demonstrates the importance China attaches to Central Asia, which is playing an increasingly important role in Chinese diplomacy. In recent years, the EU has changed its perception of Central Asia. In October 2022, European Council President Charles Michel made his first official visit to Astana and met with the leaders of all five Central Asian countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The EU-Central Asia Leaders' Summit was held for the first time as Russia's importance in Central Asia has diminished as a result of the war with Ukraine. The EU intends to intensify its cooperation with Central Asia in order to realize its geo-economic ambitions of increasing Euro-Asian connectivity through which goods, people and services can flow freely. To this end, the EU has sought to strengthen relations with Central Asian countries through a bilateral approach based on mutually beneficial Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA). The EU implemented the EPCA with Kazakhstan and also signed an interim trade agreement with Turkmenistan. In July 2022, the EU and Uzbekistan successfully concluded three years of talks and signed a new EPCA in Brussels. In addition, the revised EU strategy for Central Asia states that Brussels is also involved in the implementation of the EPCA with other interested Central Asian countries - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The EU is particularly interested in strengthening cooperation with Central Asian countries in addressing common security issues such as radicalization, extremism, terrorism, hybrid and cyber threats, and nuclear safety.

 

                                                                                                                                                    Dr. Vakhtang Maisaia     

 23 December 2023, Tbilisi, Georgia