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Russia’s aggressive policy and major threats on the way to strengthen Georgia’s state independence


 
Nika Chitadze

Director of the Center for International Studies of the International Black Sea University
Professor of the International Black Sea University







 








Meri Tseruashvili

Research Fellow of the Center for International Studies of the International Black Sea University













Introduction

Despite Russia's direct aggression in August 2008, as a result of which Kremlin occupied 20% of the territory of Georgia, official Moscow failed to achieve its ultimate goal to abolish de-facto Georgian statehood and change foreign policy course of official Tbilisi. Therefore, Russia still continues to pursue its imperialist policy towards Georgia. Consequently, it is still possible for Russia to use various levers to weaken Georgia's statehood in the short, medium- and long-term perspectives. There is a great danger from Russia to carry out possible provocations against Georgia and put appropriate pressure to its southern neighbor.

From Russia's side, Georgia may be threatened primarily by political, economic, military, information and energy threats, in particular:

The political and diplomatic threats: 

Russia will make every effort to convince various countries, especially developing ones, that Georgia had aggressive policy against Ossetian and Abkhaz people at various times. Therefore, in order to restore "historical justice", it’s necessary to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and so called “South Ossetia”.

The official Kremlin will continue to lobby the anti-Georgian policy in various international organizations. For instance, Russia will be particularly active within the framework of the UN General Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In addition, Russia will use its veto right to block the adoption of any pro-Georgian position within the OSCE and UN Security Council.

Moreover, Russia will continue its information war against Georgia by using Kremlin-controlled and foreign media sources to create negative image (for example, to mention about "genocide" against Ossetian and Abkhaz people) about Georgia in the whole world.
Within the scope of defamation of Georgia's international image, Moscow will try to portray Georgia as a patron of terrorists, which promotes terrorists’ activities in North Caucasus region.
One of the main goals of the Kremlin is to encourage certain anti-national political forces in Georgia (Russia calls them "healthy Georgian political forces"), including specific political parties, NGOs and mass media representatives in order to destabilize Georgia by organizing pro-Russian broadcasts and articles, as well as by demonstrations, provocations and other destructive actions. In this case, Russia will also try to use so called “Georgian communities” in Russia.

Various sociological surveys have shown that The Church of Georgia has the highest confidence among the population of Georgia. It is possible, that Russia will try to move different clergymen to its side and these people from their turn, while performing appropriate church rituals, will try to influence the visitors of the church and convince them in the positive effects of “Orthodox Christian Russia" for Georgia.

The Kremlin will never hesitate to make threatening political statements, as Russia aims to introduce fear and panic among Georgian people.

The economic threats

Nowadays, due to the fact that the volume of trade-economic turnover between Russia and Georgia is gradually increasing (For example, in the first seven months of 2019, exports of Georgian products to the Russian market increased by approximately 26%), there is a great danger that Georgia will become significantly dependent on its northern neighbor economically.
For comparison, it should be noted that if the trade turnover between the two countries amounted to approximately $ 260 million as of 2010, after opening of the Russian market for Georgian products (Primarily alcoholic and mineral drinks, agricultural products, etc.), the volume of trade turnover between Russia and Georgia exceeded $ 1 billion 200 million by 2019. At the same time, it should be mentioned that 60% of Georgian wine (about 50 million bottles) is sold on the Russian market. As a result, Russia is Georgia’s the second trading partner by 2019 while it was sixth in 2010. Consequently, as it was noted, Georgia's economic dependence on Russia is increasing, which increases Georgia's political dependence on Russia as well. This gives Russia the opportunity to permanently blackmail Georgia by threatening to close the Russian market, like as Putin did in July 2019.

In addition, the largest amount of remittances comes from Russia. For example, in 2018, 1 billion 579 million USD of remittances entered Georgia, among of which 457 million were transferred from Russia. According to various data, tens of thousands of families in Georgia benefit from remittances from Russia, which makes them loyal to this country.

It is worth to noting that in 2019 more than 9 million international travelers (mostly tourists) visited Georgia. The number of visitors from Russia was 1 million 463 thousand people. So, it means that Georgian Tourism Sector is still dependent on Russian tourists.

In addition, due to the fact that in 2019 the total amount of foreign investments in various sectors of the Georgian economy decreased by approximately 40%, Russia can take this opportunity and offer various Russian companies close to the Kremlin to invest in Georgia to purchase various strategic assets in the country.

