Professor Vakhtang
Maisaia, International Black Sea University (IBSU) and Warsaw University,
Central-European Institute of Research and Strategic Studies (CIRSA, Republic
of Poland);
PhD Student Miranda
Mikadze, Caucasus International University (CIU, Georgia)
Abstract:
The
EU has been developing its foreign policy implications having considered
regional security provisions since 1999 and several approaches have been performing
in order to achieve common stability on the European space. Certainly one the
pillars of the security enshrines in resolving ethno-political conflicts not
only inside of the European area but also in neighborhood ones. That is why the
EU leadership has introduced several policy ENP– like, European
Neighborhood Policy, The Eastern Partnership, etc. have variety approaches
toward dealing peacefully conflicts staggered around the EU geopolitical space,
including in Georgia and notable in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia Being
contemporary occupied by the Russian Armed Forces.
Unresolved conflicts and mitigation of threats in the
South Caucasus have become one of the most important issues on the EU foreign
policy agenda.
In the 2003 Security Strategy, the EU emphasized that
it needed to "take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of
the South Caucasus, which, of course, will also be a neighboring region."
The European Union (EU) has appointed a Representative (SR) to the South Caucasus
with the task of promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region,
including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as
regional cooperation.
All three countries in the South Caucasus have
different policies towards the EU and therefore each of them requires a
different form of cooperation. The EU is trying to maintain a balanced approach
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has
become an obstacle in EU-Azerbaijan relations, but this is clearly different
from the Georgian case, where the EU never hides its full support for Georgia.
In 2009, the EU established the Eastern Partnership
(EaP) to strengthen relations with its eastern neighbors, including the
countries of the South Caucasus.
The
Common Security and Defense Policy is an integral part of the EU's foreign
policy, aimed at ensuring the EU's operational capabilities through military
and civilian means. The EUMM is a country-specific tool used for conflict
prevention and peacebuilding.
Key Words: European
Union, Ethnical conflict, Political conflicts, Foreign policy, Georgia
Introduction
The EU's foreign
policy aims primarily to ensure security, democracy and the protection of human
rights - not only in its immediate neighborhood but also in other hotspots
around the world, where the EU is seen as a so-called soft power. (Soft Power)
Conductor in international relations, covering issues such as election
observation missions, humanitarian assistance, political dialogue, mediation,
and more.
European Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP) enables the EU to play a leading role in peacekeeping
operations, conflict prevention and international security. It is a
comprehensive approach to crisis management based on civilian and military
assets.[1] Through which the EU hopes to achieve regional cooperation
and help states resolve their own conflicts. Mitigating the potential threats posed by unresolved
conflicts in the South Caucasus remains one of the most important issues on the
EU foreign policy agenda.[2]
Although there are
numerous definitions of conflict in the modern scientific literature, experts
agree that conflict presents a problem that requires a solution. Morton Deutsch
points out that incompatibility between the parties gives rise to conflict (Deutch,
1949). Anatole Raport links conflict with competition. He believes that the
general difficulty in establishing communication between two people or two
groups lies in the lack of common experience.[3]
The EUMM Georgia is
a specific tool used for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the EU. The
EUMM is active only in situations where there is a crisis and an immediate
response is needed. It has limited rights of action on the other side of the
border, within the breakaway regions, although its influence is still very
important. On September 15, 2008, the European Union (EU) set up an unarmed
civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia to monitor the ceasefire
agreement, which meant that the EU became One of the key players, However, due to the Russia’s
incumbent government efforts, this mission has no right to enter either Tskhinvali or Sokhumi.[4]
Notably, the EUMM
was sought to aim having mandate for monitoring mission achievements in both
conflict regions since October 1, 2008. Due to the Russia’s authority efforts,
this mission was not allowed to enter either Tskhinvali or Sokhumi and their
bases were located in Tbilisi, Gori and Zugdidi.[5]
The mission began
monitoring the withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia on
October 1, 2008. Since then, the mission has been conducting 24-hour patrols,
paying particular attention to the areas adjacent to the administrative borders
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The mission's main focus is on monitoring the
situation on the ground and reporting on incidents, and the mission is
constantly on the ground in these areas and generally helps to improve the
security situation.
