The China Military Strategy in 21st Century – Power Capability Geopolitics and Military Expansionism

     Marcin Muniak

Vakhtang Maisaia 

 

 

The China Military Strategy in 21st Century – Power Capability Geopolitics and Military Expansionism

 

 

Summary

 

China is pursuing two main national goals that mark its return to the club of great powers. The country's economic growth made it possible to undertake reforms of the armed forces, and to start a program of modernization and structural changes. The expansion of the PRC's area of interest far beyond the country's borders, due to the huge foreign trade and import of energy resources, naturally requires redefining the tasks of the armed forces and adapting them to operate outside the country. From the geopolitical point of view, this is the behavior typical of any center of power in the past and today.

 

 

 

Keywords: China, armed forces, military strategy, expansion, strategic interests, national goals, US-Chinese rivalry, Great Renaissance, Xi Jinping, the PLAN, geopolitics.

 

The growth of China's power over the last three decades has attracted the attention of world public opinion, state decision-making centers and researchers. The more so as the growth of economic power entails an increase in military power. This raises concerns among Asian countries and in particular the United States, which are reluctant to see a rival instead of a participant in the system they designed. The hegemon's rivalry with the contender has begun, we are already dealing with an information warfare and creating the image of China as an expansionist state. For the authorities in Beijing, this is not an expansion however, but a return of their country to a place it occupied centuries ago and which it only temporarily left. A world order created by the United States is no longer in the PRC's strategic interest, and it is making efforts to undermine it in order to play a role matching its ambitions. The purpose of this essay is to present China's military strategy and attempt to evaluate the activities of the PRC in this area.

   In order to understand China's military strategy, it is necessary to define the country's national goals. They were formulated by Chairman Xi Jinping in 2014 and consist of two main points:

-     building a society of moderate welfare, i.e. middle class, generating domestic demand and sustainable development. The measure of success here is the doubling of the average per capita income by July 1, 2021, taking income level from 2012 as reference. For this purpose, another date has been added - 2035, marking the creation of an innovative society;

-     achieving the status of a great power by 2049, i.e. China’s return to its rightful place on the world stage^[1]

These two main goals consist of many intermediate goals, such as transforming the country from a world factory into a leader in implementation of new technologies („made by China” versus „made in China”), but from the point of view of other powers, the reunification of Chinese lands draws attention in particular, as it can spark international crisis. Priority, however, has the first goal, which is focused on internal affairs. The Chinese make sure that the state is stable and that the economic development is undisturbed. After the experiences of the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is trying to maintain current political system and eliminate sources of social unrest. While in the political dimension this means no alternative to the CCP, in the economic, fortunately for citizens, there is a possibility of accumulating wealth without major limitations. Disregarding cultural differences and the way in which the first goal is planned to be achieved, this approach should be considered pragmatic - a strong economy, advanced technologies and social peace, give decision-makers much more room for maneuver in achieving foreign policy goals.

China is therefore to pursue the second goal as soon as it is ready. It is the "Great Renaissance" (or „Great Rejuvenation”) and the status of a great power, which is expected blur period of the opium wars and domination of Western powers in the history of the country, perceived by the Chinese as "the age of national humiliation". To achieve this, it is necessary to unify the Chinese lands, preferably by peaceful means, but the adjective "peaceful" has recently disappeared from official Chinese documents. It is understandable - the date of 2049 is not so distant, the United States considers the PRC to be a threat and American counteraction it is likely, therefore the government in Beijing clearly suggests that various scenarios are possible. A necessary step to achieve the second national goal will be to build its own sphere of influence in Asia, and give it a status similar to that of the American Monroe doctrine gives to the Western hemisphere - although China officially refrains from dividing the world into spheres of influence. A prelude to this would be successful extension of sovereignty over the South China Sea, in order to control or prevent foreign navies from accessing this area. This would be to the detriment of other states having their own claims to these waters (Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bhutan etc.). The expansion of the PRC's interests far beyond the state borders and increased foreign trade, require a change in thinking about the tasks of the armed forces. Various forms of the Chinese military presence abroad should serve to protect the supply of raw materials, necessary to achieve the first major national goal, i.e. stabilization and undisturbed economic development. Currently, Chinese supply lines are de facto at the mercy of the US Navy, an unacceptable situation to Chinese decision makers.

