Nika Chitadze
Director of the Center for International Studies of
the International Black Sea University
Professor of the International Black Sea University
Meri Tseruashvili
Introduction
Despite
Russia's direct aggression in August 2008, as a result of which Kremlin
occupied 20% of the territory of Georgia, official Moscow failed to achieve its
ultimate goal to abolish de-facto Georgian statehood and change foreign policy
course of official Tbilisi. Therefore, Russia still continues to pursue its
imperialist policy towards Georgia. Consequently, it is still possible for
Russia to use various levers to weaken Georgia's statehood in the short, medium-
and long-term perspectives. There is a great danger from Russia to carry out
possible provocations against Georgia and put appropriate pressure to its
southern neighbor.
From
Russia's side, Georgia may be threatened primarily by political, economic,
military, information and energy threats, in particular:
The
political and diplomatic threats:
Russia
will make every effort to convince various countries, especially developing
ones, that Georgia had aggressive policy against Ossetian and Abkhaz people at
various times. Therefore, in order to restore "historical justice",
it’s necessary to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and so called “South
Ossetia”.
The
official Kremlin will continue to lobby the anti-Georgian policy in various
international organizations. For instance, Russia will be particularly active
within the framework of the UN General Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe. In addition, Russia will use its veto right to block
the adoption of any pro-Georgian position within the OSCE and UN Security Council.
Moreover,
Russia will continue its information war against Georgia by using
Kremlin-controlled and foreign media sources to create negative image (for
example, to mention about "genocide" against Ossetian and Abkhaz
people) about Georgia in the whole world.
Within
the scope of defamation of Georgia's international image, Moscow will try to
portray Georgia as a patron of terrorists, which promotes terrorists’
activities in North Caucasus region.
One
of the main goals of the Kremlin is to encourage certain anti-national
political forces in Georgia (Russia calls them "healthy Georgian political
forces"), including specific political parties, NGOs and mass media
representatives in order to destabilize Georgia by organizing pro-Russian
broadcasts and articles, as well as by demonstrations, provocations and other
destructive actions. In this case, Russia will also try to use so called
“Georgian communities” in Russia.
Various
sociological surveys have shown that The Church of Georgia has the highest
confidence among the population of Georgia. It is possible, that Russia will
try to move different clergymen to its side and these people from their turn,
while performing appropriate church rituals, will try to influence the visitors
of the church and convince them in the positive effects of “Orthodox Christian
Russia" for Georgia.
The
Kremlin will never hesitate to make threatening political statements, as Russia
aims to introduce fear and panic among Georgian people.
The economic threats
Nowadays, due to the fact that
the volume of trade-economic turnover between Russia and Georgia is gradually
increasing (For example, in the first seven months of 2019, exports of Georgian
products to the Russian market increased by approximately 26%), there is a
great danger that Georgia will become significantly dependent on its northern
neighbor economically.
For comparison, it should be
noted that if the trade turnover between the two countries amounted to
approximately $ 260 million as of 2010, after opening of the Russian market for
Georgian products (Primarily alcoholic and mineral drinks, agricultural
products, etc.), the volume of trade turnover between Russia and Georgia
exceeded $ 1 billion 200 million by 2019. At the same time, it should be
mentioned that 60% of Georgian wine (about 50 million bottles) is sold on the
Russian market. As a result, Russia is Georgia’s the second trading partner by
2019 while it was sixth in 2010. Consequently, as it was noted, Georgia's
economic dependence on Russia is increasing, which increases Georgia's
political dependence on Russia as well. This gives Russia the opportunity to
permanently blackmail Georgia by threatening to close the Russian market, like
as Putin did in July 2019.
In addition, the largest amount
of remittances comes from Russia. For example, in 2018, 1 billion 579 million
USD of remittances entered Georgia, among of which 457 million were transferred
from Russia. According to various data, tens of thousands of families in
Georgia benefit from remittances from Russia, which makes them loyal to this
country.
It is worth to noting that in
2019 more than 9 million international travelers (mostly tourists) visited
Georgia. The number of visitors from Russia was 1 million 463 thousand people.
So, it means that Georgian Tourism Sector is still dependent on Russian
tourists.
In addition, due to the fact that
in 2019 the total amount of foreign investments in various sectors of the
Georgian economy decreased by approximately 40%, Russia can take this
opportunity and offer various Russian companies close to the Kremlin to invest
in Georgia to purchase various strategic assets in the country.
