China Geo economic Code and its Global Economic Engagement (OBOR)

 China Geo economic Code and its Global Economic Engagement (OBOR)

By Joanna Tung

Vakhtang Maisaia

 

 

 

Introduction:

     Chinese BRI initiative as one of the biggest global investment project received a lot of attention and is extensively discussed among the scholars and policymakers.  Motives and methods behind the One Belt, One Road are subjected to scrutiny and criticism, and across the literature the initiative is being branded anything from Chinese Marshall Plan to “debt trap” and “new colonialism.” This paper will try to answer the question whenever depicting BRI Initiative as a predatory form of economic statecraft, seeking to ensnare poor countries for geopolitical ends is justified. In order to do so it will explore the genesis and the motivations of BRI and then will discuss the priorities, financing and performance of China’s investments in the BRI from the angles of geographical distribution, routes and projects.  Final part is committed to perception of One Belt, One Road and its advantages and disadvantages.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Genesis of the One Belt, One Road initiative

     The intention to revive the old Silk Road tradition was first shown by President Xi in 2013. The Chinese proposal consisted of two projects comprising overland and maritime, routes. The first one, called the Silk Road Economic Belt, was announced in September during a speech at the Kazakhstan University in Astana. The second so-called Maritime Silk Road opened with a Chinese leader speech in Indonesia. Initially, both projects were referred to under a common name: One Belt, One Road (OBOR), which was later transformed into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

     In Kazakhstan, Xi Jinping proposed deepening economic ties and cooperation as well as expanding the space for development between Eurasian countries from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea. The means to achieve these goals was to strengthen policy communication and people-to-people exchanges, improve road connectivity, promote trade facilitation and enhance monetary circulation. President assured regional partners that: “China respects the development path as well as the domestic and foreign policies Central Asian people have independently chosen for themselves. China will never intervene in internal affairs of Central Asian countries, seek leadership in regional affairs, or operate sphere of influence. To strengthen mutual support and to be good friends with sincerity and mutual trust. “[1]

     During the Jakarta speech president promised strengthening maritime cooperation with ASEAN countries and building The Maritime Silk Road for the benefit of common development, peace and prosperity by using huge space and grow potential of the region.

In president’s own words: “China cannot achieve development in isolation from the world, and the world also needs China for development. China is fully committed to the path of peaceful development, the independent foreign policy of peace and the opening-up strategy for win-win results. A stronger China will add to the force for world peace and the positive energy for friendship, and will present development opportunities to Asia and the world, rather than posing a threat. China will continue to share opportunities for economic and social development with AESAN, Asia and the world.” [2]

     He showed readiness to upgrade the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and proposed the establishment of an Asian infrastructure investment bank. 

The assumptions of the OBOR framework were not innovative but were borrowed from the popular in the mid-1990s, concept of Peaceful Development, according to which China's own development and stability is contingent on shared prosperity with its international economic partners, especially those in the developing world.  The Silk Road initiative fits well with the presented by Xi fenfayouwei (striving for achievement, SFA) foreign policy strategy, that aims at making more friends by letting others benefit from China’s growth.

     With new Silk Road initiative Xi “sold” to the world vision of peaceful and inclusive cooperation towards common good, development and prosperity under China’s leadership. The vision that portrays China as friendly, open and committed to grow and support everyone that needs it became a key tool of Beijing’s diplomacy in the incoming years.

Motivations

     From a domestic perspective, OBOR aims to rebalance regional development between the advanced coastal regions and the under-developed western regions within China and address China’s overcapacity. 