During the 2008
Russia-Georgia war, the European Union assumed the role of mediator, and it was
Brussels' involvement that led to the signing of a six-point ceasefire
agreement between Russia and Georgia. The six-point peace plan was negotiated
by the president of France, the then holder of the EU presidency, but Moscow
only partially fulfilled the agreement. At the same time, on 25 September 2008,
the Council of the European Union appointed the EU Special Representative for
the South Caucasus, in particular for the Crisis Resolution in Georgia (EUSR).[6]
After the August
2008 war, the format of the Geneva International Talks was established between
Georgia and Russia. In addition to Georgia and Russia, representatives of the
United States and its co-chairs from the OSCE, the European Union and the
United Nations are taking part in the talks. The Geneva International Talks are
being held in two parallel working groups. The first discusses security issues,
while the second addresses the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees, as well as other humanitarian issues. Despite this, the Geneva peace
process only managed to maintain the status quo.
The EU continues to
use its traditional model for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, but the
conflicts in the South Caucasus are much more deeply rooted than the issue
discussed in Europe. On the other hand, the countries of the South Caucasus
probably need more time to adapt to the traditional European approach to
conflict resolution. The Conflicts in the South Caucasus have become a driving
force for European integration. The Georgian-Russian war of 2008 especially
conditioned the rapprochement of the South Caucasus countries with the European
Union. In 2009, the EU established the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to strengthen
relations with its eastern neighbors, including the countries of the South
Caucasus.
The
aim of the EU-Georgia Joint Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dialogue and
cooperation is to gradually bring them closer to their Common Security and
Defense Policy (CSDP).
New EU
Challenges Security in the Black Sea Basin - South Caucasus
In 2007, EU
enlargement led to the Black Sea coast. The Black Sea region is an area rich in
natural resources and cultural diversity. It has great potential as a transit
corridor between Asia and Europe. According to Fischer, its member states are
not distinguished by state power, they are characterized by destructive
nationalism, unresolved conflicts, which constantly lead to crises such as the
2008 Russia-Georgia war.[7]
The Black Sea
connects Europe with the Caspian region and beyond - with Central and Southeast
Asia hence it is also called the Natural Bridge. The Black Sea has always been
of strategic importance to the EU, especially in terms of the security of
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries located along the Black Sea-Danube
basin.[8]
The EU Neighborhood Policy (2003),
the Black Sea Synergy (2007) and the Eastern Partnership (2009) have influenced
the region's democratic transformation and internal consolidation and helped
bring regional players closer to the EU.[9]
In his paper
"EU Black Sea Policy and Enlargement", Kakha Gogolashvili discusses
the goals and ambitions of the Black Sea region, the tools of cooperation, the
shortcomings and challenges of its policy. His interests, in terms of solving
various problems of the region, have grown. The researcher also links the main challenges
to the environment, migration, employment and social protection, economic
development and trade, border and internal disputes and fluctuations, terrorism
and arms proliferation, drug and human trafficking, natural resource use,
navigation and the military. The countries of the region are either rich in
natural resources or are transit countries, which is important for the EU's
energy security. They form a transport corridor and bridge between the Caspian
and Central Asia regions, which are also rich in natural resources, including
energy. Security and stability on the Black Sea have a significant impact on
the future of the EU.
On the territory of
the post-Soviet world, the South Caucasus is distinguished by the fact that
there are three unresolved conflicts in a small geographical area, the conflict
is exacerbated by the occupation of Georgian territories by Russia. He
periodically tries to create problems with the so-called. Moving the
administrative boundary or kidnapping people.
In the modern world,
conflicts remain one of the main challenges, it is an integral part of human
life, therefore neither society nor country exists without it, conflict in all
types of government and everywhere affects the functioning of the state.
However, this is particularly acute for developing countries, as already
fragile institutions are threatened in a number of areas.
One source of
conflict is power and the unequal distribution of resources. Weber notes that
power represents the potential expressed in social activity. According to
Burton, power is a means of controlling events. Likert believes that power
provides an opportunity to influence actions.[10]
It is believed that
in recent years states have lost the function of universal control. It is
necessary for each person to better understand the essence of the conflict in
order to be able to overcome the difficulties and realize their own
responsibility for the ongoing processes. It is impossible to completely
eliminate conflicts in any society or country, however, it is possible to study
their management for the full functioning of the state. It is also necessary to
be able to constructively transform the destructive events in the conflict.[11]
Every type of
conflict has its cause. It is a fact that the conflicts in Georgia have
political and ethnic grounds. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that for
years there did not seem to be a desire to solve these problems.