The Kremlin will try to  intensify the negotiation process with Azerbaijan in order to increase oil and gas exports to Russia and at the same time to reduce energy exports to Georgia. Instead, Russia will offer Azerbaijan even more assistance in resolving the Karabakh conflict. By the Russian`s estimations, as a result, Georgia may face additional problems with energy security.  According to Kremlin position, It will also be possible that the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the "TANAP" project to be implemented in the future lose their significance. At the same time, official Baku will refuse from the Kremlin`s offer and will keep the close - strategic relations between Baku and Tbilisi.

Russia will also offer a bargain deal to Turkey in the framework of the energy project "Turkish Stream", which provides natural gas to Georgia`s southern neighbor at an affordable price and increases the volume of gas exports. By the estimations of Moscow, Turkey may lose interest to the "TANAP" (Trans Anatolian) and "TAP" (Trans Adriatic) projects being implemented with the participation of Georgia and the positions of Russia and Turkey may be brought closer to prevent US and NATO activation in the region. It is a high probability that Official Ankara, which actively supports the further integration of Georgia to NATO, will abstain from the offerings of the Russia`s side.

Russia will continue to blackmail Georgia (for example by threatening to close the Russian market) in order not to continue implementing the Anaklia Port Project in the future (At the present stage, the suspension of the project works in favor of Russia). As it is known, this port will be able to process about 40 million tons of cargo per year at the first stage, thus Georgian port will compete with Novorossiysk port on the Black Sea coast of Russia.

Military threats:

At present, the possibility of large-scale military aggression of Russia against Georgia is minimized, however, in order to weaken the statehood of this Caucasian country, Russia will try to continue the process of further "borderization". In the worst case, it is entirely possible that Russia will “establish a new border” under the pretext of “provoking” the Georgian side and finding “a new topographic map of the South Ossetian autonomous region of the Soviet period”. As a result, the Kremlin may block the central highway linking East and West Georgia. In this case, the Russian troops will not need to enter Tbilisi at all.

In addition, the so-called Russian military border guards will continue to abduct Georgian citizens under the pretext of "violating the state border of South Ossetia." In addition, in extreme cases, Russia will not refrain from bribing saboteurs in the territory controlled by Georgia, using gangs in the occupied territories and carrying out various types of subversive actions both on the transport infrastructure and on transmission lines, as well as on the Baku-Supsa, Baku-Oil pipeline Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. Subversive activities in energy sectors that are of strategic importance can trigger the energy crisis in Georgia. As mentioned earlier, Russia will try to use gangs in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as in the North Caucasus to pressure Georgia.

It should be noted that Russia can bribe various terrorist groups operating in the North Caucasus for terrorist and subversive actions and send them to Georgia along one (or several) of the 44 paths connecting Georgia and Russia (where there are no border points). ,

In the worst case, preventive strikes by Russian aircraft against Georgian military installations are not ruled out. Russia can explain this by saying that these facilities supply weapons to terrorist organizations operating in the North Caucasus, and so on.

The number of Russian occupation forces and illegal armed formations stationed in Abkhazia

It should also be noted that, according to data for 2017, the total number of Russian occupation forces deployed in Abkhazia is estimated at about 4,000 troops. The armament of the 7th military base includes 40 T-90A tanks, 120 BTR-80A armored vehicles; 18 self-propelled 2C3 "Acacia"; 12 grenade launchers 2S12 "Sani", 18 volley fire and rescue systems BM-21 "Grad", towing D-30, anti-aircraft missile defense system S-300.

According to various sources, in the illegal armed formations of the so-called "Republic of Abkhazia" there are from 2100 to 2200 people (total population 242 thousand people).
According to the statement of the de-facto regime of Abkhazia, the structure of the so-called "Armed Forces" is defined as "Central Command point", "Ground Forces", "Air Force" and "Naval Forces".

Armed formations are deployed in three "military districts": "Central" (Sukhumi), "Eastern" (Ochamchira) and "Western" (Bichvinta). The armament of the "ground forces" includes 50 T-55 tanks, 92 artillery and a grenade launcher, including 152-mm howitzers and SAM, 14 MLRS BM-21 grad, 96 armored vehicles.

The 4th Russian military base in Tskhinvali region

As of 2018, the total number of Russian occupation forces deployed in the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region is about 4000 personnel. The base is armed with 40 tanks T-72, 120 infantry fighting vehicles, 36 self-propelled 2C3 "Akacia", 12 grenade launchers 2C12 "Sani".