The Kremlin will try to intensify the negotiation process with
Azerbaijan in order to increase oil and gas exports to Russia and at the same
time to reduce energy exports to Georgia. Instead, Russia will offer Azerbaijan
even more assistance in resolving the Karabakh conflict. By the Russian`s
estimations, as a result, Georgia may face additional problems with energy
security. According to Kremlin position,
It will also be possible that the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the
"TANAP" project to be implemented in the future lose their significance.
At the same time, official Baku will refuse from the Kremlin`s offer and will
keep the close - strategic relations between Baku and Tbilisi.
Russia will also offer a bargain
deal to Turkey in the framework of the energy project "Turkish
Stream", which provides natural gas to Georgia`s southern neighbor at an
affordable price and increases the volume of gas exports. By the estimations of
Moscow, Turkey may lose interest to the "TANAP" (Trans Anatolian) and
"TAP" (Trans Adriatic) projects being implemented with the
participation of Georgia and the positions of Russia and Turkey may be brought
closer to prevent US and NATO activation in the region. It is a high
probability that Official Ankara, which actively supports the further
integration of Georgia to NATO, will abstain from the offerings of the Russia`s
side.
Russia will continue to blackmail
Georgia (for example by threatening to close the Russian market) in order not
to continue implementing the Anaklia Port Project in the future (At the present
stage, the suspension of the project works in favor of Russia). As it is known,
this port will be able to process about 40 million tons of cargo per year at
the first stage, thus Georgian port will compete with Novorossiysk port on the
Black Sea coast of Russia.
Military threats:
At present, the possibility of
large-scale military aggression of Russia against Georgia is minimized,
however, in order to weaken the statehood of this Caucasian country, Russia
will try to continue the process of further "borderization". In the
worst case, it is entirely possible that Russia will “establish a new border”
under the pretext of “provoking” the Georgian side and finding “a new
topographic map of the South Ossetian autonomous region of the Soviet period”.
As a result, the Kremlin may block the central highway linking East and West Georgia.
In this case, the Russian troops will not need to enter Tbilisi at all.
In addition, the so-called
Russian military border guards will continue to abduct Georgian citizens under
the pretext of "violating the state border of South Ossetia." In addition,
in extreme cases, Russia will not refrain from bribing saboteurs in the
territory controlled by Georgia, using gangs in the occupied territories and
carrying out various types of subversive actions both on the transport
infrastructure and on transmission lines, as well as on the Baku-Supsa,
Baku-Oil pipeline Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline.
Subversive activities in energy sectors that are of strategic importance can
trigger the energy crisis in Georgia. As mentioned earlier, Russia will try to
use gangs in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, as well as in the North
Caucasus to pressure Georgia.
It should be noted that Russia
can bribe various terrorist groups operating in the North Caucasus for
terrorist and subversive actions and send them to Georgia along one (or
several) of the 44 paths connecting Georgia and Russia (where there are no
border points). ,
In the worst case, preventive
strikes by Russian aircraft against Georgian military installations are not
ruled out. Russia can explain this by saying that these facilities supply
weapons to terrorist organizations operating in the North Caucasus, and so on.
The number of Russian
occupation forces and illegal armed formations stationed in Abkhazia
It should also be noted that, according
to data for 2017, the total number of Russian occupation forces deployed in
Abkhazia is estimated at about 4,000 troops. The armament of the 7th military
base includes 40 T-90A tanks, 120 BTR-80A armored vehicles; 18 self-propelled
2C3 "Acacia"; 12 grenade launchers 2S12 "Sani", 18 volley
fire and rescue systems BM-21 "Grad", towing D-30, anti-aircraft
missile defense system S-300.
According to various sources, in
the illegal armed formations of the so-called "Republic of Abkhazia"
there are from 2100 to 2200 people (total population 242 thousand people).
According to the statement of the
de-facto regime of Abkhazia, the structure of the so-called "Armed
Forces" is defined as "Central Command point", "Ground
Forces", "Air Force" and "Naval Forces".
Armed formations are deployed in
three "military districts": "Central" (Sukhumi),
"Eastern" (Ochamchira) and "Western" (Bichvinta). The
armament of the "ground forces" includes 50 T-55 tanks, 92 artillery
and a grenade launcher, including 152-mm howitzers and SAM, 14 MLRS BM-21 grad,
96 armored vehicles.
The 4th Russian military
base in Tskhinvali region
As of 2018, the total number of
Russian occupation forces deployed in the territory of the former South
Ossetian Autonomous Region is about 4000 personnel. The base is armed with 40
tanks T-72, 120 infantry fighting vehicles, 36 self-propelled 2C3
"Akacia", 12 grenade launchers 2C12 "Sani".