The EU plays an
important role in the Middle East peace process, it has troops, it has police
and judges who help save lives. Contribute to the further stabilization of
conflicts in countries and regions around the world.
Georgian-Abkhazian
relations have been strained since the 1980s, when a section of the political
elite dissatisfied with the Soviet regime demanded Georgia's independence from
the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, Abkhaz separatists signed the so-called
The Likhni Declaration, according to which they granted the Autonomous Republic
of Abkhazia the status of a Soviet Republic and declared independence from
Tbilisi.[12] The Likhni Declaration was signed by the rector of Sokhumi
University, which was met with a negative response from ethnic Georgian
scientific and political elites, and escalated into a feud between the opposing
parties. This was the reason for the events of April 9, 1989, when the protests
in front of the Government Palace in Tbilisi turned into bloodshed as a result
of the violent crackdown on peaceful protesters by the Russian special
services.
The Political Aspects of the Abkhaz-Ossetian Conflitcs:
History and Reality
Tensions between the
Georgian and Abkhaz populations peaked in Abkhazia on July 16-17, 1989. As a
result of the confrontation, 14 people were killed and up to 140 civilians were
injured. Most of the victims were ethnic Georgians. This event is considered to
be the first armed confrontation between the parties, which played a major role
in the subsequent escalation of the situation and significantly determined the
future of Georgian-Abkhazian relations.[13]
On July 23, 1992,
the political elite of Sokhumi declared Abkhazia's independence from Georgia,
and despite the lack of response from the international community, it further
strained relations between the ethnic Georgian and ethnic Abkhaz populations. A
few days later, the armed conflict escalated into a war after the breakaway
region of Abkhazia suspended the Georgian constitution; National symbols
emerged: the flag and the coat of arms.[14]
The fighters from
the North Caucasus - Chechens, Adyghes, Karachay-Circassians, Kabardino-Balkarians
- fought against the Georgian government; Militants from Syria, Karabakh,
Transnistria and Turkey also took part in the hostilities. Abkhaz separatists
have been mercilessly killing Georgian civilians. According to eyewitnesses,
sadistic methods of torturing ethnic Georgians by Abkhazians have been
reported. According to unconfirmed reports, up to 6,000 Georgians were killed
on the territory of Abkhazia (in Sukhumi, Gagra, Ochamchire, Gali, etc.),
including more than 50% women, children, the elderly and the disabled. Georgian
cultural and historical monuments were deliberately destroyed in Abkhazia.[15]
As a result of the
sharp deterioration of the situation and the large number of victims, there was
an urgent need for negotiations between Georgians, Abkhazians and Russians. On
May 14, 1993, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the parties in Moscow,
signed by Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin. As the Russians failed to meet
the terms of the agreement and the "series of false promises" continued,
on July 27 of the same year, another agreement was signed in Sochi on a
"ceasefire and control mechanism in Abkhazia". It provided for the
complete disarmament of the opposing parties.[16]
Despite the Sochi
agreement, Abkhaz separatists continued to bomb disarmed Sokhumi, killing
people with extreme brutality. Eduard Shevardnadze, in fact, was deceived. He
could not control the situation. At the same time, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's
supporters were active in counter-attacks, which created an even more difficult
and hopeless situation.
On September 27,
1993, after a 13-month battle, Sukhumi fell. On September 28, we read the
address of Eudard Shevardnadze in the pages of the newspaper "Republic of
Georgia": "In fact, Georgia is on its knees. That too was not enough.
It is unfortunate, but I must honestly say that without the interests of the
forces we could not be deprived of anything but internal strife and betrayal of
fellow citizens. I, along with my comrades, am shocked by what has happened.
God knows, I was doing everything I could to avoid this terrible day. I could
not. Let my contemporaries and descendants forgive me.[17]
On the day of the
fall of Sokhumi, which resulted in the fall of Abkhazia, Abkhaz separatists
captured and shot Zhiuli Shartava, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, who heroically sacrificed himself for the
survival of Georgia and the Georgian idea in the Abkhaz war. He was severely
beaten along with Guram Gabeskiria, the mayor of Sukhumi, Vakhtang
Gegelashvili, a member of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic
of Abkhazia, Mamia Alasania, Alexander Berulava and others.