At the present stage, the most sophisticated armament is the Operational-Tactical Missile Complex "Tochka-U" and multiple rocket launcher systems division "Smerch". In addition, there is presumption that Russia has deployed anti-aircraft missile defense system S-300 in the occupied region, though the Russian Ministry of Defense denies it.

The "agreement" signed by the Russian and Ossetian sides on March 31, 2017, envisaged the unification of separate "military units" in the Russian Armed Forces. Accordingly, it can be said that the Tskhinvali region does not have its own armed formations.

 Russian military exercises as a method of psychological pressure on Georgia

One of the main goals of psychological pressure on Georgian and international democratic society is to conduct large-scale military exercises in the occupied regions and near the state border of Georgia. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the 58th Russian Army regularly conducts military exercises.

One of the examples is the military exercises from 3 to 5 February of 2020 in so called South Ossetia, Chechnya and Stavropol region with participation of approximately 3 000 military personnel.

However, the most notable fact is that, Russia used the Iskander Tactical Missile Operational Rocket for the first time near the Georgian territory as part of the exercises. The 49th and 58th Armies participated in the exercises as well. Apart from “Iskanders”, 500 units of combat techniques were used in the exercises, including Su-25 fighter aircraft, etc.

In addition, Russia used also for the first time the radio-electronic combat systems, which are usually used to “blind” missile defense systems during hostilities. These include communications, mobile connections, as well as operational links between combat units.
As for “Iskanders”, based on various data, one battery participated in the exercise, which included four Iskander missile launchers.

It is noteworthy that the SSC-8 / 9M729 missile flight distance exceeds 500 kilometers, so it means that, Russia violated the US-USSR Treaty of 1987 on the Elimination of Medium and Small-Scale Missiles. For the first time this happened back in 2018. As a result, the US and then Russia withdrew from the treaty, which ultimately contributed to the proliferation of armaments in the Black Sea region near Georgia.

Prediction of events' development: Pessimistic scenario

- Despite the fact there is a low chance of Russia’s direct large-scale aggression against Georgia, Russia will use different kinds of reasons (for example, in order "to prevent Georgia's aggression" against so-called South Ossetia) to gain control over Georgia’s main highway.

- Russia will do its best to continue subversive acts on Georgian infrastructure facilities in the future, primarily on power lines, railroads (Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway) and, in the worst case, on oil pipelines. As it is known, three days before the Russian-Georgian war, on August 5, 2008, a terrorist act was carried out on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. There was an explosion on the territory of Turkey, but it is most likely that the terrorist attack (The Kurdistan Labour Party took a responsibility for its implementation) was carried out with the direct intervention of the Russian special services. At the  same day, a special statement was made by de-facto Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh, who reiterated Abkhazia's readiness to carry out another terrorist attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The terrorist attacks on Georgia's transport and energy infrastructure will significantly reduce Georgia's image as a transit country.

- Russia will continue the information war against Georgia, in particular it will carry out cyber attacks, also accuse our country of protecting Chechen and other North Caucasian terrorists, etc. Russia will threaten Georgia with some economic sanctions. Also, it will increase military contingencies both in the occupied regions of Georgia and in the North Caucasus for the purpose of blackmail and psychological pressure. As a result, this will frighten foreign investors and hinder investments in the Georgian economy.

-Russia may conclude agreements with a number of European states on the supply of natural gas at reduced prices especially considering the fact that in 2018 Russia exported about 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Europe. This factor will increase the loyalty of European partners towards Russia and reduce interests towards Georgia;

 -  Offfiicial Kremlin will continue to blackmail Georgia by threatening to close the Russian market in order not to continue implementing the Anaklia Port Project in the future and reject project of the “Silk Road” (“one belt, one road”).

Optimistic scenario:

- The launch of the TANAP (capacity: About 16 to 32 billion cubic meters of natural gas) and TAP (10 billion cubic meters of natural gas in Europe) projects will increase Europe's interest to Georgia, so the EU will be increasingly interested in establishing stability in Georgia. Due to this fact, the EU agenda will further intensify peacekeeping operations in Georgia to minimize the threats coming from Russia.

- The same can be said about the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway project, which is expected to transport approximately 5 million at the first stage and 17 million tons of cargo at the second stage from Europe to Asia. Talking about transit role of Georgia, the same can be said about China’s “One belt, one road initiative” as well.