 Knowing the national goals, we can take a closer look at the military tool that could be used to achieve them. The official document explaining the military strategy of the PRC is "China's National Defense in the New Era", the last version of which was published in 2019. At the beginning, we find a description of the international situation from Beijing’s point of view. According Chinese strategists, it is characterized by the rise of new regional powers, that are beginning to balance the power of the existing powers. The document explicitly mentions the United States as a country destabilizing the international system, acting unilaterally and trying to maintain status of a hegemon. The authors point to an increase in military spending by major powers - apart from the United States, also Russia, Japan, NATO and Australia.^[2]

From regional perspective, Asia has become the center of world economy, and therefore its geopolitical importance is growing. Establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has a positive effect on security in the region, as does the proper risk management by the countries of the South China Sea basin. However, actions of the United States, re-militarization of Japan, stoking of Taiwanese separatism by other states, disputes over certain islands, and violation of Chinese airspace and territorial waters have a negative impact.

In military sphere, China is observing efforts of many countries to change the structure of their armed forces (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, India, Russia) and the fact that artificial intelligence, quantum computing, big data management and the Internet of Things are part of the these changes, and begin to shape the character of the future battlespace. The United States has been mentioned as a country trying to gain absolute military advantage over others.

At the end of the overview, there is a reference to the modernization effort of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLAN), which, although effective, is insufficient to match the armies of other players.^[3]

The next part of the document states that China's military doctrine is defensive because it is based on the state's strategic decision to develop peacefully. Finally, we have list of tasks, assigned to armed forces: protection of the sovereignty, security and development of the state (repelling the aggressor, political security and social stability), counteracting the independence of Taiwan, defeating separatists, securing maritime rights and interests abroad, control of the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands. It cointains this strong statement: "China must be and will be reunited". According to the authors of the strategy, the PRC's goal is not hegemony, expansion and the creation of a sphere of influence^[4] (especially the latter does not fit in with national goals, as long as China wants to oppose US interference in Asian affairs). The Chinese declare that "we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked”, and that they will not use nuclear weapons first, but will keep its quantity at the minimum level, necessary for self-defense.^[5]

According to the strategy, the PLAN should be strengthened in the Chinese way, by implementing the thought of Chairman Xi, increasing its loyalty, using it according to the law, reforms and new technologies, focusing on the combat capabilities necessary to win (mechanization and computerization by 2020, comprehensive development of military thought, structure, personnel, armaments and equipment, in coordination with the country's development, and complete this initial reform process by 2035). The ultimate goal is to build a world-class armed force by 2050, without mentioning the criteria by which this will be assessed, however. The military is also to help build an international community based on a shared vision of the future. PLAN is to be the advocate of new security architecture and participate in peace and stabilization missions.^[6] If we look at the goals set for individual components of the PLAN - land forces, air force, navy, missile forces, strategic support, there is a noticeable shift in the emphasis from local activities and defense of the territory, to the ability to conduct combined operations, in many operational theaters outside the country, using the latest electronic warfare technology. It’s too early to say PLAN aims for global presence, but is has started it’s way to abandon low profile and set its foot at strategic locations.

Hitherto, achievements in reforming the army structure consist reducing the number of command level (officers) by 25% and non-combat units / structures by 50%; reduction of army groups from 18 to 13, reduction of the number of military universities from 77 to 44, withdrawal of the armed forces from commercial activities (approximately 100,000 projects of this type were canceled).^[7]

Chinese efforts are closely followed in Washington, the Department of Defense has been preparing annual reports for the Senate on the PLAN since 2000. A recent report notes far-reaching changes - the PLAN is no longer an archaic army, but is world's largest ground force, the largest navy, and in some in aspects, the Chinese missile forces outweigh the American ones. PLAN is assessed as a difficult opponent, with great potential, especially in the so-called the first chain of islands, and it is very likely, and will soon become a peer competitor to the US forces.^[8] Another report, prepared outside the Department of Defense, is actually consistent and records a leap in the combat capability of PLAN in the South China Sea basin, directly threatening US air bases in the Pacific, that were considered safe not that long ago. Considering the potential conflict over Taiwan, the authors noted an increase in the number of Chinese missiles that could be used in it, from several dozen in 1996 to several thousand in 2017. It is clearly visible that the immediate foreland of China is slowly becoming difficult to access even to the United States.^[9]