The war in Abkhazia
from 1992 to 1993 was fought between Georgian government forces for the most
part, and Abkhaz separatist forces, Russian armed forces and North Caucasian
militants. The separatists received support from thousands of North Caucasus
and Cossack militants and from Russian forces stationed in and near
Abkhazia. Between 13,000 to 20,000 ethnic Georgians and approximately 3,000
Abkhaz have been reported killed, more than 250,000 Georgians became internally
displaced or refugees and 2,352 are considered missing. Among the missing more
than 1,500 are ethnic Georgians, up to 200 are ethnic Abkhazians and about 100
are ethnic Ossetians. 563 bodies have been identified and 191 of the 563 have
been given to their families since 2013.[18]
There are still
conflicting opinions about what caused the defeat of the Georgians in the
Abkhaz war. It is important to emphasize that one of the reasons was
undoubtedly Georgia divided into two parts, opposing camps and a wide range of
pro-Russian oppositions, which further complicated the already tense situation
in the country. One of the reasons is also the faulty intelligence services,
the unprofessionalism of Georgian TV channels, which often cover secret
information about the dislocation or movement of the Georgian Armed Forces. It
is a shameful fact that Georgians are looting their own population, etc.
It is worth
mentioning the indifferent attitude of a part of the Georgian society towards
the Abkhazian conflict and the Abkhazian ethnos in general. As Akaki Bakradze
wrote, "An atmosphere reigned throughout Georgia as if Abkhazia was in
Africa and not in ours".[19] Like the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict matured in the 1980s, which 10 years
later alated
into the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in 1991-1992.
Tensions and
conflicts of interest between the Georgian and Ossetian sides date back to
1918-1920, when the Georgian National Council adopted the Act of Independence
and thus seceded from imperialist Russia. The Georgian Menshevik government
accused the Ossetians of collaborating with the Russian Bolsheviks, which
provoked a negative reaction from the Ossetians. They repeatedly tried to
organize an uprising to secede from Georgia and gain independence. In 1921,
after the loss of Georgia's independence and its Sovietization, the South
Ossetian Autonomous District was established within Georgia.
Bilateral relations
are significantly strained since 1985 in the so-called Soviet Union. In
parallel with the "transformation" processes. Ossetian separatism was
brewing in Georgia against the background of national liberation movements.
According to a report published by the Temporary Commission on Territorial
Integrity of the Parliament of Georgia, the South Ossetian conflict, as an
integral part of the ethno-national confrontation, was based on political,
economic, social and criminal motives, which were reflected: a) between
Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. In the War of Laws ”; B) in discussions between
Ossetian and Georgian socio-political leaders and publicists; And c) in the
confrontation of Georgian and Ossetian armed formations.[20]
On August 15, 1989,
the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR established the constitutional
status of the Georgian language, according to which only Georgian as a state
language would be used in all scientific-educational or administrative
institutions throughout the country. The decision was followed by the first
rally and protest by the informal organization Adamon Nikhas, whose leader,
Alan Chochiev, was repeatedly noted for his separatist aspirations and
anti-Georgian actions or narrative.[21]
The Ossetian side
declared disobedience to the Georgian side and initiated an amendment to the
Georgian Constitution. They demanded that the Georgian government declare
Ossetian the state language in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region and respect
Ossetian identity and identity. The Georgian authorities did not comply with
the Ossetian side's request, considering their claim "illegal" and
abolishing the South Ossetian Autonomous District on November 16, 1989.