On the international level the development and investment initiatives was originally devised to link East Asia and Europe through physical infrastructure including creating a vast network of railways, highways, energy pipelines  and streamlined border crossings, both westward, southward, and the rest of Southeast Asia. While the Maritime Silk Road project involved investments in the development of ports along the Indian Ocean as far as East Africa and parts of Europe and aimed at recreating and widening traditional navigation routes. On top of the physical ties Chinese initiative aims to connect countries on business and cultural levels. In the decade since, the project has expanded to Africa, Oceania, and Latin America and, according to Council of Foreign Relations, currently up to 147 countries either already have signed on to projects or indicated interest in doing so.[3]  With two-thirds of the world’s population and 40 percent of global GDP affected, China has significantly broadened its economic and political influence. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is considered the Chinese response to American pivot to Asia and is interpreted as an institutional framework and largest platform for economic cooperation that primarily favours trade, enhance investment and is actively involved in the construction of complex global infrastructure network. Through project promoting the objective of closer economic integration, China attempts to change the international relations landscape and boost its image by actively helping many developing countries to grow their infrastructure and enhance trade and investment. However Beijing’s primary objectives are to increase their own share of global commerce, bilateral trade with numerous potential partners and its overseas direct investments. “In addition, OBOR should benefit China's access to natural resources that are needed to sustain its medium- and long-term economic growth, such as food, oil and natural gas, as well as other strategic minerals.”[4]

     By assumption, BRI’s investments in infrastructure and government-level international cooperation, support and policy coordination, should boost outward direct investment flows from China by improving the availability and quality of logistics facilities in the participating countries and considerably lower their political risks for Chinese firms investing there.

The investment are concentrated around 6 corridors:

1.      New Eurasia Land Bridge: rail link to the Baltic Sea in Poland via Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus

2.      China, Mongolia, Russia Economic Corridor (rail and road)

3.      China, Central Asia, West Asia Economic Corridor

4.      China Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor

5.      China, Pakistan Economic Corridor: (Kashgar city to Gwadar port)

6.       China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor.

 

Priorities

     Cooperation within OBOR is based on five priorities. Number one priority stresses the improvement of infrastructure along the OBOR routes in order to get an efficient infrastructure network connecting all sub regions (such us: highways, railways, aviation, shipping and pipelines and electricity, postal services, customs, border defence, quality inspection and planning). Second, is policy co-ordination that involves an intergovernmental mechanism for the exchange of macroeconomic policies and communication and the promotion of intergovernmental cooperation at several levels. Third is open trade that encourages cooperation in new industries, the development of mutual investment areas and the removal of obstacles to investment. Fourth priority is taxation integration, the establishment of a stable exchange rate system, further strengthening financial cooperation, the establishment of a regional financial early warning system and the issuance of renminbi bonds. Number five is focusing on the connections between people by promoting tourism (by streamlining visa application procedures in OBOR member countries), facilitating cultural exchanges between students and scientific and technological cooperation and research collaboration.

Forms of investments and financing

     “Outward direct investment (ODI) and construction contracts are the two major forms of China’s investments in the BRI countries. The value of China’s total investments and construction contracts in BRI countries during 2014–2018 amounts to $573.31 billion. Both ODI and construction contracts experienced a rapid increase in the first five years of the BRI.”[5]

 

Source: He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180; https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

 

Source: He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180; p.145

https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

 

87% of BRI funding come from Chinese state-owned banks mainly from CDB, Exim Bank of China, ICBC, Bank of China, the China Construction Bank (CCB) and the Agricultural Bank of China.  The figure includes government-sponsored bilateral funds (two percent) and the BRI bonds. The other 13 percent of BRI funding is supported by multilateral financial institutions, enterprises’ equity financing in Chinese capital markets and the Silk Road Fund.[6] “The Silk Road Fund” - the state-owned fund with total assets of $40 milliard exclusively focusing on investments for the BRI was established by the Chinese government in 2014. Additionally, there are some multilateral and bilateral funds jointly sponsored by other governments and China (such as i.e. China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (CAF)), however China’s state-owned banks are usually the major sponsors behind them. Besides Chinese state own banks two multilateral development banks AIIB and New Development Bank provide loans for projects in countries and regions along the Belt and Road.  Only a few large private enterprises such Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent participated in the investment in BRI infrastructure projects, however the private sector is increasingly getting involved in the BRI by investing in trade and economic cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road.

