Energy Resources and Foreign Policy of the small post-soviet states and its reflection on the regional stability of South Caucasus Region
Energy Resources and Foreign Policy of the small post-soviet states and its reflection on the regional stability of South Caucasus Region
By: Nika Chitadze. Ph.D.
Director of the Center for International Studies. Tbilisi, Georgia
Abstract
The purpose of this research paper is to
analyze the interconnection between energy resources, oil and gas in
particular, and national security and foreign policies of the post-soviet
small/weak states of South Caucasus. It is proposed that the formation of foreign
policies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are related not only to great
powers but also to the internal economic factors such as oil and gas reserves
or respective export and/or transit capabilities of energy resources.
This research argues that states with rich oil
and gas reserves or export/transit possibilities (oil and gas factor) are more
likely to get rid of the influence of the neighboring great power - Russia,
and, thus, to distance themselves from the military alliances and economic/political
international organizations created by Moscow. In contrast to this, the state
with no oil or gas reserves and no export and/or transit capabilities stay
closely aligned with Russia, which is significantly caused by the energy
aspects.
Keywords: South Caucasus, Oil, Gas, Energy
Resources, Foreign Policy.
Introduction
The energy factor has come to world politics
with the beginning of an industrial era. Before that people were fighting for
territories (pastures and fields), or deposits and control over trade routes,
and so on. The XX century has added to the fight for energy resources carried
on using all available economic, diplomatic, and military ways. Aspiration for
control over energy resources has turned into a major factor in world history.
After the collapse of USSR, the new
geopolitical realities have been created in global politics and especially in
the post-soviet space. Together with such a positive event as the
disintegration of the last totalitarian empire - USSR, at the beginning of the
1990s of the 20th century, at the same time, several political and interethnic
conflicts have been emerged in the post-soviet space, first of all in the Black
Sea/Caspian Region.
By this, competition in the Black Sea/Caspian
Region grounds on prospect estimations of the Caspian oil and gas scopes. And
here it’s noteworthy that the states of the Black Sea/Caspian area evaluate
noticeable growth of the scopes of Caspian gas production as a serious and
promising factor of assurance of their energy security. Black Sea/Caspian
states act in the role of energy “bridge” to deliver Caspian hydrocarbons to
Europe. To our mind exactly the node Pre-Caspian – Black Sea region is turning
into the frame of new international relations, which are in the stage of formation,
reserving a possibility of turning the two regions into a separate geopolitical
area.
The issue of the geopolitical configuration of
forces in the Black Sea/Caspian Region is greatly connected with the trend of
foreign powers influencing the processes, happening within its borders and out
of their lines and with the establishment of new exporting pipelines by-passing
Russia to minimize the Moscow`s place and role in the region.
The small states of the South Caucasus:
Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators
According to the existing quantitative and
qualitative indicators, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are considered small
countries. In particular, the population and area of all three countries of
the South Caucasus are small - about 3 million people live in Armenia and
Georgia, and 9 million in Azerbaijan; The area of Armenia is 29 thousand
square meters. Km does not exceed, Georgia - 69 thousand, and Azerbaijan - 86
thousand (CIA, The World Factbook, 2016). The military strength of the South
Caucasus countries (military infrastructure, military personnel, weapons, etc.)
is insignificant compared to other large states, however, it should be noted
that Azerbaijan's growing military budget ($ 1.6 billion) and upgraded military
equipment are outdated by outdated Russian equipment in Armenia and It makes
some difference compared to the small military budget of Georgia (the military
budget of Armenia does not exceed 512 thousand US dollars, and the budget of
Georgia - 380 thousand). The GDP per capita of the South Caucasus countries is
also small: Armenia - $ 3,936.8; Azerbaijan - $ 4,131.6; Georgia - $ 4,078.3
(World Bank, 2017).
As for the qualitative indicators, the most
important in this regard is the inability of the South Caucasus states to influence
the international arena independently or to change the status quo. Neither
Georgia, nor Armenia, nor Azerbaijan could independently change the status quo
in the region; Moreover, these countries have not been able to secure their
national interests since the 1990s, which is reflected primarily in unresolved
internal conflicts: in the 21st century, the Karabakh issue remains an
unresolved issue, despite the wishes of the parties involved; This is evidenced
by the increasing number of military clashes in recent years (De Waal, 2017).