At the present stage, the most
sophisticated armament is the Operational-Tactical Missile Complex
"Tochka-U" and multiple rocket launcher systems division
"Smerch". In addition, there is presumption that Russia has deployed
anti-aircraft missile defense system S-300 in the occupied region, though the
Russian Ministry of Defense denies it.
The "agreement" signed
by the Russian and Ossetian sides on March 31, 2017, envisaged the unification
of separate "military units" in the Russian Armed Forces.
Accordingly, it can be said that the Tskhinvali region does not have its own
armed formations.
Russian military exercises as a method of
psychological pressure on Georgia
One of the main goals of
psychological pressure on Georgian and international democratic society is to
conduct large-scale military exercises in the occupied regions and near the state
border of Georgia. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the 58th Russian Army
regularly conducts military exercises.
One of the examples is the
military exercises from 3 to 5 February of 2020 in so called South Ossetia,
Chechnya and Stavropol region with participation of approximately 3 000
military personnel.
However, the most notable fact is
that, Russia used the Iskander Tactical Missile Operational Rocket for the
first time near the Georgian territory as part of the exercises. The 49th and
58th Armies participated in the exercises as well. Apart from “Iskanders”, 500
units of combat techniques were used in the exercises, including Su-25 fighter
aircraft, etc.
In addition, Russia used also for
the first time the radio-electronic combat systems, which are usually used to
“blind” missile defense systems during hostilities. These include
communications, mobile connections, as well as operational links between combat
units.
As for “Iskanders”, based on
various data, one battery participated in the exercise, which included four
Iskander missile launchers.
It is noteworthy that the SSC-8 /
9M729 missile flight distance exceeds 500 kilometers, so it means that, Russia
violated the US-USSR Treaty of 1987 on the Elimination of Medium and Small-Scale
Missiles. For the first time this happened back in 2018. As a result, the US
and then Russia withdrew from the treaty, which ultimately contributed to the
proliferation of armaments in the Black Sea region near Georgia.
Prediction of events' development:
Pessimistic scenario
- Despite the fact there is a low
chance of Russia’s direct large-scale aggression against Georgia, Russia will
use different kinds of reasons (for example, in order "to prevent
Georgia's aggression" against so-called South Ossetia) to gain control
over Georgia’s main highway.
- Russia will do its best to
continue subversive acts on Georgian infrastructure facilities in the future,
primarily on power lines, railroads (Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway)
and, in the worst case, on oil pipelines. As it is known, three days before the
Russian-Georgian war, on August 5, 2008, a terrorist act was carried out on the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. There was an explosion on the territory of
Turkey, but it is most likely that the terrorist attack (The Kurdistan Labour
Party took a responsibility for its implementation) was carried out with the
direct intervention of the Russian special services. At the same day, a special statement was made by
de-facto Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh, who reiterated Abkhazia's readiness to
carry out another terrorist attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The
terrorist attacks on Georgia's transport and energy infrastructure will
significantly reduce Georgia's image as a transit country.
- Russia will continue the information war against
Georgia, in particular it will carry out cyber attacks, also accuse our country
of protecting Chechen and other North Caucasian terrorists, etc. Russia will threaten Georgia with some economic
sanctions. Also, it will increase military contingencies both in the
occupied regions of Georgia and in the North Caucasus for the purpose of
blackmail and psychological pressure. As a result, this will frighten foreign
investors and hinder
investments in
the Georgian economy.
-Russia may conclude agreements
with a number of European states on the supply of natural gas at reduced prices
especially considering the fact that in 2018 Russia exported about 200 billion
cubic meters of natural gas to Europe. This factor will increase the loyalty of
European partners towards Russia and reduce interests towards Georgia;
- Offfiicial Kremlin will continue to blackmail
Georgia by threatening to close the Russian market in order not to continue
implementing the Anaklia Port Project in the future and reject project of the
“Silk Road” (“one belt, one road”).
Optimistic scenario:
- The launch of the TANAP
(capacity: About 16 to 32 billion cubic meters of natural gas) and TAP (10
billion cubic meters of natural gas in Europe) projects will increase Europe's
interest to Georgia, so the EU will be increasingly interested in establishing
stability in Georgia. Due to this fact, the EU agenda will further intensify
peacekeeping operations in Georgia to minimize the threats coming from Russia.
- The same can be said about the
Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway project, which is expected to transport
approximately 5 million at the first stage and 17 million tons of cargo at the
second stage from Europe to Asia. Talking about transit role of Georgia, the
same can be said about China’s “One belt, one road initiative” as well.