Meetings between the
Georgian and Ossetian sides were held periodically to defuse the situation. The
constructive-minded political elite tried their best to defuse the situation
and reach a consensus through negotiations, as neither side's interests
included a hand-to-hand fight and escalation of the conflict. 15,000 Georgians
moved in the direction of Tskhinvali. Ossetian insurgents blocked the entrance
to Tskhinvali and prevented Georgian protesters from entering the city. They
considered this action as a "muscle game" by ethnic Georgians and an
attempt to destroy two ethnic groups. Ossetians confronted Georgians with
Soviet soldiers. The clash was followed by casualties.[22]
Georgian-Ossetian
relations have stalled since the Council of People's Deputies of the South
passed a resolution on the "sovereignty of South Ossetia" and
declared direct distrust of the Georgian central government. As this action was
contrary to the Constitution and legislation of Georgia, it was repealed by the
Supreme Council of Georgia. In response, the 15th session of the Autonomous
District Council was convened in Tskhinvali and the Declaration on the
Sovereignty of South Ossetia was adopted again, with local elections scheduled
for December 2, 1990.[23]
On December 11,
1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia held a so-called meeting held by the
Autonomous District of Abkhazia. He declared the "elections" illegal
and declared them invalid. It also abolished the South Ossetian Autonomous
Region and declared a state of emergency in the region.
After the
above-mentioned events, the conflict of interests between the Georgian and Ossetian
sides escalated into a direct military confrontation. Within a year, 1,000
people were killed and more than 30,000 displaced as a result of the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Residential houses and infrastructure were
destroyed. Conflict has done great damage to both sides.[24]
On June 24, 1992, a
ceasefire agreement was signed between Russia and Georgia in Sochi, signed by
the leaders of Georgia and Russia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin.
Later, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) set up a
Joint Control Commission (JCC), uniting Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia and
North Ossetia. The main task of the Quartet was to resolve the conflict
peacefully; Restore trust between the parties; Return of refugees and
internally displaced persons; Rebuilding the bridge related to economic
challenges between the parties; Maintaining peace and order in the conflict
zone, etc.[25]
Despite the
above-mentioned efforts, it has become very difficult to restore trust between
the parties to the conflict, as the parties have repeatedly violated their
obligations and resumed armed attacks. In the early and mid-1990s, the
situation was less under control. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict marks a red
line in the first years of independence in the recent history of Georgia.
The EU is also an
objective player in Georgia, which can inform the whole world about what is
happening in the conflict regions, it does not have an additional mandate.
Conclusion
The
European Union is one of the most important organizations in the world, both
politically, economically and militarily. Recently, especially after the UK
withdrew from the union in a referendum, despite some Euroscepticism, the EU
remains a global player of growing global interest and interest in all political,
economic and cultural spheres of the world. Therefore, it is natural that the
interest and aspirations of the post-Soviet states, including Georgia, towards
the European Union are a precondition for the country's development and the
peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Conflicts in the post-Soviet space are a global challenge not only for the
EU but for the whole world, we have to face a great power that is not bound by
international standards and therefore it makes things very difficult. Russia's
goal is to maintain its influence in the area that was once called the Soviet
Union and is therefore constantly interested in conflict and unrest in the
region, because it is easy for it to maintain its influence in such conditions.
The success of EU policy depends on resolving the conflicts in Georgia,
the South Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU Country Strategy Paper
on Georgia states that the EU wants Georgia to develop as a politically stable
region in the South Caucasus. Georgia's peaceful conflict resolution
policy is linked to a comprehensive vision for the future, where the rights and
identities of all citizens and ethnic groups are protected and guaranteed by
the Georgian Constitution. Consequently, Georgia's democratic development,
stability, economic prosperity and the building of a European model state
remain key to Georgia in resolving conflicts.
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Apciauri K., Abkhaz War (1992-1993)
(in Georgian), Tbilisi 2003.
Asatiani T., et al., How to resolve
conflict (in Georgian), Tbilisi 2000.
Bakradze A., For Abkhazia, (in
Georgian) Tbilisi, 2002.
Fischer S., The European Union and
security in the Black Sea region after the Georgia crisis, “Southeast European
and Black Sea Studies”, vol.9(3) 2009, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14683850902934325
Georgia
& The European Union, http://eugeorgia.com/en/on-georgia/eu-georgia (access 1.03.2021).
European External Action Service,
European External Action Service, 2018
Gogolashvili K., EU Black Sea
Policy and Enlargement, Georgian Strategy and International Relations Research
Foundation, Tbilisi 2018.
Łyhny 1989 goda. 35 tysiacz za Abhazii (Лыхны 1989 года. З6 тысяч за свободу Абхазии),
https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/Abkhazia/20160318/1017585741.html (access 1.03.2021).