And the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia pose a threat
to Georgia's territorial integrity and, consequently, to Georgia's
Euro-Atlantic integration (Litra and Chkhikvadze, 2016).
It is easy to see that the conflicts in the
South Caucasus are easy, likely, the conflicts in the South Caucasus are mainly
in the interest of a third party, namely Russia. , 2009).
The distinguishing energy factor
In comparing Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan,
the paper considers, as already mentioned, the gas and oil factor - reserves,
export, and/or transit opportunities - as a factor of some importance in the
foreign policy of these countries.
Energy policy of Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is
one of the first countries, where the oil, and
later gas industry was developed. Its history is connected to
the fortunes of petroleum. The state is ready to become an important oil and
gas producer once again.
Resources
According to the statistical information for
the second decade of the XXI Century, Azerbaijan produces about 873,260 barrels
(138,837 m3) of oil per day and 29 billion cubic meters of gas per year (SOCAR,
2014).
As a result of modern methods of exploration
being employed, four new multi-reservoir fields were opened in the Caspian at a
depth of 200 meters: Gunashli (1979), Chirag (1985), Azeri (1988),
and Kapaz (1989).
Only the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli complex
contains more than 16 billion barrels of oil in place (Offshore, Technology,
2017)
Natural gas production
has become more important in recent years, especially in Baku, where some of
the oil wells have been exhausted. Proven reserves as of the beginning of the
21-st century totaled 1.37 trillion cubic meters (Eurasianet, 2017).
The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan
The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan was founded at the
decree of former president Heydar Aliyev on 29 December 1999 and started to
operate in 2001 (ARDNF, 2017). It is a sovereign wealth fund where surplus
revenues of the oil industry are saved. The main purposes of the Fund are to
maintain macroeconomic stability and through decreasing dependence on oil and
gas revenues and to foster the development of the non-oil sector, to put
investments in the development of new technologies, to save revenues for future
generations, and to release funds for those projects, which represent the
national interests of the country. The approximate amount of the Fund's
financial reserves are 34.7 billion dollars (Investopedia, 2017). Fund's assets
may be used for strategically important infrastructure projects but not for
government borrowing. The strict target asset allocation of the Fund decreases
investment risks. Funds flow mainly from the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan.
Energy policy of Armenia
Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia does not have its
energy resources. They are mainly imported from Russia. As a result, about 83%
of the gas, having been imported to Armenia is Russian. Up to 2 billion cubic
meters of Russian gas is supplied to Armenia annually through the North
Caucasus-Transcaucasia (Mozdok-Tbilisi-Yerevan) main pipeline, which was put
into operation in the 1970s.).
The natural gas market in Armenia is
monopolized entirely by "Gazprom Armenia", a subsidiary of the
Russian Gazprom, with a vertically integrated structure. Gazprom also owns the
Armenian part of the Iran-Armenia pipeline (up to 140 km long; it has been
operating since 2007; its planned maximum capacity is 2.3 billion cubic meters
per year).
Due to some technical (and in reality
political reasons), as a result, in the future, the export of Iranian gas via
Armenia to the West will be technically complicated. As a result, Gazprom will
not have a competitor in terms of European gas supply and Armenia will not have
an alternative source of supply (Socor, 2007). With all this in mind, the
amount of Iranian gas imported by Armenia is gradually declining every year.
For example, in 2017, only 380 million cubic meters. of Iranian gas was
imported (Neftegaz.ru, 2018).
Georgia - a country with oil and gas transit
opportunities
Unlike neighboring Armenia, Georgia is not
militarily dependent on neighboring Russia, especially since its northern
neighbor was directly involved in the military conflicts against Georgia at the
beginning of the 90th (in Abkhazia and former South Ossetian Autonomous
District) and direct military aggression against Georgia in 2008. Georgia
imports military equipment and weapons mainly from the West. It should also be
noted that Georgia has the smallest military budget among its neighbors; The
country mainly purchases defense weapons and equipment (combat vehicles, light
or heavy weapons) and conducts joint military exercises with western partners,
first of all, NATO member states.