     OBOR initiative is based on debt financing. [7] “A 2021 study analyzed over one hundred debt financing contracts China signed with foreign governments and found that the contracts often contain clauses that restrict restructuring with the group of twenty-two major creditor nations known as the “Paris Club.” China also frequently retains the right to demand repayment at any time, giving Beijing the ability to use funding as a tool to enforce Chinese hot button issues such as Taiwan or the treatment of Uyghurs. In January 2022, Nicaragua officially joined BRI, one month after severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.”[8]

 

Projects and geography

     One of the major part of One Belt One Road is China, Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) the transit hub that thanks to connection to Arabian Sea routes could with time diminish China’s sensitivity to Malacca Strait issue and bring it closer to oil exporting countries   The investment involves numerous large projects such as power plants, wind farms, roads, industrial parks, high speed rail lane and the extension of the deep-water port in Gwadar. Other flagship projects and investments in the region include new train line through Laos and high-speed rail and freight rail through Southeast Asia. Additionally Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and Sri Lanka received milliards of dollars’ worth of loans to build power plants, highways, bridges, power and deep water ports.  In Central Asia, Beijing is focusing on the energy sector by building pipelines in Russia and buying oil fields in Kazakhstan and cooperating with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan it also plans to build almost 7,000-kilometre long high-speed railway from Beijing to Moscow.

     China’s investments are spreading also in Europe and Africa. China has invested in railway connection between Chengdu and Łódź and has agreed to finance a 400-kilometre railway line from Budapest to Belgrade. In regards to the Maritime Silk Road, it will lead to already expanded Greek port in Piraeus and China has plans to upgrade ports in Lisbon and Duisburg. Since 2015 Beijing has also been encouraging Western developed economies to join the BRI and as an effect in March 2019, Italy became the first G7 member to join the initiative.

     Africa is the largest regional component of BRI as 46 African nations that have signed onto the initiative. This represent over 1 milliard people and cover about 20 per cent of the Earth’s landmass. “Africa, as an important raw materials supplier, is also included in this project. In January 2015, China agreed with the African Union to help build railroads, roads, and airports to link all 54 African countries at the cost of over US$ 26 billion. The plans include a 1,400-kilometre-long coastal railway in Nigeria,a 800-kilometre-long railway in Kenya, a 740-kilometre railway linking Djibouti and Addis Ababa, and a 1,400-kilometre network of rail lines in Chad Other Beijing’s maritime plans include modernisation of the ports in Tanzania and Mozambique. “[9] In 2017 idea of BRI extended into Latin America. By the first half of 2019 China had signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with 19 countries in this region including Venezuela, Chile, Panama and Costa Rica.

BRI themes

     BRI themes are ever-expanding and are now including the Digital Silk Road, the Green Silk Road initiative and the Polar Silk Road.[10]By May 2019 China had already signed MoUs with 16 countries on building the Digital Silk Road which focuses on intensifying cooperation in frontier areas such as nanotechnology and quantum computing, artificial intelligence, digital economy, and advancing the development of big data, cloud computing and smart cities and promote Chinese standards and services. However in this fields Beijing has advantages in wireless internet (5G), internet and telecommunications technologies, and is providing key digital infrastructures in these sectors. Behind the idea of Green BRI lay the promotion of green, low-carbon and sustainable developments. The BRI International Green Development Coalition was officially established in 2019 and will act as a platform for green technology transfer, policy communication and environmental knowledge sharing.

     Since 2013 the idea of Polar Silk Road through the development of the Arctic shipping routes has been raised. Additionally the sector-based Silk Roads, such as an energy Silk Road, an air Silk Road and an electricity Silk Road, were suggested.

Global perception of OBOR initiative

     The implications of OBOR are still heatedly debated in China and abroad as Beijing’s initiative provokes controversy and debt-trap diplomacy has become a common accusation against BRI since 2017. China’s investments are often carried in underdeveloped, low income countries that that take on large amounts of debt to fund infrastructure upgrades.  OBOR could potentially worsen the existing problem of government debts as many local governments rush to implement the OBOR strategy without careful consideration of efficacy and productivity. Even though China uses ostensibly peaceful tactics, Beijing views BRI projects as a commercial endeavour, loans with close to a market interest rate are expected to be fully repaid and not all countries can afford it.  In some of them overall debt to China has soared since 2013 above 20% GDP. [11] Particularly since market became unstable due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine many countries struggle to repay loans associated with the initiative that contribute to budget deficit and debt crises. Due to costs of CPEC Pakistan, for example, required bailout from the International Monetary Fund and in Ghana and Zambia, high debt loads that partly consisted of BRI loans led to sovereign default. Former prime minister of Malaysia Mahathir bin Mohamad campaigned against overpriced BRI initiatives and cancelled $22 billion worth of BRI projects.