- With the decreasing the
geopolitical influence of Russia, which can be caused because of increasing the
volume of important of shale gas from USA to Europe, and natural gas from the
Caspian Sea Region, Russia will be forced to allow the direct dialogue (at the
first stage) between Georgian and Abkhazian, Georgian and Ossetian societies;
-If US deploys military
facilities in the Black Sea region (specifically in Georgia), it will force
Russia to stop provocative actions against Georgia (the US has already been
increasing its military presence in the Black Sea region - in Bulgaria and
Romania);
-The tension between Russia and
Turkey over Syria, Libya and Crimea will hinder the cooperation between these
two countries and will help to increase cooperation between Turkey and the
West, including NATO. As a result, the North Atlantic Alliance will be
activated in the Black Sea region.
Recommendations
Diplomatic Aspects
Georgia should maximize its
diplomatic levers and persuade the West that solving the problems of Abkhazia
and the Tskhinvali region should be as important as ongoing process in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine, because Georgia, unlike Ukraine, is at greater risk of
losing state sovereignty. In addition, due to Georgia's transit function, the
West should be significantly interested in establishing stability on the
territory of Georgia.
Georgia needs to convince the
West that various kinds of economic sanctions should be imposed against Russia
until the problems of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region are resolved. Falling world
oil prices are important for the West as well as to reduce the dependence on
Russian gas, which will significantly reduce Russia's budget revenues and hence
its imperialistic ambitions.
It is necessary to continue the
fight against Russia in the diplomatic arena. In particular, within the
framework of the UN General Assembly, a resolution should be adopted annually
(as in previous years) on the right of internally displaced persons to return
to their homes in occupied territories of Georgia. Also, useful and important
resolutions for Georgia should be adopted within the framework of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Georgia has significant legal
levers in its relations with Russia. In particular, it is clear that Russia
ignored various principles of international law regarding Georgia (and not only
Georgia). Among them, the Kremlin ignored principles of “territorial integrity
of the states”, “non-interference in the internal affairs of the states”, also
according to the UN General Assembly Resolution "on aggression",
adopted in 1974 etc. Russia implemented the direct aggression against Georgia
in August 2008. Accordingly, the issue of the dispute between Georgia and
Russia should be discussed at the UN International Court of Justice. Russia's
refusal to refer the matter to the UN International Court of Justice will be
another clear confirmation, that Georgia is right in relationship with Russia
and before the population of the occupied regions of the country as well.
Information sphere
Georgia should use its own
information resources and mass media to convince Georgian people, as well as
ethnic minorities, that European and Euro-Atlantic choice is the best solution
for the country.
It is necessary to activate
various information levers and provide objective information to the residents
of the occupied territories about the history of Georgia. They should know that
there has never been any oppression of Abkhaz and Ossetian people and the
representatives of these two nations have always felt safe on the territory of
Georgia.
Economic sphere
Due to the fact that Georgia's
GDP per Capita is about $ 4,000 and in Russia it is $ 17,000, at present, the
population of the occupied region will be more Russia-oriented.
Therefore, by implementation of
economic levers (for example: attracting foreign investments, using of tourism
potential, using the Georgia’s natural
resources - primarily water etc.), Georgia with developed economy will be more
attractive for Ossetians and Abkhaz people.
It is necessary to act within the
framework of EU-Georgia Association Agreement and encourage the dissemination
of Georgian products on the European market that will strengthen the
cooperation between the state and business community. As a result, Georgia's
economic and political dependence on Russia will be reduced.
Political sphere
In order to bring Georgia closer
to the Western structures, democratic values must be spread in the country. The
2020 parliamentary elections can play an important role in this case. With the
support of Georgia`s Western partners, the authority should take responsibility
to hold the elections democratically and in case of defeat, transfer the power
peacefully, whereas the opposition should take responsibility not to refer to
any political retribution, and in case of losing the elections democratically,
recognize the elections results.
Military sphere
Due to the fact that, at this
stage, Georgia's integration process in NATO is delayed, the deployment of US
military bases on the Georgian territory or, in some way, the increase of the
US military presence in in the country, will significantly increase
Georgia`s defense capability.
Moreover, it is necessary for the
Georgian Armed Forces to become even more involved in NATO-led exercises.
Georgia should raise the issue of
changing the mandate of the EU monitors, both in terms of quantity and quality.
In particular, the number of monitors should be increased from 300 to about 600
or more. Also, in order to protect Georgian citizens from abductions, EU
monitors should be always deployed across with the occupation line.
Comments
Post a Comment