Due to its special geographical location,
Georgia is important for major powers, especially the United States and the
European Union, in the context of existing and planned energy projects aimed at
relieving European countries of their dependence on Russian gas and, to some
extent, balancing Russian influence. These projects are often cited as a source
of "alternative supplies" to Europe, which irritates
Russia.
Thus, from the end of the twentieth century
till now, Georgia has been an energy corridor connecting Asia and Europe,
largely as a result of its geographical location and political will.
Many Economic analysts suggest that the
corridor has more of a security than an economic function. After the collapse
of the Soviet system, Georgia could have either stayed in Russia’s orbit as a
satellite or taken a Western orientation and an independent stance. It chose
the second option, not only leaving Russia’s sphere of influence but competing
with it as east to the west energy supplier, while Russia claimed it had the
sole right to fulfill this function. Of course, Moscow reacted to this and
started taking all possible and impossible steps to damage Georgia’s image as a
transit country.
The idea of the Europe - Caucasus - Asia
transport corridor in Georgia was born in 1992. In 1993, in the City of
Brussels, European Commission invited South and Central Asia’s eight country’s
Ministerial Conference where was risen idea of a trans-Caspian pipeline’s
development that followed the adoption of a declaration, which was a base of
the regional program – TRACECA. This was a preconditioning strategy to restore
the so-called “Great Silk Road”.
Importance of existing pipelines on Georgia’s
territory for the ensuring energy security
Due to the important geopolitical location
between East and West and because of its foreign political orientation, Georgia
was actively involved in the Caspian energy
projects implementation process. In this case,
this South Caucasian country can play a very important role as a transit state
in providing Black Sea countries with oil and gas, which as it is known is
transported and will be transported in the future from Azerbaijan and
Central Asia. There are projects, which are
already implemented and projects, which can be implemented.
Among the projects, which have started
functioning are the following:
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline:
Implementation of the project started on April
17, 1999, and by this pipeline is transported more than 5 million tones of oil
per year. Through the Georgian port Supsa, part of the oil by tankers is
exported to the Bulgarian port of Burgas, Ukrainian port Odesa and Romanian
port Constanta In this case, a very important role can play oil refinery
factory in Constanta, which can produce more than 35 million tones of oil
products per year (Chitadze, 2016).
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline:
About the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,
agreement about construction of this pipeline was sighed on 18 November 1999 in
Istanbul. As it is known, the pipeline has already started its functioning
since 2005. The capacity of this pipeline is about 50 million tonnes, but, if
the pipeline receives an additional volume of oil from the Kazakh port Aktay,
capacity will be increased to 80 million tonnes per year (Chitadze, 2016).
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Gas Pipeline
South Caucasus Pipeline (also known as
Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum Pipeline, BTE pipeline, or Shah Deniz Pipeline) is a
natural gas pipeline from the Shah Deniz gas field in the Azerbaijan sector of the
Caspian Sea via the territory of Georgia to Turkey. It is constructed in
parallel to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.
On 21 May 2006, the commissioning gas was
pumped into the pipeline from the Sangachal Terminal. First deliveries through
the pipeline commenced on 30 September 2006. Deliveries of gas from Shah Deniz
gas field started on 15 December 2006.
During the military aggression of Russia
against Georgia in August 2008, the pipeline operator BP closed the pipeline
for several days for safety reasons (NHST Media Group. 2008).
The 42-inch (1,070 mm) diameter gas pipeline
runs in the same corridor as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. It is 692
kilometers (430 mi) long, and, 442 kilometers (275 mi) is laid in Azerbaijan,
and 248 kilometers (154 mi) in Georgia.
The initial capacity of the pipeline is 8.8
billion cubic meters (310 billion cubic feet) of gas per year, but some experts
and government officials consider, that its capacity could be increased to 25
billion cubic meters (880 billion cubic feet) per year (Chitadze, 2015).
From this project, Georgia as a transit state
annually receives 5% of the whole volume of gas (about 0.5 billion cubic
meters). At this stage, it is being considered the project Shah Deniz Stage 2,
is a giant project, within of which the additional pipeline will be constructed
and that will add a further 16 billion cubic meters per year of gas production
to the approximately 9 billion cubic meters produced by Shah Deniz Stage 1. In
the case of the second phase project implementation, it is expected, that Georgia
will receive about 400-700 million US Dollars in investments (Chitadze, 2015).