     Some BRI investments have involved opaque bidding processes and required the use of Chinese firms and Chinese workers, thus limiting the benefits to the host country and inflating the costs. Criticism is pointing at lack of transparency, government control, obscure business practices, human rights abuse, and a neo-colonial character of trade relationship with developing countries. Beijing has been accused of paying low wages, unfair practices concerning the usage or its own companies disregard to international standards binding the Western competitors. Additionally China has a negative history related to worker safety, corporate governance and environmental standards and its financial help is criticised for its approval of authoritarian regimes.

     China is also facing criticism in relation to contribution to climate change. Nearly half of all BRI spending goes to non-renewable energy investments. Beijing committed to stop building coal-fired power plants abroad in 2021 however the conditions regarding the application of this promise remain ambiguous.

     “Meanwhile, the United States shares the concern of some in Asia that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development and military expansion. President Joe Biden has maintained his predecessors’ skeptical stance towards Beijing’s actions, but Washington has struggled to offer participating governments a more appealing economic vision”.[12]

     Among the Asian countries, India shows far-reaching distrust of China's intentions. For a long time it have been trying to convince international opinion that Beijing creates unsustainable debt burdens for its Indian Ocean neighbours in order to seize control of regional choke points and their true ambition is to obtain regional hegemony. Similar approach is presented by Japan.

     BRI initiative is causing mixed reaction in Europe. Participating countries such as Greece and Hungary have obstructed bloc-wide efforts to criticize China, however in December 2021, the EU announced Global Gateway, a $300 billion infrastructure investment program explicitly meant to rival BRI and French President Emmanuel Macron suggested the BRI could make partner countries “vassal states.”

     Particularly worrying for the big geopolitical players are locations of new ports built by China for economic reasons. Placed on the Indian Ocean rim and the Arabian Sea, such us Pakistani port of Gwadar (situated strategically on the Strait of Hormuz), or the Sri Lankan Colombo Harbour, they may as well be used for military purposes.  Also, Beijing’s already has considerable economic influence in Africa and it managed to integrate a military and security component into its economic partnerships with African states.  In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti, situated at the strategic entrance to the Red Sea corridor. Very recently heavily indebted to China Equatorial Guinea presented Beijing with an opportunity to establish a naval base on the Atlantic. Since Guinea is not only African nation with a high indebtedness to China where Beijing plays a central economic development role, it is possible that other Chinese naval bases may yet appear on Africa’s Atlantic coast. “The pursuit of large-scale commercial infrastructure signals strategic intent, and the expansion of China’s military presence across Africa in the wake of the BRI is not unexpected. Beijing’s adroit interweaving of economic soft power and hard power has produced a symbiosis between the growing number of Chinese commercial enterprises across Africa and the proliferation of China’s new security arrangements across the continent. While economics played the lead role in this military-economic development complex, the dynamics appear to be entering a new phase.“[13] The consolidation of Chinese military power on the continent combined with the already considerable economic influence makes Africa a forward-base for Beijing to project power directly towards North America and Europe and constitutes a threat to US hegemony and Europe’s position in international affairs.  

     China has already eclipsed the World Bank and IMF as world’s largest source of development credit to the rest of the world. In 2020 and 2021 the sharp deterioration of the BRI’s loan portfolio was observed. It was driven mainly by pandemic but also flaws in the programme’s design and caused China’s first overseas debt crisis.  Implementation of infrastructure projects financed by China’s two big policy banks and its state-owned commercial banks was often  speed up by absence of environmental and social impact studies that would help decrease the risk. Another design shortcoming is the selection of risky key debtors such as Russia, Angola, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Iran Pakistan, Venezuela and Argentina. Deteriorating financial conditions in debtor countries plus project-specific problems necessitated, in 2020 and 2021, renegotiations of loans of the total value of $52 milliards.[14] The renegotiations mostly involved loan write-offs, deferred payment schedules and reductions in interest rates.