Jafarova E., EU Conflict Resolution
Policy Towards the South Caucasus, “The Quarterly Journal” Vol. 10 (3) 2011.
Jojua D., Abkhazia in 1938-2006:
Aspects of the Regional Historical Process, CCU, 2007
Jorbenadze R., Managing
political conflicts (in Georgian), Open Society Georgia Foundation Tbilisi
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König M., The Georgian-South
Ossetian Conflict, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the
University of Hamburg, Hamburg 2004.
Malashkhia Sh., Anatomy of
Conflict (in Georgian), Tbilisi 2011.
Nichol J., Russia-Georgia Conflict
in August 2008: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, “CRS Report for
Congress”, 3 March 2009.
Rapoport A., Game Theory as a
Theory of Conflict Resolution, Springer Science, Dordrecht 1974.
Shevardznadze E., God knows, I was
doing everything I could to avoid this terrible day, Republic of Georgia 1993.
Songhulahshvili A., South Ossetia
in Georgia ?!, (in Georgian) Tbilisi,
2009.
Towards
Security. Building Confidence, https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM (access 1.03.2021).
Rondeli, A., 2001. „The choice of
independent Georgia“. The security of the Caspian Sea region, pp.195-211.
Parliament of Georgia.
"Informative Notice on the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict". Office of the
Temporary Commission on Restoration of Territorial Integrity of the Parliament
of Georgia. Available: http://www.parliament.ge/uploads/other/18/18511.pdf.
https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM, 2008
[1] European
External Action Service, European External Action Service, 2018
[2] E. Jafarova, EU
Conflict Resolution Policy Towards the South Caucasus, “The Quarterly Journal”,
Vol. 10 (3) 2011, pp. 59-60
[3] A. Rapoport, Game
Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution,
Springer Science, Dordrecht 1974
[5] Towards
Security. Building Confidence, https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM (access
1.03.2021)
[6] Georgia & The European Union, http://eugeorgia.com/en/on-georgia/eu-georgia (access 1.03.2021)
[7] S. Fischer, The
European Union and security in the Black Sea region after the Georgia crisis,
“Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, Vol. 9(3) 2009
[9] K. Gogolashvili, EU
Black Sea Policy and Enlargement, Georgian Strategy and International Relations
Research Foundation, Tbilisi 2018
[10] R.
Jorbenadze, Managing political conflicts, Tbilisi: Open Society Georgia
Foundation (in Georgian) 2001
[11] T.
Asatiani, et al., How to resolve conflicts, (in Georgian) Tbilisi 2000.
[12] Łyhny
1989 goda. 35 tysiacz za Abhazii (Лыхны 1989 года. З6 тысяч за свободу Абхазии),
https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/Abkhazia/20160318/1017585741.html (access
1.03.2021)
[13] Sh. Malashkhia, Anatomy
of Conflict (in Georgian), Tbilisi 2011
[14] D. Jojua,
Abkhazia in 1938-2006: Aspects of the Regional Historical Process, CCU, 2007
[15] Sh. Malashkhia, Anatomy
of Conflict (in Georgian), Tbilisi, 2011
[16] K. Apciauri, Abkhaz War
(1992-1993),(in Georgian), Tbilisi 2003
[17] E. Shevardznadze, God
knows, I was doing everything I could to avoid this terrible day, Republic of
Georgia 1993.
[18] Agenda.ge, 14 Aug 2020 - 11:41, Tbilisi,Georgia,
https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/2537
[19] A.
Bakradze, For
Abkhazia
(in Georgian), Tbilisi 2002
[20] Parliament
of Georgia. "Informative Notice on the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict".
Office of the Temporary Commission on Restoration of Territorial Integrity of
the Parliament of Georgia. Available: http://www.parliament.ge/uploads/other/18/18511.pdf.
[21] M. König, The
Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Institute for Peace Research and Security
Policy at the University of Hamburg, Hamburg 2004
[22] Ibidem
[23] A. Songhulahshvili,
South Ossetia in Georgia ?! (in Georgian), Tbilsi 2009
[24] J. Nichol, Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008:
Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, “CRS Report for Congress”, 3
March 2009.
[25]https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GE%20RU_920624_AgreemenOnPrinciplesOfSettlementGeorgianOssetianConflict.pdf
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