Importance of the TANAP project
On June 12, 2018, the inauguration day of the
starting the TANAP project was held. The Gas Southern corridor takes into
consideration the widening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline
construction to the new pipeline – Trans Anatolian Pipeline till the
Greek-Turkish border.
In the framework of the new historic
project, natural gas will be transported from Azerbaijan`s gas field “Shah
Deniz” toward Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy.
The length of the pipeline is 3500 Km.
The cost of the southern corridor project is
about 40 billion USD, from where $9,3 billion was spent to the Trans Anatolian
Pipeline (TANAP), $6 billion – for Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and $23,8
billion for the second stage of exploration and exploitation activities of the
“Shah Deniz” field.
On the same day, during the inauguration day,
the US Department of State spread the official declaration, that “The USA fully
supports the “Southern Gas corridor”, it realizes the importance of this
project toward the diversification of the energy supply of Europe.
About the capacity of this gas pipeline,
according to the experts, it would contain about 16 billion cubic meters of
natural gas per year with the perspective of the gas volume increasing up to 23
billion cubic meters by 2023, 31 billion cubic meters by 2026, and at the final
stage 60 billion cubic meters with the possibilities the transportation of the
additional volume of gas supplies from Azerbaijan (in case of the number of
compressor stations are increased) and in long-term perspectives if
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline enters into exploitation from Turkmenistan
(Chitadze, 2016) It is expected the pipeline to be connected with Trans
Adriatic Pipeline.
Armenia – Main foreign policy and national
security priorities
From the military point of view, among the
three South Caucasus Countries, Russia is mostly dependent on Armenia (especially,
that country has no other military partners).
Over the last decade, Moscow has been actively
supplying arms to Armenia. Also noteworthy is the importance of the Russian
military base 102 on the territory of Armenia, which completely covers the
budget of Armenia. Armed weapons acquired from Russia are actively used in the
clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
It is noteworthy that the South Caucasus
countries most closely cooperate with Russia in the format of regional
international organizations. As early as the 1990s, after declaring
independence, Armenia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
(formed shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union) by the initiative of
the Russian government. The purpose of the official regional organization was
to "prevent the disintegration of the cooperation mechanisms" of the
post-Soviet countries (deepening the political, economic, social, and
humanitarian dialogue between the member states);
One of the most important places in the Russian-Armenian
military relations is the cooperation within the structure of the Central
Committee of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CSTO is a
military-political organization created by the initiative of Russia in the
early 1990s. Founders of this organization were Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; Later to this organization was
joined by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus. However, in 1999 Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Uzbekistan left the organization. The organization aims to
strengthen military cooperation between member states, which also includes
providing military assistance in case of a threat.
On January 16, 2012, the Permanent
Representation of the country to the mentioned regional organization was officially
approved by the President of Armenia. In 2015, Armenia took over the five-year
chairmanship of the CSTO (Asbarez, 2018).
Particular importance in Russian-Armenian
relations is attached to the cooperation between the two countries in the field
of energy, which is asymmetric and mainly serves the interests of Russia. As
already mentioned, Armenia has neither oil nor gas. These resources are mainly
imported from Russia. This energy dependence is often reflected in Moscow's
years of accumulated debts. In exchange for energy debts, Armenia has had to
hand over several strategically important economic facilities to Russia - gas and
oil infrastructure, the country's largest cement plant, Razdan power plant,
which supplies 40% of the country's electricity (Danielyan, 2003). Most
importantly, however, due to its energy dependence on Russia, Armenia also had
to change its foreign policy, most clearly in 2013, when the government refused
to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) in exchange for the
Russian-initiated Customs Union (currently the Eurasian Economic Union), which
has been operational since 2015.
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus
become members of this organization before.