- With the decreasing the geopolitical influence of Russia, which can be caused because of increasing the volume of important of shale gas from USA to Europe, and natural gas from the Caspian Sea Region, Russia will be forced to allow the direct dialogue (at the first stage) between Georgian and Abkhazian, Georgian and Ossetian societies;

-If US deploys military facilities in the Black Sea region (specifically in Georgia), it will force Russia to stop provocative actions against Georgia (the US has already been increasing its military presence in the Black Sea region - in Bulgaria and Romania);

-The tension between Russia and Turkey over Syria, Libya and Crimea will hinder the cooperation between these two countries and will help to increase cooperation between Turkey and the West, including NATO. As a result, the North Atlantic Alliance will be activated in the Black Sea region.

Recommendations

Diplomatic Aspects

Georgia should maximize its diplomatic levers and persuade the West that solving the problems of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region should be as important as ongoing process in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, because Georgia, unlike Ukraine, is at greater risk of losing state sovereignty. In addition, due to Georgia's transit function, the West should be significantly interested in establishing stability on the territory of Georgia.

Georgia needs to convince the West that various kinds of economic sanctions should be imposed against Russia until the problems of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region are resolved. Falling world oil prices are important for the West as well as to reduce the dependence on Russian gas, which will significantly reduce Russia's budget revenues and hence its imperialistic ambitions.
It is necessary to continue the fight against Russia in the diplomatic arena. In particular, within the framework of the UN General Assembly, a resolution should be adopted annually (as in previous years) on the right of internally displaced persons to return to their homes in occupied territories of Georgia. Also, useful and important resolutions for Georgia should be adopted within the framework of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Georgia has significant legal levers in its relations with Russia. In particular, it is clear that Russia ignored various principles of international law regarding Georgia (and not only Georgia). Among them, the Kremlin ignored principles of “territorial integrity of the states”, “non-interference in the internal affairs of the states”, also according to the UN General Assembly Resolution "on aggression", adopted in 1974 etc. Russia implemented the direct aggression against Georgia in August 2008. Accordingly, the issue of the dispute between Georgia and Russia should be discussed at the UN International Court of Justice. Russia's refusal to refer the matter to the UN International Court of Justice will be another clear confirmation, that Georgia is right in relationship with Russia and before the population of the occupied regions of the country as well. 

Information sphere

Georgia should use its own information resources and mass media to convince Georgian people, as well as ethnic minorities, that European and Euro-Atlantic choice is the best solution for the country. 

It is necessary to activate various information levers and provide objective information to the residents of the occupied territories about the history of Georgia. They should know that there has never been any oppression of Abkhaz and Ossetian people and the representatives of these two nations have always felt safe on the territory of Georgia.

Economic sphere

Due to the fact that Georgia's GDP per Capita is about $ 4,000 and in Russia it is $ 17,000, at present, the population of the occupied region will be more Russia-oriented.
Therefore, by implementation of economic levers (for example: attracting foreign investments, using of tourism potential, using the  Georgia’s natural resources - primarily water etc.), Georgia with developed economy will be more attractive for Ossetians and Abkhaz people.

It is necessary to act within the framework of EU-Georgia Association Agreement and encourage the dissemination of Georgian products on the European market that will strengthen the cooperation between the state and business community. As a result, Georgia's economic and political dependence on Russia will be reduced.

Political sphere

In order to bring Georgia closer to the Western structures, democratic values must be spread in the country. The 2020 parliamentary elections can play an important role in this case. With the support of Georgia`s Western partners, the authority should take responsibility to hold the elections democratically and in case of defeat, transfer the power peacefully, whereas the opposition should take responsibility not to refer to any political retribution, and in case of losing the elections democratically, recognize the elections results.

Military sphere

Due to the fact that, at this stage, Georgia's integration process in NATO is delayed, the deployment of US military bases on the Georgian territory or, in some way, the increase of the US military presence in in the country, will significantly increase Georgia`s  defense capability.
Moreover, it is necessary for the Georgian Armed Forces to become even more involved in NATO-led exercises.

Georgia should raise the issue of changing the mandate of the EU monitors, both in terms of quantity and quality. In particular, the number of monitors should be increased from 300 to about 600 or more. Also, in order to protect Georgian citizens from abductions, EU monitors should be always deployed across with the occupation line.

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