Some American analysts distinguish four scenarios for the development of the situation until 2050: a triumphant China, an ascendant China, a stagnant China, an imploding China. They reject two extreme scenarios (triumphant and imploding), while the other two (ascendant and stagnant) they estimate as probable and possible. The „an ascendant China” scenario assumes partially successful implementation of a of PRC’s grand strategy, mainly concerning internal stabilization and economic development, as well as domination in the region of Asia. China would become a regional power, but it would not be on par with the United States in science, research and the military. However, there will be no successful solution to the Taiwan issue for the PRC. The „stagnant China” scenario predicts an economic slowdown, social unrest in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, and inefficiency of state administration (corruption). The complicated internal situation forces the authorities to channel frustration of citizens to enemies outside the country, which is why the PRC causes small-scale crises, potentially easy to win, and within the capabilities of sitll not fully modernised armed forces. Politically and militarily, the country is no match for the United States and is forced to seek angreements with them on multiple issues. The question of Taiwan is not close to a positive conclusion, Taipei is loosening its ties with Beijing.^[10] According to the author, the latter scenario seems much less probable. Chinese economy emerged as beneficient of Covid-19 related lockdowns, it’s trade is flourishing and no signs of economic slowdown in nearest future exist.

   China's power has grown so much that it is hard to ignore. In the international environment, this means changing its status from a developing country to a rival in the regional and global dimension. The PRC’s authorities understand this very well, and therefore they are trying to protect their strategic interests. This is the approach typical to any center of power, and it does not differ much, apart from the rhetoric and goals declared, from actions of other centers of power, starting from antiquity to the present day, regardless of the regime: Rome successfully transformed the Mediterranean into an inner sea and controlled trade, its investments in the infrastructure of, for example, conquered Egypt resemble the Belt and Road Initiative, Sweden tried to do the same in the 17th century with the Baltic Sea, Russia fought wars for non-freezing ports, and don’t hesitate to shape the Great Limitrof as a buffer against other powers both peacfully or by force, Germany planned to secure economic domination by implementing the Mitteleuropa concept during World War I, Japan counteracted cutting off its raw materials supply lines by occupying Dutch colonies in the 1940s, Great Britain built naval bases in strategic points of the world to protect trade routes from the colonies  and finally, the United States expanded westward to take control of American continent, then neutralized its neighbors to the north and south, and finally made the western hemisphere its exclusive sphere of influence. Attributing expansionism to China, especially because of its political system, does not stand up to the test of arguments. China's actions seem to be adequate to its present power - economic growth has enabled the modernization of the armed forces, which are still deployed in the country, but it is already known that this is a temporary situation, and soon Chinese soldiers will be more and more visible outside the Middle Kingdom. The country's military strategy is aligned with national goals and is based on the rational assumption that its success depends on the undisturbed economic development of China. The development of the international situation and the risk of an armed conflict depend on the attitude of other centers of power - the acceptance of China's new status, or in the case of rivalry, the choice of tools (of apeaceful or military nature). Every day that passes, however, seems to favor China.

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^[1] Bogdan Góralczyk „Wielki Renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje”, ebook, chapter: „Dwa cele na stulecie i powrót pragmatyków”, e-book, 2018

^[2] „China’s National Defense in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019, p. 2-4

^[3] Ibidem, p. 4-6

^[4] Ibidem s. 10

^[5] Ibidem s. 8

^[6] Ibidem s. 10

^[7] Ibidem s. 20

^[8] „Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republich of China 202. Annual Report to Congress”, Office od the Secretary od Defence, 2020

^[9] more in Anthony H. Cordesman „Chinese Strategy, Military Forces and Economics: The Metrics of Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180919_China_Strategy_Metrics_Report.pdf?bgjttReIklyFTTJo3YqYUZ3cHG1E3hWr, access 01.04.2021

^[10] Scobell, Andrew, Edmund J. Burke, Cortez A. Cooper III, Sale Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner, and J.D. Williams, „China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition”, RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2798.html, access 01.04.2021

Literature:

 

1.      Bogdan Góralczyk „Wielki Renesans. Chińska transformacja i jej konsekwencje”, e-book, 2018

2.      „China’s National Defense in the New Era”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 2019

3.      „Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republich of China 202. Annual Report to Congress”, Office od the Secretary od Defence, 2020

4.      Anthony H. Cordesman „Chinese Strategy, Military Forces and Economics: The Metrics of Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2018, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180919_China_Strategy_Metrics_Report.pdf?bgjttReIklyFTTJo3YqYUZ3cHG1E3hWr, access 01.04.2021

5.      Scobell, Andrew, Edmund J. Burke, Cortez A. Cooper III, Sale Lilly, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Eric Warner, and J.D. Williams, „China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition”, RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2798.html, access 01.04.2021