Armenia's pro-Russian choice was somewhat
unexpected as cooperation between Europe and Armenia deepened in recent years.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Armenia and the
European Union was signed in 1996; In addition, Armenia became a member of the
European Union's Neighborhood Policy in 2004 and the Eastern Partnership in
2009 and has been actively negotiating an Association Agreement since 2010. It
is noteworthy that during this period, several important reforms were
implemented in Armenia with the assistance of the European Union, thanks to
which the country has made significant progress in terms of democracy
development. For example, according to the World Press Freedom Index, in 2014
Armenia was the leader of the region (World press freedom index, 2014).
Thus, despite the progress made with the help
of the EU, Armenia eventually opted for membership in the pro-Russian Customs
Union, even though the organization is likely to serve to limit the
independence of post-Soviet countries and ultimately Russia's long-held
aspirations to rebuild the former Soviet Union.
The pro-Russian foreign policy course of
Armenia remained unchanged even after the change of government in the country
in 2018. Moreover, there is an opinion that Pashinyan's victory was achieved
with the help of the Russian government (Pinchuk and Osborn, 2018).
Armenia's foreign policy choice can be
explained by the lack of energy resources in the country, and consequently,
energy dependence on Russia. As is well known, Russia often uses energy
resources to achieve foreign policy goals (Fiona, 2004; Rutland, 2008).
The same thing happened in the case of
Armenia. after Armenia declared rapprochement with the EU as a foreign policy
priority, the Russian side repeatedly warned the Armenian President that the
country's pro-European course would jeopardize Russian-Armenian cooperation.
Indeed, in the summer of 2013, a few months before the Eastern Partnership
Vilnius Summit, Moscow raised the price of gas for its ally Armenia. As a
result, gas for the Armenian population has risen in price by 18% and
electricity by 26% (as one-third of Armenia's electricity is generated from
fuel power plants); Under the new tariffs, Armenia had to pay $ 270 instead of
$ 180 for Russian gas (Armenpress, 2013). All this would add to the already
existing debts and pose a significant threat to the country's energy security,
especially since there was no alternative source of supply. The Armenian part
of the Armenian-Iranian pipeline was already sold to Armrosgaz by the Armenian
government. Almost 80% of this company is owned by the Russian Gazprom (Socor,
2007). Therefore, the purchase of alternative Iranian gas would be completely
controlled by Russia, or this project would never be implemented.
That is why the offer of the Iranian
ambassador to Armenia, Mohammad Rice, to buy Iranian gas at a lower price did
not receive a response from the Armenian side. The Armenian government realized
that cooperation with Iran in the gas field would be impossible at any cost and
under any conditions. In addition, Iran, as the main supplier of gas, would not
be acceptable to the West if we take into account the international sanctions
imposed on Tehran by the US and the EU.
Given all the above, it is clear that one of
the most important determinants of Armenia's pro-Russian choice was energy
security, and in particular the problems in the gas sector. By rejecting the
Association Agreement in 2013 and concluding a deal with Russia, Armenia has
finally lost the ability to balance its foreign policy. However, it must be
said that the country had no other choice. The rise in natural gas prices would
have far more serious consequences, especially given the role of gas in the
Armenian economy. Naturally, the "overflow" effect of the economic
crisis would have on political stability, the social sphere, and so on. The
Armenian government was well aware of this. In 2013, the Armenian Minister of
Energy acknowledged that refusing to join the Customs Union / Eurasian Economic
Union would pose a serious threat to the country, as it would not be able to
repay its accumulated Russian natural gas debt of up to $ 300 million. A
similar statement was made by the former President of the country; Serzh
Sargsyan noted that his government could not allow the price of gas to almost
double, which would lead to an increase in the price of electricity. So, the
only solution was to choose a customs union (Ter-Matevosyan, Drnoian,
Mkrtchyan, and Yepremyan, 2017). These statements once again underscore the
fact that in the case of Armenia, gas has become one of the important factors
determining the foreign policy course of the state.
The foreign policy of Georgia
Georgia has become a member of US-initiated
energy projects and continues its pro-Western policies, primarily in close
cooperation with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
This cooperation dates back to the 1990s when the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) with the EU was signed and since 2004 Georgia has been an
official member of the European Neighborhood Policy. In addition, Georgia is a
participant in several EU regional initiatives (Chitadze, 2011). It was within
the framework of these initiatives that the Association Agreement (AA) between
Georgia and the European Union was signed in 2013 as part of the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and since 2017 Georgian citizens
have been able to travel to the EU without a visa.