     “However, the allegation that the Chinese government deliberately put countries in the BRI into a debt trap is not based on solid evidence. Academic studies on China’s overseas lending by three institutions have provided data that suggests this claim may be inaccurate. The Center for Global Development finds that the “BRI is unlikely to cause a systemic debt problem in the regions of the initiative’s focus”. The data from the China-Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University shows that non-Chinese lenders still held the majority of the debt in 17 countries that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified as in or at risk of “debt distress”. Based on their studies of China’s investments in Latin America and the Caribbean, researchers at the Global Development Policy Center concluded that Chinese loans alone did not cause these countries to go above the IMF’s debt-sustainability thresholds. Venezuela is the only exceptional case.”[15]

          Despite the criticism China has managed to increase its global attractiveness and drastically  changed its picture of a dangerous country to a constructive player in many parts of the world “Kurlantzick (2007) describes China's increasing presence in the world and the influence of soft power throughout the world as a ‘charm offensive'. He was shocked to learn that in South East Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Latin America, China's influence in local communities is spreading. Even in Australia, which is considered the closest country to the U.S., nearly 70% of Australians have a positive opinion of China.”[16] Big infrastructural project s can change the fate of the undeveloped countries that often are overlooked by big global creditors. They create the jobs, secure the undisturbed transportation of people, natural resources (especially oil) and other cargo and can increase commercial attractiveness of the country. The establishment of economic cooperation zones, increased technology exchanges, and employment opportunities grow the national economies, increase the prosperity and foster economic and social changes. As part of BRI initiative, China offers those countries exactly what they are craving immediate financial help, speedy development, understanding of their internal problems and political backup with no questions asked.

 

Conclusion:

Alex He argues that the debt-trap accusation fails to understand the essential part of why China’s investments in BRI projects caused debt distress. He states that BRI projects originated in China’s long-established state-driven overseas investment mode which typically can lead to many problems and risks, including non-transparency, corruption, lack of local participation and lower economic efficiency. The SOEs and state-owned banks treating the BRI as a political task, the economic returns and debt sustainability of the investments are not the top priorities for them and low economic efficiency and debt risks are inherently caused by soft budget constraints and guaranteed government bail-out.  On top of this most of the BRI countries offer an unfavourable investment environment with a higher political and economic costs, and high risk of default. Extra risks to Chinese investments is added by fact that Beijing is ready to drop some necessary requirements in order to beat the competition and over a short span of time invest huge amount of loans and investments in one country that is not capable of absorbing it.

     China cannot be exclusively blamed for problems resulting from the implementation of BRI, this approach only allows domestic elites to evade accountability. The so-called debt trap is the result of the actions of both parties of investment agreements, but this fact is often neglected when assessing Beijing’s initiative. China’s development financing system is recipient-driven and it is typically initiated by foreign governments and rely on host-country governance, China could not simply force other nations to accept projects on their territory. Terms and conditions have to be agreed on the both sides and recipients have to allow Chinese SOE to undertake the projects, therefore they are not hapless victims, but active participants in shaping outcomes. From this perspective it is clear that Beijing is not driven purely by some grand “evil” strategy but its actions are an effect of adaptation of Chinese business interests into the ‘development strategies’ of recipient countries.

     Many developing countries have limited capacity to assess projects’ viability or ensure their appropriate governance and rational development planning is often overwhelmed by greed and protecting the interests of powerful minorities. However it is also responsibility of their governments to ensure that projects are viable and financially sustainable and have developmental benefits for local people. Since relationship with Beijing it is a business contract and China is driven by profit making, recipients should bargain harder to make sure that deal benefits both sides. They should also be accountable for their domestic regulations and enforcement capacities.