As early as the 2002 NATO Prague Summit,
Georgia formally stated its desire to become a member of the North Atlantic
Alliance, and at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, a formal response was made by NATO
- the Alliance believes that Georgia will become a member of NATO (Chitadze,
2008).
The National Security Concept of Georgia
(2011) emphasizes the importance of the transit role in terms of security and
states that “Georgia attaches special importance to strengthening its transit
function. To this end, it is ready to be even more actively involved in
international energy, transport and communication projects. ”(Georgian National
Security Concept, 2011).
It should be noted that the Euro-Atlantic
course of Georgia's foreign policy is often linked to factors of the country's
history, geography, and identity, which implies Georgia's "return to the
European family". It was in this context that Georgia needed to get rid of
Russian oil and gas.
Because if Russian Gazprom would remain the
country's main supplier, Georgia would not be able to pursue an active
pro-Western foreign policy and, like neighboring Armenia, could not sign the
Association Agreement in 2013. Like Armenia, Georgia would come under pressure
from its northern neighbor to become a member of Russian-made military
alliances and regional international organizations under the Kremlin
leadership.
Azerbaijan and the external world
Azerbaijan has the strongest military
capabilities among the countries of the South Caucasus. The country cooperates
with several partner states, which excludes dependence on one of the powers of
this country. Thanks to its rich energy resources, Baku has been able to
improve its military strength; Thanks to revenues from the oil and gas sector,
the country's annual military budget has reached almost $ 2 billion in recent
years, equivalent to the total state budget of Armenia (SIPRI Fact Sheet,
2017). The Ministry of Defense Industry of Azerbaijan was established in 2005
with the main purpose of upgrading obsolete Soviet equipment. Some authors
believe that the purpose of Azerbaijan's energy resources is to increase
military power and, as a result, to solve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh
(Shahbazov, 2017). The main driving force of the country's economy is energy
extraction, processing, and Export revenue (energy exports account for 95% of
the country's total exports). Therefore, it is natural that the country's
energy resources, including the gas industry, are entirely controlled by the
state-owned company SOCAR; Under the current legislation, privatization of the
energy sector is not allowed (EBRD, 2014). In addition, the document of the
National Security Concept of Azerbaijan especially emphasizes the role of
Azerbaijan as an energy-rich country in the context of strengthening energy
security regionally and internationally; Any attack on the country's energy
infrastructure (including pipelines) is considered a threat to national
security (Azerbaijan National Security Concept, 2007). All this underscores the
strategic importance of gas resources at the state level.
It should be noted that in the military
sphere, Azerbaijan actively cooperates with Russia, Israel, the United States,
the European Union, and Turkey. There were also reports of Turkey opening a
military base on the territory of Nakhichevan a few years ago, although,
according to the Azerbaijani government, the country will never host foreign
military bases on its territory. In 2012, the only foreign base on the
territory of Azerbaijan was closed - the Russian-run Gabala radar station,
which operated since Soviet times. It should be noted that the Constitution of
Azerbaijan itself excludes the existence of any foreign military base on the
territory of the country; In addition, in 2011 the country became a member of
the "Non-Aligned Movement" (an international organization that unites
120 countries), which opposes unification in any military bloc (Kucera, 2016).
Unlike neighboring Armenia, Azerbaijan's
foreign policy course is arguably less influenced by external forces (except
for the Karabakh issue). In addition to maximizing military force, Azerbaijan
has also managed to get rid of its strong neighbor`s (Russia) expansionist
policy - despite Moscow's efforts, Azerbaijan has not changed its foreign
policy course and has not joined pro-Russian regional initiatives. Moreover, if
Armenia became a loyal member of any Russian initiative, in 1999 Azerbaijan
left the Russian-initiated Collective Security Treaty Organization; Despite
active efforts by the Russian side in 2009, Baku again refused to join the
organization; In 2011, Azerbaijan also did not sign the CIS Free Trade
Agreement (TENGRINEWS, 2011); Later, it also avoided the Customs Union
agreement. According to a Eurasian Development Bank survey, only 38% of the
Azerbaijani population was in favor of joining the organization, as the
majority saw Russia as an adversary rather than an ally (Nalbandov, 2016). In
return, Azerbaijan became a member of the GUAM, an organization set up against
Russia's expansionist policies in the region. Along with Azerbaijan,
post-Soviet Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova also joined GUAM. Moreover, Azerbaijan
has taken important steps in the international arena in terms of cooperation
with Russia's main rival - the West; In this regard, Azerbaijan's military
assistance in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan is important, and in
2009 Azerbaijan became one of the main members of the EU Eastern Partnership
initiative.