     BRI responds to the genuine need of countries often overlooked by multilateral development agencies due their poor credit score or unstable regime and its high risk appetite is creating unique and hard to resist opportunities. However Chinese development financing has several pathologies such as weak governance, poor planning and inadequate due diligence driven by desperate need for contracts that often yields poor results at high cost to both parties. Without the initiative, willingness and cooperation of the recipient countries BRI’s project financing would never be implemented.  Dependence on the decision of the third party negates existence of the Chinese coherent geopolitical aims it also indicates that debt problem of the recipient countries is largely self-inflicted.

     So called “debt-trap diplomacy” is the result by the intersection between powerful political and business interests seeking to exploit the BRI for gain and associated governance shortcomings on the Chinese and recipient sides.  China may not be luring developing countries into debt dependency but it is skilfully manipulating the outcome of the recipient financial troubles for its political gains.

 

Bibliography

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https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

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-          Krukowska Monika; „China’s ‘one belt, one road’ strategy and its implications for the global world order”; https://www.ejournals.eu/pliki/art/7886/

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-          Premarathna P.K.B. Isuru; „China’s Economic soft power and Challenges in OBOR Project: a Study Based on China”; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue III, March 2021|ISSN 2454-6186; https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-5-issue-3/472-482.pdf

-          Steil Benn; “Belt and Road Tracker”; Council on Foreign Relations; https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

-          Tanchum Michael; “China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America” 14 Dec 2021; https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/;

-          Xiaoyu Pu; „One Belt, One Road: Visions and Challenges of China’s Geoeconomic Strategy”; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312533416_One_Belt_One_Road_Visions_and_Challenges_of_China's_Geoeconomic_Strategy

 

Websites:

-          ASEAN-China Centre, Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament 03 Oct 2013; http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm

-          Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Toronto ; “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries” 07/09/ 2013 accessed 21/06/23; http://toronto.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/201309/t20130913_7095490.htm

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[1] Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Toronto ; “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries” 07/09/ 2013 accessed 21/06/23; http://toronto.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/201309/t20130913_7095490.htm

[2] ASEAN-China Centre, Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament 03 Oct 2013; http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm  accessed 22/06/23

[3] McBride James, Berman Noah, Chatzky Andrew;  “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

[4] Premarathna P.K.B. Isuru; „China’s Economic soft power and Challenges in OBOR Project: a Study Based on China”; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue III, March 2021|ISSN 2454-6186 p.478 ; https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-5-issue-3/472-482.pdf

 

[5] He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180 p. 148 ; https://systems.enpresspublisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

 

[6] He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180; https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

 

[7] Premarathna P.K.B. Isuru; „China’s Economic soft power and Challenges in OBOR Project: a Study Based on China”; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue III, March 2021|ISSN 2454-6186; https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-5-issue-3/472-482.pdf

 

[8] McBride James, Berman Noah, Chatzky Andrew;  “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

 

[9] Krukowska Monika; „China’s ‘one belt, one road’ strategy and its implications for the global world order”; https://www.ejournals.eu/pliki/art/7886/

[10] He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180; https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

 

[11] Steil Benn; “Belt and Road Tracker”; Council on Foreign Relations; https://www.cfr.org/article/belt-and-road-tracker

 

[12] McBride James, Berman Noah, Chatzky Andrew;  “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

 

[13] Tanchum Michael “China’s new military base in Africa: What it means for Europe and America” 14 Dec 2021; https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/

[14] “China’s emerging Belt and Road debt crisis” 27 July 2022; https://www.ft.com/content/eb2d89f6-afd1-491e-b753-863e9727f6de

[15] He Alex; “The Belt and Road Initiative: Motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of Xi’s ever-expanding strategy”; Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development (2020) Volume 4 Issue 1. DOI: 10.24294/jipd.v4i1.1180; https://systems.enpress-publisher.com/index.php/jipd/article/view/1180/895

[16] Premarathna P.K.B. Isuru; „China’s Economic soft power and Challenges in OBOR Project: a Study Based on China”; International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS) |Volume V, Issue III, March 2021|ISSN 2454-6186; https://www.rsisinternational.org/journals/ijriss/Digital-Library/volume-5-issue-3/472-482.pdf