It should be noted that despite the above
steps, Azerbaijan has not expressed interest in deepening cooperation with
either the EU or NATO (as well as pro-Russian organizations). Although
Azerbaijan has become a member of the European Union's Eastern Partnership program,
it has rejected the most important part of the initiative - the Association
Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).
It is also true that Azerbaijan has been linked to NATO through the Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), but the government has repeatedly stated that,
unlike neighboring Georgia, Baku's ultimate goal is not to join NATO.
In analyzing the more or less biased foreign
policy course of Azerbaijan, some authors emphasize the importance of the country's
special geographical location (Vera, 2012). However, it should be noted that
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia are parts of the same strategically important
South Caucasus region, so if we consider only the geographical location factor,
it will be impossible to explain the completely different foreign policy
courses of the South Caucasus countries.
In addition to the geographical factor, some
authors explain the fact that Azerbaijan distances itself from regional
alliances because of
Armenia-Russia relations (Aslanli, 2010).
However, it should be noted that even in the absence of the Armenian factor,
Azerbaijan is unlikely to be an active member of organizations created by the
leadership of the Greater Neighbor, since, as has already been seen, the
post-Soviet states are largely dependent on Russia. Rich energy resources (95%
of the country's budget) allow Azerbaijan to get rid of its dependence on
Russia.
Given all the above, it can be said that in
the foreign policy context, Azerbaijan has the opportunity to maneuver
relatively more; It can pursue an impartial and flexible foreign policy, i.e.
not to join the international military, political, or economic international
organizations created by a large neighboring power. Due to its rich energy resources,
Azerbaijan does not need Russia's energy "protection", so there is no
significant political leverage that Moscow successfully uses about other
post-Soviet countries.
Conclusion
The main objective of the study was to
determine the relationship between the foreign policy course of the post-Soviet
small/weak states in the South Caucasus region and the energy resources, in
particular, the oil and gas factor (reserves, exports, and/or transit).
Therefore, the main question in the research was the following - what is the
connection between the oil and gas factor (reserves, exports, and/or transit)
and the foreign policy of small/weak post-Soviet countries in the South
Caucasus?
This question can be answered as follows: The
existence of the oil and gas factor (reserves, exports, and/or transit) allows
the small/weak states of the South Caucasus, namely Azerbaijan, Georgia, to
free themselves from the influence of great power - Russia and not join its
military alliances. And a country that does not have rich oil and gas reserves
and has no export and/or transit opportunities, in particular Armenia, together
with many other post-soviet republics, which do not possess energy reserves is
easily influenced by Russia and, consequently, by its military alliances and
regional economic organizations.
The answer is as follows: Azerbaijan has rich
oil and gas resources and export opportunities, which in turn has a strategic
purpose for the state. Energy resources are an important source of income for
this country and also provide an increase in the defense budget. It also helps
to increase the importance of Azerbaijan at the international level. Thanks to
it, Azerbaijan has the opportunity to balance Russian influence and not aspire
to membership in Moscow-led military alliances and regional international
organizations. In the case of Georgia, to be free from the import of natural
gas from Russia and playing a transit role in energy projects together with
Azerbaijan and Turkey are of great foreign policy importance for the country's
main goal - Euro-Atlantic integration. It is the "reasonable use of the
East-West transit and transport corridor function" that should bring
Georgia back into the "Common European Family" (Georgia's Foreign Policy
Strategy 2019-2022). Armenia, which has neither rich gas reserves nor export or
transit opportunities, is a close ally of Russia and, consequently, a member of
its military alliances and regional international organizations.
Given this attitude, Armenia is unable to free
itself from Russian influence.
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